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Abstract 
Exemplified by fire crews, SWAT teams, and emergency surgical units, critical 
teams are a subset of action teams whose work is marked by finality, pressure, and 
potentially fatal outcomes (Ishak & Ballard, 2012). Using communicative and temporal 
lenses, this study investigates how organizations prime and prepare their embedded 
critical teams to deal with improvisation. 
This study explicates how organizations both encourage and discourage 
improvisation for their embedded critical teams. Throughout the training process, 
organizations implement a structured yet flexible “roadmap”-type approach to critical 
team work, an approach that is encapsulated through three training goals. The first goal is 
to make events routine to members. The second goal is to help members deal with non-
routine events. The third goal is to help members understand how to differentiate between 
what is routine and non-routine.  
 vii 
The grounded theory analysis in this study also surfaced three tools that are used 
within the parameters of the roadmap approach: experience, communicative decision 
making, and sensemaking. Using Dewey’s (1939, 1958) theory of experience, I introduce 
a middle-range adapted theory of critical team experience. In this theory, experience and 
sensemaking are synthesized through communicative decision making to produce 
decisions, actions, and outcomes in time-limited, specialized, stressful environments. 
Critical teams have unique temporal patterns that must be considered in any study 
of their work. Partially based on the nested phase model (Ishak & Ballard, 2012), I also 
identify three phases of critical team process as critical-interactive, meaning that they are 
specific to action/critical teams, and they are engaged in by critical teams for the 
expressed purpose of interaction. These phases are simulation, adaptation, and debriefing.  
These tools and phases are then placed in the Critical-Action-Response Training 
Outcomes Grid (CARTOG) to create nine interactions that are useful in implementing a 
structured yet flexible approach to improvisation in the work of critical teams. 
Data collection consisted of field observations, semi-structured interviews, and 
impromptu interviews at work sites. In total, I engaged in 55 hours of field observations 
at 10 sites. I conducted 31 semi-structured interviews with members of wildland and 
urban fire crews; emergency medical teams; and tactical teams, including SWAT teams 
and a bomb squad. I also offer practical implications and future directions for research on 
the temporal and communicative aspects of critical teams, their parent organizations, and 
considerations of improvisation in their work.  
 viii 
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CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION 
There are particular teams for which dealing with unpredictability is a part of life.  
Made up of highly skilled members and tasked with time-sensitive performance events, 
action teams deal with novel circumstances on a daily basis (Sundstrom, 1999).  The 
organizations that house them (e.g., fire departments, military branches) may provide 
structure and support to reduce the need to improvise in the face of non-routine events.  
For example, part of military training involves simulation of wartime activities so that 
personnel will have experienced as many common scenarios as possible before going to 
battle. Despite the criticality of these teams in our society, they have been vastly 
understudied. 
Action Teams 
Studies of action teams make up a very small percentage of the scholarly 
literature on groups.  Sundstrom and colleagues (2000) examined 90 group studies from 
the 1980s and 1990s that met the following requirements: teams were 1) labeled as teams 
and 2) worked for pay; and researchers 3) treated groups as the unit of study and 4) 
measured group effectiveness (they did not include sports teams or student groups).  Of 
the 90 studies, only 9 focused on action teams.  Their research sites included military 
units (Eden, 1990; Tziner, 1988; Tziner & Eden, 1985; Tziner & Vardi, 1982), police 
teams (Brewer et al., 1994), hospital emergency units (Argote, 1982, 1989), firefighter 
teams (Wekselberg et al., 1997), string quartets (Murnighan & Conlon, 1991), and live 
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TV production crews (Carter & West, 1998).  Given that action teams are often important 
components of society (e.g., firefighting, law enforcement, military), it would stand to 
reason that they should receive more attention from communication researchers going 
forward. 
For the same reasons that certain teams have been studied in the field of group 
research, action teams have not received attention.  Unlike those in the service industry, 
many action teams perform work that is highly guarded (e.g., military units), private (e.g., 
surgical teams), or dangerous (e.g., police squads and fire crews).  Unlike management, 
action teams perform heavy physical work that sometimes occurs over large spaces (e.g., 
spill containment teams), which makes fieldwork difficult.  And unlike production units, 
action teams do not have easily understood inputs, processes, and outcomes.  In fact, 
action teams are defined by their inherent complexity.  There are three components of 
action teams that add to their distinctiveness.  First, they conduct time-limited 
engagements in front of audiences or against human and non-human adversaries 
(Sundstrom, 1999).  Second, they are composed of highly skilled members who have 
specialized individual tasks and complementary roles (Mathieu & Day, 1997; Ziegert, 
Klein, & Xiao, 2001).  Third, their life cycle is composed of two interrelated concepts: 
taskwork and team process (Marks, Mathieu, & Zaccaro, 2001).  Taskwork is what teams 
do, including interaction with tasks, tools, and systems (Bowers, Braun, & Morgan, 
1997); team process is how teams do things, involving interdependent events—such as 
communication and coordination—that convert inputs to outcome.  Team process is used 
to direct taskwork, meaning that action teams cannot complete crucial tasks without 
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effective communication.  While the distinction between taskwork and team process can 
become blurry, the importance of interaction is not; for example, practices such as 
emergency medicine are mainly communicative activities (Eisenberg et al., 2005). Team 
process also includes interactions that span team boundaries (Cohen & Bailey, 1997), 
incorporating communication with other members of the larger organization.   
 Action teams are important to the larger field of organizational communication 
because most are highly integrated into organizations of societal consequence.  For 
example, surgical units cannot exist without the larger system of a hospital.  A hospital 
can technically exist without a surgical unit, but the goals of the hospital (e.g., saving 
lives, profit) would benefit from the inclusion of such teams.  Most group research has 
not examined links between team performance and systems in which they are embedded 
(Joshi & Roh, 2009; Levine & Moreland, 1990).  This is especially troubling when 
examining action teams because they are highly integrated into organizations.  Because 
they conduct brief but complicated performances, the proficiency of action teams is 
dependent on prolonged training (Ellis et al., 2005; Sundstrom, 1999; Sundstrom & 
Altman, 1989), which is often structured and funded by the organization.  And because 
they use scarce and highly developed expertise, they need a great deal of support from the 
rest of the organization for critical tasks.  For example, hospital workers perform 
particular necessary tasks before surgery, such as cleaning and organization of tools, 
because a skilled surgical unit must focus their time and mental energy on specialized 
activities.  
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There are consequences of embeddedness for the team and organization (Ellis et 
al., 2005; Guzzo & Dickson, 1996; Joshi & Roh, 2009).  First, the performance of the 
team is tied to that of the larger system.  Second, changes that occur in one social entity 
will affect the other.  Third, it becomes more difficult to understand cause and effect in 
either unit, as interventions made at one level have an effect at other levels.  Guzzo and 
Dickson (1996) make a plea for research on teams and change in organizational systems 
even in the face of heightened complexity.  Certainly any study of action teams will 
involve a level of difficulty, but such difficulties are outweighed by the benefits of being 
able to study concepts relevant to organizational communication at a different yet crucial 
unit of analysis.  Below are three concepts that must be taken into account in any study of 
action teams. 
Time.  Action teams have a unique relationship with time in that they must 
perform activities in an externally paced temporal structure.  For example, firefighters 
cannot choose when a fire needs extinguishing, nor can an emergency medical team put 
off dealing with an outbreak of a virus. Even in teams that control the start of an event, 
such as an orchestra, the tempo of the song then paces their work.  More importantly, the 
work of action teams is characterized by finality.  If a firefighting unit does not put out a 
fire appropriately and casualties occur, they cannot “redo” the activity later.  Even in less 
consequential action settings, such as sports, performance events are still final.  Because 
of external pacing, finality, and deadlines, action teams develop communicative practices 
that prioritize efficiency and specialization, discussed below. 
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Communication. In the face of deadlines, action teams develop communicative 
practices anchored in efficiency and specialization.  For example, pilots have their own 
language of short phrases and terms to signify elaborate concepts (Kanki & Smith, 2001).  
Pilots also have interaction patterns that are unique to their field.  Time pressures have 
created a variety of “distinct, sophisticated and recognizable interaction” among action 
teams (McKinney et al., 2005, p.215).  Because action teams use team process to direct 
taskwork, their interactions are just as crucial as their activities.  Many teams that deal in 
life-or-death work (e.g., surgical units) must communicate seamlessly to be effective.  
Eisenberg and colleagues (2005) posit that emergency medicine is mainly a 
communicative activity; indeed, many mistakes in medicine are linked to communication 
procedures and are easily preventable (Aggarwal et al., 2004; Cicourel, 2004; Leape, 
Lawthers, Brennan, & Johnson, 1993; Lingard et al., 2004, 2005; Salas et al., 2008).  
NASA found that 70 percent of errors in aviation were due to human factors, including 
poor communication (Helmreich, Merritt, & Wilhelm, 1999).  Even those practicing in 
the field agree on the importance of good communication practices in the face of time-
constraints; 80 percent of medical professionals point to pre- and post-operative 
discussions as key components of teamwork and safety (Aggarwal et al., 2004).  A study 
of flight crews found that pilots believe communication skills to be as important as flight 
skills to technical safety (Tajima, 2004).  Certainly, action teams offer a critical setting in 
which to study the communicative processes of groups and organizations. 
Complexity.  Action teams are complex by nature.  They have high levels of 
integration and differentiation, which creates intricate negotiations at the group-
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organization boundary.  There is often a high level of turnover among action teams 
(Klein, Ziegert, Knight, & Yan, 2006), requiring constant incorporation of new group 
members.  Their processes generally involve uncertain inputs and lead to unpredictable 
outcomes.  Demands such as time, decision-making, and stress lead to heightened 
confusion among members (Marks et al., 2001).  In addition, they often have to 
improvise in the face of unpredictable environments.   
 In addition to studies of time, communication, and complexity, research on action 
teams could reveal findings on team-organization relationships.  The relationship 
between the team and organization is critical because the team is enacting at least a 
portion of organization’s goal(s) and the organization provides a context in which to 
achieve them.  Organizational context is defined as the inputs provided (or not provided) 
to the team—both intentionally and inadvertent—that affect their process and outcome.  
More specifically, it is the rewards, information, education, and material resources at the 
team’s disposal (Hackman, 1987; Wageman, Gardner, & Mortensen, 2012).  
Conceptually, context included only a few inputs in the 1970s but later broadened as 
more factors were discovered in practice (Ketchum, 1984).   
Many aspects of organizational context impact the effectiveness of work teams 
(Doolen, 2006; Doolen, Hacker, & Van Aken 2003; Gladstein, 1984; Sundstrom et al., 
1990, based on a study by Cummings and Molloy, 1977). One aspect is organizational 
culture, enacted by collective artifacts, values, norms, and assumptions (Keyton, 2011; 
Rousseau & Cooke, 1988).  High-performing teams are usually influenced by an 
organizational culture that values principles such as superior quality and service, attention 
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to detail, and support of innovation (Dyer & Dyer, 2010; Peters & Waterman, 1982).  
Another aspect is task design and technology.  While tasks differ from team to team, the 
importance of a task-focused process is widely supported by small group researchers 
(Arrow et al., 2000; Guzzo & Dickson, 1996; McGrath, 1984).  Organizations must 
engage teams tasks such that expected processes fit the team type.  For example, teams 
with unpredictable inputs and outcomes—a descriptor that fits many action teams—may 
perform best with decentralized communication (Tushman, 1979; Tushman, Lakhani, & 
Lifshitz-Assaf, 2012) and flexible coordination (Argote, 1982; Stachowski, Kaplan, & 
Waller, 2009; Susman, 1970).   
Therefore, organizations must consider a team’s integration and differentiation 
needs when determining the appropriate type of support and control given to the work 
group.  Groups often negotiate interdependence with organizations because they function 
most effectively when inputs from the organization fit the team’s demands (Anand, 
Clark, & Zellmer-Bruhn, 2003; Sundstrom & Altman, 1989).  First, organizations must 
be aware of the level of group integration.  Integration refers to the communication, 
coordination, and centralized control occurring among the organization and embedded 
group (Katz & Kahn, 1978; Kozlowski & Ilgen, 2006; Sundstrom & Altman, 1989).  It 
involves temporal issues such as external pacing and synchronization. Variation on this 
measure has been described as tightly coupled versus loosely coupled (Kozlowski & 
Ilgen, 2006; Weick, 1982) or as autonomy versus centralization of control (McGrath and 
Kelly, 1992).  Organizations must also consider differentiation between group members 
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and nonmembers.  Differentiation is defined as group specialization and independence 
(Humphrey, Morgeson, & Mannor, 2009; Sundstrom and Altman, 1989).     
It is difficult for a group to be highly integrated with and differentiated from an 
organization at the same time, but this is the case for action teams.  Sundstrom and 
Altman (1989) proposed a typology of teams based on levels of integration and 
differentiation in which most types of groups are either high on one measure or the other; 
the relationship between integration and differentiation is strongly inverse because of the 
complexities involved in achieving both concomitantly (Anand et al., 2003; Lawrence 
and Lorsch, 1969; Sundstrom & Altman, 1989).  If a group is high in both measures, it 
would be constantly engaged in negotiations of control with the organization: 
organizations would want more control because of high integration needs, while the 
group would want autonomy due to specialization. For example, a military bomb squad 
has unique procedures they must enact to increase probability for success; at the same 
time, the larger military system would want to standardize procedures so their training, 
equipment, and strategy can be integrated with all squads under their control.  Such teams 
must deal with complexity created by negotiations of control between the group and 
organization.  The only team type that Sundstrom and Altman (1989) categorize as 
having high levels of both integration and differentiation are action teams.  Thus, the 
interactions between action teams and their support organizations are both highly 
dynamic and ripe for research on the relationship between organizations and teams.   
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Team Improvisation 
One interesting facet of the team-organization relationship is the approach to 
improvisation, which is heavily dependent on interactions that occur long before 
decisions are made. Because organizations are often responsible for training, personnel, 
and culture, decisions made in the heat of the moment by team members are influenced 
by input variables provided by the organization in preparation for actual performance 
events. In other words, the success of any team is dependent on the organization. 
Manager-led work teams, for example, require that the manager or organization monitor, 
design, and determine structure while teams perform tasks (Hackman, 1987; Stone, 
2010).  Organizations should also provide ongoing assistance, such as creating 
opportunities for the group to renegotiate design and context.  The team relies on the 
organization for many of its inputs, and the organization should provide them because 
teams are crucial to their missions.  This symbiotic relationship is no more apparent than 
in the study of improvisation for action teams.  
The dilemma of improvisation is faced by many high-risk organizations.  If they 
provide too much structure and experience for their teams, improvisation may occur less 
than it should.  If they create culture and communication systems that are overly 
supportive of improvisation, teams may ad-lib too often.  This is not to say that structure 
and support for improvisation are diametrically opposed; rather, they are orthogonal 
dimensions that organizations have to balance in training and support provided to teams.  
It is important to understand that teams may be forced to act independent from their 
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parent organizations at times, so they must take particular issues into account well before 
teams engage in performance events.  And while it may seem that action teams comprise 
only a small percentage of all group types, their specialization implies “non-normal 
organizational performance situations” which are important to mainstream organizational 
theory (Whetten & Cameron, 1994, p. 136).  Improvisation is a variable that should be 
considered at the earliest stages of team training in organizations. 
There are particular issues that should be addressed in future research of 
improvisation in organizational communication.  First, our understanding of 
improvisation will be more robust if we know how members of teams and organizations 
talk about improvising.  It is likely that some teams accept it as a part of their work and 
talk about it regularly, while other teams avoid it completely.  Second, as we recognize 
that action teams have unique communication patterns, we should examine how 
particular interactions during performance events might initiate or preclude 
improvisation.  For example, there may be interactions or schemas that organizations 
instill in their members to remind them of their structure.  Third, we should strive to 
incorporate fieldwork into research on action teams.  Even though access can be difficult, 
action teams are unique because of the real-life pressures they face on a day-to-day basis, 
something that cannot be captured in a laboratory.  
Rationale 
The study of action teams would answer a plea by group communication scholars 
to study teams with real consequences.  Specifically, action teams also offer a rich setting 
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in which to study bona fide groups, or those that have stable yet permeable boundaries 
and interdependence with context (Frey, 2003; Putnam & Stohl, 1990).  Action teams 
have stable yet permeable boundaries because membership is clearly defined but can be 
changed, and interdependence with context is a critical component of action teams 
because they almost exclusively exist within a larger support organization.  This is of 
value to organizational and group communication scholars because studying groups in 
context eliminates the errors that occur from studying groups in a vacuum (Farris, 1981; 
Frey, 2003). 
Any study of bona fide teams is a study of organizations.  To attempt an 
understanding of teams without organizational context would be the same as trying to 
understand members without an organization (“then what are they members of?”) or an 
organization without members (“then what is the organization made of?”).  In this way, 
an organization’s relationship to its teams is very similar to its relationship with the 
people that comprise it.  Teams are like members but larger and more complex.  In turn, 
the organization is often the implied variable in team communication research.  This is 
especially true with action teams because they are highly integrated within the 
organization (Klein et al., 2006; Sundstrom and Altman, 1989).   
Putnam and Stohl (1990) lay out three requirements for group research, all of 
which are met by the study of action teams.  First, group research should involve the 
emotional intensity and stress associated with real groups.  Because action teams always 
have something at stake (e.g. human lives, team victories), they cannot exist without 
emotions and stress.  Second, groups should have temporal structures that resemble real 
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life spans.  Action teams always conduct time-limited engagements (work) that occur in 
an authentic group life span (time), a relationship that mediates communication of the 
team (Ballard & Seibold, 2000, 2003).  Third, group research should cover a variety of 
team types.  There are many different kinds of action teams.  Ishak and Ballard (2012) 
detail three subsets of action teams with a multitude of differentiating factors.  A study 
that focuses solely on action teams can still provide a robust variety of team types on 
which to focus.   
 The conceptualization of action teams at the group level is valuable because it 
falls into a Goldilocks-type window between organizations and individuals.  Poole (1998) 
argues that the majority of studies that use the organization as the unit of analysis treat 
them as “giant individuals, much more as micro theories focus on individual human 
organisms” (p. 96).  This perspective pushes the role of human interaction into the 
background.  Thus, Poole says that small groups should be the fundamental unit of 
analysis for communication studies.  It has also been argued that the organization is 
meaningless as a unit of analysis (Wiley, 1988); instead it may be more appropriate to 
focus on the intersubjective (dyads), generic subjective (roles), and extrasubjective 
conceptions (meaning that does not belong to an individual), such as organizational 
routines (Pentland & Feldman, 2005). Some prominent organizational researchers agree 
with the crux of Poole and Wiley’s arguments.  For example, Weick and colleagues 
(2008) allow that research on high-reliability organizations (HROs) does not have to 
occur at the organizational level of analysis.  Instead, they feel that systems make up the 
appropriate analytical unit.  Systems are defined any type of interrelated set of elements, 
 13 
methods, structures, or arrangements, and they can be larger or smaller than 
organizations.  Larger units are useful to study because errors that lead to bad 
consequences often involve multiple members embedded in larger systems (Woods, 
Johannesen, Cook, & Sorter, 1993).  Smaller units, such as teams, can be the appropriate 
level of analysis because teams often contain the risk handlers of the organization, 
performing manual work and interpreting actions (Perrin, 1995).  One example of a 
suitable approach is Vaughan’s (1996) analysis of the Challenger disaster.  Although 
Vaughan unitizes both dyads and larger NASA systems, her study works well because 
she maintains a focus on process.  This is effective because processes that are 
fundamental for dyadic relationships are embedded in all communicative relationships 
that matter (Weick et al., 2008).  A logical extension of this argument is that fundamental 
group processes are crucial to larger organizations.  Consequently, a focus on teams can 
serve as a fresh perspective on vital concepts in organizational communication research. 
 Much like the broader categories of organizations, work groups, and action teams, 
a study on a crucial subset of action teams—critical teams—would offer unique settings 
for research on particular organizational communication principles.  Critical teams are 
those that operate in life-and-death situations within complex systems that necessitate a 
high degree of coordination.  Examples include fire crews, military units, and S.W.A.T. 
teams.  Indeed, critical teams are embedded in teams and action teams but present 
opportunities to explore meaningful concepts that are not available in those wider 
categories.  Management scholars might study work groups as a way to synthesize 
effectiveness, cohesion, organizational context, and the dual concepts of integration and 
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differentiation.  More specifically, researchers on action teams will find a setting rich 
with data on time, complexity, and crucial communicative practices.   
Organizations cannot be studied without accounting for the systems that comprise 
its structure, and teams exist to serve the function of the organization.  Processes that are 
fundamental for dyadic relationships are embedded in all communicative relationships 
that matter (Weick et al., 2008).  In other words, what we learn from interpersonal 
relationships can be applied to organizational communication.  A logical extension of this 
argument is that the study of group communication has ramifications on the organization 
as well.  Research on teams has multiple potential contributions to organizational 
research, including better comprehension of effectiveness, organizational context, and 
integration/differentiation.   In addition, research on action teams will help strengthen our 
understanding of improvisation and improvised communication, concepts that are vital 
for the advancement of organizational communication research. This manuscript 
spotlights action teams and their support organizations to contextualize research on 
improvisation and improvised communication.   
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CHAPTER 2 – LITERATURE REVIEW 
The purpose of this chapter is to review multiple bodies of literature that form the 
background for the present study.  In particular, the topics of improvisation, time, and 
communication are explored within the context of action teams. I begin with an overview 
of team-organizational context, focusing on the effects of inputs from the organization on 
team outputs.  Next, I review critical teams—a subset of action teams—and compare 
them to the management perspective on high-reliability organizations (HROs).  This 
leads to an examination of the phases of unique timing of action teams.  Then. I review a 
component of the unique timing of action teams: the role of improvisation in their work. 
Finally, I identify several research questions that serve as the basis of my empirical 
investigation. 
Teams and Organizational Context 
What do we call a set of individuals who work interdependently in a hierarchy to 
create goods or provide services: a team or an organization?  It might be presumed that 
objects of study must be one or the other, but this is a false dichotomy.  It has been 
argued that an organization is defined by the existence of five critical features: social 
collectivity, goals, coordination, structure, and embeddedness (Miller, 2011).  This 
definition fits many teams and organizations interchangeably.  In a study of the Mann 
Gulch disaster, Weick (1993) argues that a high-risk type of wildland firefighting team 
was also an organization because it had an interlocking set of routines—habitual patterns 
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that involve the same people and activities in the same times and places (Westley, 
1990)—and it fit Mintzberg’s (1983) five criteria for a simple organizational structure: 
coordination by direct supervision, top-down strategy, minimal formalized behavior, 
organic structure, and plans formed by leader institution.  According to Weick, the same 
system can be considered a team or an organization.  As a result of such conceptual 
flexibility, teams have a place in organizational communication even before an 
explication of the potential contributions of team research. 
Here I will synthesize many scholarly conceptualizations into three characteristics 
that make up the basic definition of a team.  First, they are interdependent because the 
tasks they perform demand such a setup (Guzzo & Dickson, 1996; Campion, Medsker, & 
Higgs, 1993; Offermann & Spiros, 2001). This interdepence should be structural, 
meaning the design of the work itself requires the interaction of a group of people 
(Wageman, et al., 2012).  Teams also have formal, shared responsibility for one or more 
outcomes (Sundstrom & Altman, 1989).  Lastly, they are embedded within a larger social 
system that is affected by said outcomes (Hackman, 1987; Hackman, 2012; Guzzo & 
Dickson, 1996, Sundstrom & Altman, 1989).  Often, the larger social system is an 
organization with which the team has a symbiotic relationship. 
Organizational Context and Effectiveness 
 It can be argued that most team studies have the implicit or explicit goal of 
understanding what makes teams more effective, since the goal of working in teams is to 
increase effectiveness at a given task.  However, team effectiveness is a complex, multi-
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dimensional construct (Maynard et al., 2012; Wageman et al., 2012). The minimal 
definition of effectiveness comes from Guzzo and Shea (1987): “the production of 
designated products or services per specification” (p. 329).  This denotes a binary 
perspective on effectiveness: a team’s output is either satisfactory or unsatisfactory.  
However, issues like lasting conflict and dissatisfaction with process can lead to burnout, 
leaving members unwilling to work on subsequent projects (Apker, Propp, & Zabava 
Ford, 2009; Hackman & Oldham, 1980).  Therefore, it has been posited that a team must 
achieve both performance and viability (Maynard et al., 2012; Sundstrom et al., 1990; 
Wageman et al., 2012).  Groups must also strive for member satisfaction, participation 
and a willingness to work together to consider their efforts effective. Building on the 
classic definition from Hackman (1987), Wageman and colleagues (2012) define the 
measurement of effectiveness as client satisfaction, team viability, and member growth 
and fulfillment.  From a temporal perspective, teams must balance effectiveness now 
(e.g., how are we performing?) and effectiveness later (e.g., does our process have long-
term viability?).  For example, a doctor will leave at the end of her shift, even if handing 
off patient responsibility results in decreased effectiveness (Eisenberg et al., 2005).  A 
doctor will do so because she needs regular time off to be effective in the long term. 
Team effectiveness is dependent on the sustainability of performance.  
 Many of the inputs for group effectiveness explicated by researchers are not under 
total control of the team, a fact that calls attention to the importance of the organization.  
For example, Sundstrom and colleagues (2000) argue that two types of processes have an 
effect on group performance.  One is intragroup process, defined as the communication, 
 18 
coordination, conflict and collaboration within the team.  The second type is external 
group process, which includes communication and collaboration with non-members and 
integration with the larger organization.  Other factors that involve the organization 
include group composition, work design, and synergy (Hackman, 1987; Sundstrom et al., 
2000).  While these variables may be viewed as encapsulated by the group, it is important 
to remember that the organization has influence on member choice, task structure, and 
group norms (Hackman, 1987, Stone, 2010).  Studies of effectiveness are more accurate 
if they account for organizational context, which affects and is affected by the team-
organization relationship. 
Researchers have previously argued that organizational context has an effect on 
group performance (Sundstrom et al., 2000).  Hackman (1977, 1987) was one of the first 
social scientists to call for the inclusion of organizational context into studies of 
effectiveness.  In doing so, he introduced new requirements for the study of effectiveness 
as well as requirements for group process.  According to Hackman, studies of 
effectiveness must examine 1) intact social systems, not including social groups, advice 
groups, or coaching groups (because they have individual tasks). Groups of interest must 
have 2) boundaries and differentiated roles and 3) more than one task to perform.  Lastly, 
they must 4) operate in an organizational context.  This last requirement is also an 
important factor for determining the effectiveness of group process, as it has been argued 
that effectiveness should be defined by the system, not the researcher (Hackman, 1987.  
Freestanding groups (those not housed in an organization) are not of value in the study of 
performance because effects on the larger system cannot be measured.  A model that 
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attempts to bridge the gap between understanding and improving effectiveness must only 
measure and predict the actions of intact social systems embedded in organizations—in 
other words, “real groups” (Hackman, 1987, p. 322).  Otherwise, the researcher denies 
the consequences of organizational context on team effectiveness. 
Critical Teams 
Critical teams have received more focus from group scholars than other types of 
action teams, which is deserved given the high-risk nature of their work.  Critical teams 
are so named because they generally deal in life-or-death outcomes (Ishak & Ballard, 
2012) and they work in situations where “ineffective performance can have disastrous 
consequences” (Cannon-Bowers et al., 2001, p. 221). Multiple components of the 
definition of critical describe the category: teams of this type are 1) urgently needed, 2) 
societally necessary, and 3) marked by attention to errors and flaws.  Their success is 
measured both competitively (i.e., they are trying to beat an adversary) and perfectively 
(i.e. success is on a spectrum).  This is important to the process of critical teams because 
it adds complexity to already intricate situations.  With such measures of performance, 
critical teams will be faced with the following question from time to time: do we try to 
win “harder”, or do we satisfy ourselves with being barely victorious?  The significance 
of this question may be clearer when considered in the framework of the military, where 
leaders often have to make decisions that place winning a battle (competition) and 
limiting casualties (perfection) on opposing ends of a decision-making scale. 
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Most of the research on critical teams has come from organizational behavior and 
management (although not labeled as such), with additional work done in communication 
and military psychology.  There are a limited number of communication-based studies of 
critical teams, generally focusing on wildland firefighters (Larson, 2003) and emergency 
medical teams (Eisenberg et al., 2005; McKinney et al., 2005) Studies in military 
psychology have examined the links between team effectiveness and various inputs, all in 
a laboratory setting (Bowers, Baker, & Salas, 1994; Halfhill, Neilsen, Sundstrom, & 
Weilbaecher, 2005; Stout, Salas, & Carson, 1994; Urban, Bowers, Monday & Morgan, 
Jr., 1995; Halfhill, Neilsen, and Sundstrom, 2008).  Additional studies, while not 
explicitly focused on the group level, are still relevant to studies of critical teams. For 
example, Thackaberry (2004) and Ziegler (2007) examine discourse, culture, and change 
in wildland firefighting training and accident investigation. These are examples of studies 
that are not necessarily focused on the team level but have relevance for critical team 
work. 
Management scholars have conceptualized critical teams as high-reliability 
organizations (HROs), systems that operate successfully in environments that could 
produce catastrophic errors (Perrow, 1984; Roberts, 1990; Weick, 1990; Weick & 
Sutcliffe, 2001).  They argue that HROs have succeeded because of five factors: 
preoccupation with failure, reluctance to simplify, sensitivity to operations, commitment 
to resilience, and deference to expertise (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001).  Most research on 
HROs is comprised of case studies on organizations such as nuclear plants (Bierly, Paul, 
Gallagher, & Spender, 2008; Marcus, 1995; Bourrier, 1996), aircraft carriers (Rochlin, 
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LaPorte, & Roberts, 1987), and air traffic control systems (Kontogiannis, 2012; LaPorte, 
1988; O’Neil & Krane 2012).  The studies have focused on themes such as effective 
action and limited failure and have generally emphasized structure rather than process 
(Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 2008).  While the most straightforward definition of HROs 
is that they are problem-solving organizations (van Stralen, 2008), such a simplification 
would neglect important details: all HROs operate in unforgiving social environments 
with a rich potential for error in which massive consequences rule out learning through 
experimentation (Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 2008).  They must also use complex 
processes to manage intricate technologies in the face of dynamic vulnerability (Rochlin, 
1993). 
The conceptualization of critical teams is different in a few ways from that of 
HROs.  First, HROs only include systems that have been successful, whereas critical 
teams include all teams regardless of outcome.  Weick and Sutcliffe’s (2001) label of 
high-hazard organizations is much closer to the conceptualization of critical teams, but 
that label has seen extremely limited use.  Second, studies of HROs generally come from 
a behavioral perspective and focus on the concept of mindfulness (Weick & Roberts, 
1993; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001).  Third, the literature on HROs is more focused on 
accidents than systems or coordination (Weick et al., 2008).  This limits the types of 
organizations that can labeled as an HRO to those that have the potential for catastrophe.  
Fourth, critical teams are often conceptualized as smaller units while HROs generally 
encompass more than just the team. For example, a bomb squad would be viewed as a 
critical team while the larger military unit—including support crews—would be 
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considered an HRO.  Methodologically, HROs have been exclusively studied using 
content analysis and interviews, as it would be difficult to predict a failure and then 
actively choose to embed one’s self near a catastrophe for the purpose of fieldwork.  
While most work on HROs has been descriptive (Weick et al., 2008), two main 
theories have branched from their study.  Perrow’s (1984) study of Three Mile Island led 
to the development of Normal Accidents Theory (NAT), which states that accidents are 
inevitable in systems that have tightly coupled elements and interactive complexity.  
Perrow argued that a change to loose coupling and/or a linear transformation system 
would reduce catastrophic error.  In contrast, High Reliability Theory (HRT) is more 
complex and more popular among management scholars.  Based on work of numerous 
researchers (LaPorte, 1994; LaPorte & Consolini, 1991; Roberts, 1990; Rochlin, 1993; 
Schulman, 1993; Weick, 1987; Weick et al., 2008), HRT involves the satisfaction of 
seven necessary conditions to avoid catastrophic errors: 1) prioritization of safety, 2) 
careful attention to design and procedures, 3) limited degree of trial-and-error learning, 4) 
redundancy, 5) decentralized decision-making, 6) continuous training, and 7) strong 
cultures that focus on preventing accidents.  Proponents of NAT argue that HRT neglects 
complex environmental influences and politics (Sagan, 1994), and followers of HRT 
have declared that NAT is too quick to assume that a tightly coupled interactively 
complex system will not work.  Both NAT and HRT have not been popularized in 
organizational research in part because they are more focused on accidents than 
organizations. Another reason is that reliability may seem like a simple, obvious concept 
to other scholars (Weick et al., 2008). 
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High-hazard organizations that strive for reliability must enact cognitive 
processes that are both diverse and complex. An organization must give its members 
“license to think” because reliable systems are built on members that actively seek 
information before and after catastrophes (Westrum, 1992, p. 405).  New ideas should be 
welcomed but should not challenge the singular focus on avoiding failure.  Reliability 
also comes from collective mindfulness.  In the case of HROs, mindfulness can be 
described as enriched awareness of events and surroundings coupled with a focus on 
catastrophe (Weick et al., 2008).  Each time a routine occurs, it unfolds in a slightly 
different manner (March & Olsen, 1989), so members must combine fragments of old 
and new actions to create a distinct, appropriate response (Weick et al., 2008).  HROs 
must also be careful not to oversimplify because it increases the likelihood of eventual 
surprise (Weick et al., 2008).  In essence, members of HROs must be comfortable 
working in a complex, dynamic environment.  This goes for critical teams as well, many 
of which are housed in HROs.  What makes this difficult is that critical teams often do 
not have time for deliberate processes.  In the next section I discuss the temporality of 
these teams. 
Temporality of Action/Critical Teams 
Action teams, particularly critical teams, have unique temporal traits that 
contribute to the value of their study.  One such characteristic of action teams—which is 
different from many others—is the finality of their work.  Teams such as surgical crews 
and military units cannot “redo” their work at a later time.  In other words, deaths on an 
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operating table or battlefield are irreversible.  Even action teams with lighter 
consequences must deal with finality.  A string quartet that makes a mistake during a 
performance has made that mistake indelibly—they cannot remove it from their 
performance history.   On the other hand, imagine a team of intellectual property lawyers 
who need to correct an error on a patent.  While there may be some time pressures (e.g., a 
competing team trying to file a similar patent), they are still allowed to re-write the 
patent.  In addition, the lawyers can start the writing process earlier than anyone else, 
providing time to revise first drafts.  They are not bound by starting and ending time 
constraints as strictly as are action teams.   
It can be argued that finality is a dimension of the work of all groups, not just 
action teams.  This is certainly true in the long term.  However, the work time of most 
knowledge workers is generally fungible, meaning a minute of work now can be 
substituted for a minute of work later with little consequence (Bluedorn, 2002; McGrath 
& Rotchford, 1983).   In contrast, action teams deal frequently in epochal time, which is 
composed of events (Bluedorn & Standifer, 2006; Whitehead, 1978).  This is a 
consequence of the dramatic starting and finishing points of performances.  The 
difference between fungible and epochal time can be roughly explained by comparing the 
work of accountants and firefighters.  A team of three accountants may estimate that their 
work for the month of March will take around 900 hours total.  They can choose to put in 
hours at any time as long as they finish.  This is because time (and the resulting task 
accomplishment it affords)—not events—typically matter most for knowledge workers.  
In contrast, if a fire crew is tasked with putting out a blaze, they cannot choose to do it at 
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a later time (even putting in the same number of person-hours) without major 
consequence. What matters is the event, not the time (in isolation from the event).  Events 
like fires, oil spills, and heart attacks occur epochally because a clock does not determine 
their start and end points. 
Therefore, action teams have to consider the finality and epochality of their 
process more than other teams do.  Because of this, they have a unique schedule that is 
summarized in the nested phase model of action teams (Ishak & Ballard, 2012).  Based 
on the recurring phase model (Marks, Mathieu, & Zaccaro, 2001), the nested phase 
model posits that action teams progress through four phases: preparation, simulation, 
production, and adaptation.  Two of these phases, preparation and production, are 
common with other teams as well.  Preparation includes most activities that are designed 
to better position team members for task success.  Production is, in the simplest terms, is 
the time that counts.  For example, a firefighter may read training documents 
(preparation) and then later fight a fire (production).  The other two phases are special 
because they exist specifically to deal with the heighted finality and epochality of action 
teams. 	  
Simulation 
Simulation is a technique used to replicate aspects of the real world in an 
interactive manner (Gaba, 2004).  It is not “real” action, as the outcome of simulation is 
only relevant to the extent that it affects later events (a true action phase is one in which 
the outcome directly affects goal accomplishment).  However, the importance of this 
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phase should not be overlooked, as simulations are used to reduce uncertainty.  First, 
members of the team become familiarized with likely scenarios, as well as with their 
teammates. Aggarwal, Undre, Moorthy, Vincent, and Darzi (2004) detail the benefits of a 
simulated operating theatre for surgical teams, with the main advantage being that 
simulation allows surgeons to familiarize themselves with external influences such as 
distractions and crisis situations.  Second, previously unknown scenarios are brought to 
light by playing out events with different inputs.  For example, a surgical unit may repeat 
a simulation that they have already completed, except this time they “accidentally” cut an 
artery.  What follows may play out in a familiar fashion to the unit.  However, members 
may experience unfamiliarity, or a sense of “I have never been here before,” also known 
as vu jàdé (Weick, 1993).  While vu jàdé is generally considered an unwelcome feeling, 
experiencing it during training could reduce the chance of unfamiliarity in a high-risk 
situation.   The expectation is that simulations will uncover and weaken such feelings in a 
low-risk environment. 
Simulation is crucial for action teams because there is no “redo” for what occurs 
during performance events, many of which have human lives at stake.  The finality of 
their efforts is unforgiving, which results in a work culture that demands error-free 
performances.  The amount a team allocates for simulation is often correlated with the 
rarity of their job.  Teams such as surgical units or fire crews may occasionally use 
simulation, whereas more select teams (e.g., space shuttle crews, professional sports 
teams) may spend exponentially more time simulating than in “real” events.  This 
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includes full simulations (e.g., five-on-five practice basketball games) and partial 
simulations (e.g., players lining up to make layup shots).  
Adaptation 
By definition, teams interact adaptively towards a common goal (Kozlowski et al., 
2009; Salas, Dickinson, Converse, & Tannenbaum, 1992).  In this phase, team members 
stop or slow their work in order to communicate with one another. Generally, teams use 
adaptation to realign members onto a previously determined trajectory or to discuss 
coordination onto a new path.  The most practical example of adaptation comes from the 
field of sports.  Teams call timeouts during which they players convene midgame to 
discuss strategy and evaluate their plan and options.  Communication patterns and the 
ability to “stop the clock” during adaptation phases depend on the team and their 
surroundings. First, communication during a timeout depends on organizational structure.  
It is likely to be top-down for hierarchical groups such as fire crews, sports teams, and 
military units.  On the other hand, there may be more two-way discussion among teams 
interested in gathering information from the field, such as search-and-rescue teams. 
Second, the time constraints of the environment will determine whether work is 
stopped or slowed down.  Calling a timeout in sports pauses the event, meaning the rules 
of the game cease to govern the proceedings (Coleman, 1969).  Time can be “stopped” 
for most teams with a human adversary; some team sports allow for timeouts, many legal 
systems have recesses, and militaries can agree to ceasefires.  Conversely, there are teams 
that do not have the luxury of stopping the clock. Time does not stop for teams that have 
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a natural adversary, such as a fire or a heart attack.  For example, if a fire captain wants to 
discuss strategy with his crew, he has two options: 1) communicate and fight the fire 
concomitantly, or 2) stop fighting the fire to talk.  The former option can be difficult for 
multiple reasons, including logistics and the drawbacks of multitasking on information 
retention.  Therefore, the fire captain may choose to pause the physical fight against the 
fire, even though he knows the fire will not reciprocate.  Okhuysen and Waller (2002) 
argue that the mere presence of temporal pacing can cause group members to interrupt 
their work and evaluate their progress.  By doing so, the group can “consider alternative 
paths and determine the direction their group should follow in the subsequent work 
period” (Okhuysen & Waller, 2002, p. 1057).  In other words, the group is afforded a 
chance to adapt to their situation when they take a voluntary timeout because they can 
exchange information more efficiently.  Thus, whether it is “on the clock” (e.g., for fire 
crews) or if it acts as a pause (e.g., for legal teams), taking time to communicate can be 
beneficial even if it delays response. 
Both the simulation and adaption phases exist specifically to counteract the 
negative effects of finality and epochality on team success.  Action teams have a unique 
schedule involving progression through the four phases put forth in the nested phase 
model.  Different types of action teams will progress in their own way, but each and 
every action team will spent time preparing, simulating, producing, and adapting.  For 
action teams, the only phase that “counts” is production; consequently, the other three 
phases are in place to improve performance in the production phase.  For example, teams 
run simulations in part to familiarize their members with various plans and they also have 
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to adapt when said plans are no longer applicable.  Both simulation and adaptation phases 
are crucial for action teams in part because they often need to improvise during 
performance events in the face of unpredictable circumstances.  The next section details 
the research on improvisation for action teams.	  
Improvisation 
The majority of studies on improvisation in communication and management 
literatures describe it an organizational phenomenon that should only occur when 
something goes wrong—or in jazz music.  It is often detailed as a method for the 
flummoxed, an ambiguous and risky path only to be employed as a last resort.  
Improvisation—whose very definition is problematic—is questionable as a reliable 
technique. 
While it is true that the inputs, processes, and outcomes of improvisation are more 
visible—and thus more researchable—in groups, teams, and organizations, particularly 
during emergency events, improvisation is not limited to only these structures or 
situations.  It occurs for a dentist when he loses electricity in the middle of an 
appointment.  It befalls a guest speaker who cannot connect her computer to the 
projection system before a lecture.  It happens to a mother who must make ends meet 
when she loses her job.  Opportunities to improvise arise every day, multiple times a day, 
for both individuals and the structures to which they belong.  Improvisation is not the 
provision of critical team organizations, but rather an approach that is deeply embedded 
into the fabric of human decision making.  Still, studies on improvisation in a team or 
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organizational setting offer two critical values to the communication researcher.  First, 
whereas individual improvisation is mainly a cognitive process that takes place internally, 
team improvisation will likely involve communicative acts in deliberating, decision 
making and diffusing options.  Second, teams are often taught to communicate a certain 
way, such as the flight crew that is expected to use standardized nomenclature for their 
actions, or the police squad that utilizes 10-codes.  Studies of team improvisation may 
allow for insights into improvised communication: when team members are forced or 
choose to interact in new ways (this is different from communication about 
improvisation).  
Here I will review the existing literature on improvisation, pulling research 
mainly from communication and organizational management but also touching on 
emergency management as well.  First, I will contextualize improvisation in the existing 
literature and speak to the heightened need among action teams.  Next, I will focus on 
three seminal studies, all of which use improvisational jazz as the basis for their 
theoretical perspectives: studies by Nettl (1974), Berliner (1994), and Weick (1998).  
Then, I will examine the relationship between improvisation and planning.  I will then 
compare improvisation and improvised communication.  Finally, I will pose my research 
questions regarding the composition of improvisation and improvised communication for 
critical teams. 
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The Constitution of Improvisation 
Improvisation involves using knowledge and intuition (Crossan & Sorrenti, 1997; 
Mendonça, 2001; Weick, 1998) to produce a novel action (Mendonça, 2001).  The 
process involves using what is available at the moment, including cognitive, material, 
affective, and social resources (Cunha, Cunha & Kamoche, 1999).  It is inherently 
creative; new actions and plans are created spontaneously, and action unfolds as it is 
conceived by an organization and/or its members (Cunha et al., 1999).  It also has an 
intuitive basis.  Improvising involves surfacing and restructuring “one’s intuitive 
understanding of phenomena on the spot” (Weick, 1998, p. 147), and one must determine 
how to use what they know to extend their current thought patterns (Bruner, 1983).  In 
other words, improvisation is a spontaneous, creative process with unspontaneous roots. 
 Improvisation not only involves knowledge and intuition, but the application of 
one’s abilities under pressures of time.  Moorman and Miner (1998) define improvisation 
as “the degree to which composition and execution converge in time” p. 702). Weick’s 
(1998) definition of improvisation involves activity “at a time when action can still make 
a difference” (p. 147).  And Mendonça’s (2001) definition of improvisation in emergency 
management is producing novel actions “in time to meet the requirements of a given 
situation” (p. 1).  Improvisation is not based solely on decision making; execution is a 
critical input of improvisation. 
 Previous studies of improvisation at the organizational level have focused on 
successful events and orderly arrangements; however, unpredictability is a major catalyst 
for improvisation.  There are a host of studies that examine situations in which the correct 
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choice has been made (Hayes-Roth & Hayes-Roth, 1979); research on other outcomes, 
such as false positives—improvising when unnecessary—is under-investigated 
(Mendonça & Fiedrich, 2006).  Studies of organizations generally place a strong 
emphasis on orderly arrangements of coordination and cooperation at the expense of 
focusing on the mechanisms that change them (Weick, 1998).  However, the creation of 
novel actions at the individual, group, and organizational level is more common than 
people think (Mintzberg & McHugh, 1985; Pascale, 1993; Peters & Waterman, 1982; 
Rerup, 2001).  People deal with situations that force them to rely on their intuition and 
knowledge to bring forth an action they have not taken before: a S.W.A.T. team out of 
flash bangs, a bomb squad working in the rain for the first time, a firefighter who has 
been in similar situations, but not this exact one.  According to Barrett, improvisation is a 
distinguishing feature of some organizations: 
People in organizations are often jumping into action without clear plans, 
making up reasons as they proceed, discovering new routes once action is 
initiated, proposing multiple interpretations, navigating through 
discrepancies, combining disparate and incomplete materials and then 
discovering what their original purpose was. To pretend that improvisation 
is not happening in organizations is to not understand the nature of 
improvisation (1998, p. 617) 
For many organizations, improvisation, or at least the expectation of it, is standard.  Other 
organizations that more frequently follow protocol have to improvise improvising—in 
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other words, when the time comes to improvise, members may be unclear what to do and 
unfamiliar with the process.  
Improvisation is more necessary for action teams than other team types due to the 
finality of their work.  All action teams require improvisation to deal with unpredictable 
circumstances (Eisenberg et al., 2005; Sundstrom et al., 1990), and some types need to 
improvise to a higher degree than others.  For example, members of a string quartet (a 
type of performing team) only have to improvise in the rare situations that a musical 
performance descends into chaos; even then, it is probable that performing teams are 
taught to return to the script as soon as possible instead of improvising.  In contrast, 
infantry members have to improvise more often because they face unpredictable 
adversaries in dynamic environments.  Problems for groups develop when uncertainty 
contains risk and is time-dependent, but the “indeterminate problem” is so common that 
improvisation is considered part of routine process for many teams and organizations 
(van Stralen, 2008, p. 79). 
Despite knowing that improvisation is critical, it can still be difficult to improvise in 
the face of impending danger.  Eisenberg and colleagues (2005) found that emergency 
department personnel did a poor job of allowing for improvisation in the face of 
uncertainty.  When listening to the stories of patients, emergency workers tended to force 
diagnoses into categories of previously-accumulated knowledge; in other words, the 
technical rationality of the doctors’ training subjugated the narrative rationality of the 
patients (Eisenberg et al., 2005).  Multiple studies of the Mann Gulch disaster echo the 
sentiment that action teams must rely on improvisation to perform at a high level.  At 
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Mann Gulch, a team of wildland firefighters (smokejumpers) that was running from a 
blaze disintegrated because they refused to drop their tools, an action that was wildly out 
of line with the standard procedure of firefighting (Weick, 1993).  Weick (1993) posits 
that that action teams can be more resilient if they focus on improvisation, since the 
pressure of working in a high-risk situation fuels a desire to fall back on familiar routines 
(i.e., technical rationality). Dropping their tools would have given them a better chance to 
survive the blaze.  Larson (2003) argues that the team did not improvise because the 
action of dropping their tools would have clashed with their roles as firefighters; their 
tools were a part of their smokejumper identities, and without them they were simply 
people running for their lives.  This may have been connected to the way in which action 
teams structure their time.  Through heavy, repetitive training, the concept of 
coordination is so impressed into firefighters, military members, athletes, and other action 
team members that they place a much higher value on teamwork than any other group.  
Action teams of all types have a hard time “dropping their tools” because doing so could 
lead to disintegration of the team.  In spite of this, action teams can benefit from instilling 
a culture of comfort regarding improvisation, especially in novel situations in which 
members experience vu jadé: “I’ve never been here before, I have no idea where I am, I 
have no idea who can help me” (Weick, 1993). 
Jazz Improvisation 
 Three studies that hold touchstone status in the field of team and organizational 
improvisation take a musicological approach to the subject.  The first is Nettl’s (1974) 
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comparative approach of musical improvisation in which the definition of improvisation 
is problematized. Next, Berliner’s (1994) in-depth ethnography of improvisational jazz 
musicians builds on Nettl (1974) by pushing back against the perspective that 
improvisation is diametrically opposed to composition.  Weick (1998) then argues that 
improvisation includes composition.  While the nuances of each article cannot be fully 
summarized here, a brief summary of the three pieces can paint a picture of the 
relationship between improvisation, a supposedly spontaneous activity, and that which is 
pre-composed. 
 Nettl’s (1974) comparative approach to musical improvisation in different 
cultures was the first major musicology work on the subject in decades.  In a summary of 
previous publications, Nettl says we are led to believe that improvisation and 
composition are opposed concepts with opposed characteristics: spontaneous versus 
calculated, natural versus artificial, primitive versus sophisticated.  The last dichotomy 
hints at a Western perspective of improvisation, as Nettl notes that many non-European 
cultures view improvisation as a necessary component of all music.  One example is the 
music of the Plains Indians, whose songs are often borne out of periods of fasting and 
self-torture.  A song may be created suddenly, but the creator “works it out” as he walks 
back to his tribe.  Thus, it is hard to distinguish if the song has been improvised or 
composed; it seems that both procedures have played a hand in the song’s creation.  
Other examples from Native American, Middle Eastern and South Asian cultures involve 
extemporaneous creation of songs along a repertory of standard formulas, again 
intermingling improvisation and composition.  Nettle focuses on the effects of 
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“improvisation” and “the model,” two forces that help a performer create music.  Again, 
one seems spontaneous and the other calculated, but it would be presumptuous to create a 
rigid dichotomy here.  Realistically, improvisation is a type of composition and, by 
extension, it is not paradoxical for spontaneity to be bound by a model.   
 Berliner (1994) built on the work of Nettl (1974) with an in depth study of 
improvised jazz musicians around the Chicago area.  Through interviews with over 50 
jazz musicians, each of whom has developed their own improvisational style, Berliner 
refutes the popular claim that improvisation is more than “making something out of 
nothing” (p. 492).  Building on Nettl’s (1974) conceptualization that improvising is a type 
of composition, Berliner argues that improvisation is always based on previous work, or 
is, in his words, “flexible treatment of preplanned material” (p. 400). Berliner’s detailed 
definition of jazz improvisation is useful not only for musicians but for anyone whose 
work requires adaptation: 
Improvisation involves reworking pre-composed material and designs in 
relation to unanticipated ideas conceived, shaped, and transformed under 
the special conditions of performance, thereby adding unique features to 
every creation (Berliner, 1994, p. 241). 
Essentially, improvising applies past experience, knowledge, and plans (material and 
designs) to present conditions, which theoretically results in a different outcome each 
time. Berliner details the importance of the past in improvisation.  The pre-composed 
material is the basis for decisions, tactics, and strategies taken by musicians.  In addition, 
any material composed in the present—the improvised music—is then considered as 
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composition and folded into the category of “pre-composed.”  What makes Berliner’s 
findings so valuable to non-musician researchers is the idea that improvisation is more of 
a way of life than something to be activated at a particular time.  The musicians 
interviewed by Berliner considered improvisation as critical to their performances as 
timing itself. 
 Citing both Berliner (1994) and Nettl (1974), Weick (1998) theorizes that the 
mindset of improvised jazz musicians is of benefit to organizational scholars and 
practitioners.  Particularly, organizational theorists can find value in “the simultaneous 
presence of seeming opposites in organizations” rather than rushing to consider it a 
paradox (Weick, 1998, p. 551).  Here, Weick is talking about improvisation as a mixture 
of seeming opposites: pre-composition and spontaneity.  Weick argues that managers are 
like jazz musicians in a multitude of ways; citing Mangham and Pye (1991), Weick puts 
forth a list of similarities between managing and jazz improvisation, including: 
simultaneous reflection and action (p. 79 in Mangham and Pye), simultaneous rule 
creating and rule following (p. 78), action based on melodies, or codes (p. 40), and heavy 
reliance on both intuition and imagination (p. 18).  All of these have a common thread 
that is best summarized with another notation from Weick’s string of similarities: 
continuous mixing of the expected with the novel (p. 24).  The existing melody is not 
only an early influence, but a continuing one (Weick, 1998).   
Thematically, the work of Nettl, Berliner and Weick is more about 
complementarity than dichotomy, and like Weick, many studies of improvisation use 
music analogically to study the benefits of improvisation in organizational management 
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and emergency management. The use of musical performance as a managerial analogy 
permeates the thought process of organizational practitioners as well. Tom Kneier (2003) 
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation compared the need for effective communication 
and coordination in disaster response to an orchestra: “They can be the best trumpeters 
and clarinet players in the world, but unless they’re all on the same sheet of music, it’s 
just noise.”  Much in the same way that different players must complement each other 
appropriately, so should pre-composition and spontaneity.  Otherwise, organizational 
improvisation will end up not sounding quite right. 
Categorizing Improvisation 
Weick (1998) argues that to more fully understand improvisation, we must 
understand its place on a continuum.  Citing Berliner’s (1994) work on jazz 
improvisation, Weick places improvisation as the most imaginative and concentration-
demanding endpoint of a creative spectrum.  Improvisation requires major transformation 
of an action or process, whereas the next most imaginative point on the spectrum, 
variation, still has a clear connection to previous expectations.  Next to variation is 
embellishment and then interpretation, which occur when people use some imagination 
or take minor liberties with predetermined plans.  Weick (1998) implies that the actions 
researchers have labeled as improvisation are actually within of these four categories.  
There are two salient takeaways from Weick and Berliner’s continuum.  First and 
most importantly, all four types of actions are based on something from the past, or as 
Berliner (1994) states about improvisation, they are “flexible treatment[s] of preplanned 
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material” (p. 400).  The unpremeditated nature of these actions is highlighted by Crossan 
& Sorrenti’s (1996) defining improvisation as “intuition guiding action in a spontaneous 
way” (p. 1).  Improvisation is not the creation of something out of nothing.  New actions 
are based on old structures in ways that can vary from a small shift to a complete 
overhaul of previous plans.  Berliner (1994) describes this as the perpetual cycle between 
improvised and precomposed elements, stating that the proportion of one to the other is in 
continual change throughout a performance. (p. 222). 
The second takeaway from Weick and Berliner’s continuum is that we cannot use 
a singular categorization to blanket the actions of a team or group.  In other words, teams 
can improvise one part of a process at the same time that they embellish on another, all 
the while making a variation on another component of the same action.  Improvisation is 
not dichotomous, as the issue is generally one of proportion and simultaneity rather than 
a choice between improvisation and premeditation (Weick, 1998, p. 551).   
Still, some literature on disaster research supports a binary approach to 
improvisation.  Webb (1998) describes Kreps and colleagues’ (1994) four-part method of 
coding forms of organizing in which a structure must have four pieces to be considered 
an organization.  Domains are collective representations of bounded units and the reason 
they exist.  Tasks are collective representations of a division of labor for the enactment of 
human activities.  Resources are individual capacities and the collective technologies of 
human populations.  Activities are the conjoined actions of individual and social units. 
Kreps and colleagues argue that if one of these components is missing, the structure is not 
an organization, but rather, an organizing process.  Webb’s (1998) criticism of this 
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coding form is that it overemphasizes improvisation, as even the slightest presence of 
improvisation would classify a form as unconventional.    
I believe there is value in the continual approach as well as Kreps and colleagues’ 
(1994) coding system.  From Weick and Berliner, I find it effective to look at 
improvisation on a continuum.  However, I also feel that improvisation, variation, 
embellishment, and interpretation do not need to be categorically separated as different 
levels of flexible treatment.  This set of terms can be confusing because improvisation is 
generally used as a blanket term by practitioners to describe any type of changes to pre-
planned material, regardless of degree. I find it more valuable to use the term 
improvisation and modify it with a sense of degree, such as “slight” to “extreme” (other 
terms can be used).  As for categorization, I believe Kreps and colleagues (1994) have 
presented a useful typology of sites of improvisation: domains, tasks, resources, and 
activities.  While categorizing types of improvisation is not the aim of the study, I believe 
this typology can provide a useful framework in analyzing where improvisation is 
occurring for future studies because it is specific without being overly granular. 
Improvisation and Planning 
Improvisation is rooted in planning; it draws on what one already knows, and past 
experience is rapidly processes to extemporaneously guide action (Crossan & Sorrenti, 
1997).   This perspective is best espoused by Nettl (1974), who—as opposed to viewing 
them as mutually exclusive—sees improvisation as a type of composition.  Berliner 
(1994) states that it is more than simply “making something out of nothing” (p. 492).  
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Weick agrees that “improvisation does not materialize out of thin air” (p. 546).  In 
addition, the literature on disaster response, a field composed of critical teams, places 
emphasis on the need to plan for unexpected events (Dynes & Drabek, 1994) because 
organizations will perform non-routine tasks during a disaster (Dynes, 1970). 
Arguing that improvisation is commonplace, particularly in the field of critical 
team, is not to imply that organizations are running around trying new things just because 
they can.  Abandoning plans in favor of untested tactics can lead to consequences that are 
potentially much more damaging than using pre-established strategies (Wachtendorf, 
2004).  Still, an organization or team may choose to abandon plans for a variety of 
reasons.  First, the stated plans may no longer apply (Turner, 1995).  Second, resources 
may be unavailable, whether because they are wholly inaccessible or currently assigned 
to another sector or task (Turner, 1995).  Third, a multifaceted event—e.g. an earthquake 
that causes a power outage and a tsunami—may necessitate consolidation with the plans 
of other organizations (Mendonça, 2001).  Fourth, responsibility for dealing with the 
unexpected may not have been assigned to the particular organization (Scanlon, 1994)—
for example, a construction company that helps to dig out debris after a building 
collapses.  In these cases and others, the stimuli for improvisation are usually time 
pressures and/or uncertainty (Moorman & Miner, 1995, Vera & Crossan, 1999).  
However, not all stimuli are of the limiting type.  Quarantelli (1996) lists four factors that 
can lead to emergent action.  The first is perception of a need to act on urgent matters—
essentially, perceiving time pressure—but the remaining three can be categorized as 
opportunities for improvisation: a supportive social climate for collective action, relevant 
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pre-crisis relationships, and access to resources.  Time pressure and uncertainty are 
stimuli for improvisation in the sense that a person or system has to improvise as a 
response—improvisation should happen.  Conversely, the opportunities listed are 
variables that allow for improvisation—it can happen given the presence of a supportive 
social climate, relevant pre-crisis relationships, and/or access to resources.  Teams and 
organizations that satisfy the opportunities listed in time are less likely to be forced to 
respond to the stimuli of time pressure and uncertainty.  This is why planning is a 
necessary process in the enhancement of decision making and action for teams facing 
dynamic adversaries.  Improvisation is where planning meets opportunity (Crossan, Lane, 
White, & Klus, 1996), but opportunity—like improvisation—is also a function of 
planning.  The work that an action team puts in before a performance will affect the 
options available to them during an event. 
One way to look at the interplay between improvisation and planning is through 
the duality of structure and agency. This is most accurately embodied by Gidden’s (1984) 
structuration theory and Browning’s (1992) approach to technical and narrative 
rationality.  Giddens argues that structure—the rules and resources present in a given 
social system—and agency—the ability of members of the social system to act as they 
choose—both constrain and enable each other.  Much in the same way, Browning (1992) 
posits that technical rationality—like planning—is designed with controllable outcomes 
in mind, whereas narrative rationality—like improvisation—fills the space between 
“intentions and outcomes” (pp. 281, 292).   Action teams have technical rationality in 
place as structure, such as fire orders, rules, and planning, but are ready to accept the 
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direction of narrative rationality when the intentions of the rules do not connect their 
desired outcomes.  In her research on the genealogy of the 10 Standard Fire Orders of 
wildland firefighters, Ziegler (2007) details how firefighters are ordered to use lists to 
provide structure in their work.  However, some members of the wildland fire community 
would rather depend on sensemaking by continually updating their situational awareness, 
treating the fire environment as dynamic (Weick and Putnam, 2006). 
In the same sense, the structure of action teams is provided through rules, 
planning, training, etc.  When a team or member makes an action, they do so based on the 
constraints and enablements of the structure itself.  While it may be tempting to 
dichotomize such actions into “within” the structure and “outside” of the structure—
essentially implying that the latter is improvisation—actions taken are always at least 
slightly based on the structure itself.  A spectral approach to improvisation is in line with 
the previous perspectives on the subject.  Berliner (1994) defines jazz improvisation as 
“reworking pre-composed material and designs in relation to unanticipated ideas 
conceived, shaped, and transformed under the special conditions of performance, thereby 
adding unique features to every creation” (p. 241).  Weick (1998) builds on this definition 
by comparing improvisation to any other organizational action.  He calls improvisation a 
mix of pre-composed and spontaneous elements, just as organizational action mixes 
“control with innovation, exploitation with exploration, non-routine with routine, and 
automatic with controlled” (p. 551).  This reinforces the idea that improvisation is an 
issue of proportion, not of choice.   
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Indeed, both improvisation and planning are necessary in team-based sectors such 
as critical team.  In his review of emergency management, Kreps (1991) declares that 
incorporation of both elements is a balance.  Without improvisation, organizations and 
teams lose flexibility in the face of changing conditions; without planning, they lose 
clarity and efficiency in meeting essential demands.  Kreps also writes that preparedness 
increases the ability to improvise, arguing against the competitive perspective of 
improvisation versus planning.  The raises the question of what the organization’s role is 
in terms of preparing their embedded teams and how they should approach improvisation 
in training efforts. 
Improvisation and Training 
The purpose of team training is to help prepare members for upcoming events.  
One outcome is to familiarize members with various scenarios, thereby reducing the 
chance of unfamiliarity during a real-life event.  Training and preparation are required for 
critical teams more than any other type because of the life-and-death nature of their work 
(Sundstrom et al., 1990).  Still, while training has been studied before, the context has 
generally been limited to service teams (Campion et al., 1993; Goldstein & Ford, 2002; 
Hyatt & Ruddy, 1997).  This is in part because of the limited context in which training of 
critical teams can be studied (Sundstrom et al., 1990).  For example, military teams must 
be protective of their training because of sensitive material.   
Training for improvisation can occur in a variety of organizational settings.  In 
their review of the role of information technology in emergency management training, 
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Mendonça and Fiedrich (2006, based on the work of Aase & Tjensvoll, 2003, and US 
FEMA, 2003) identify six types of training platforms.  Seminars and workshops consist 
of group discussion and instruction, and are often classroom-based.  In addition to 
serving as a primary interaction with new material, they help to identify needs and skills 
for the team and individuals.  Knowledge databases have similar content to seminars and 
workshops; they summarize relevant information and serve as resources in times of 
training and action.  Drills are cognitive and physical activities that enable personnel to 
develop skills through repetition and application of knowledge.  Mendonça and Fiedrich 
point out an additional benefit of enacting drills: run-throughs of activities can be used to 
develop knowledge, an advantage in training for improvisation. 
The next three training platforms are comprised of activities that require effective 
coordination by team members.  Tabletop exercises, which use small-scale physical 
mock-ups to engage decision-makers in slow-paced problem solving, are “particularly 
useful for practicing roles and interaction” (p. 357).  Functional exercises are activities 
that display a dynamic model of performance events with the purpose of practicing a 
specific function of complex activity.  They are “based on a rich (and therefore more life-
like) interaction” with functions, other people, and the environment (p. 357).  Lastly, full 
scale exercises are replications in which all the functions and complex activities of an 
actual event are present; in emergency management this means using actual facilities and 
resources and behaving as if the event is real.   
There are interesting insights to be gleaned from the descriptions of these six 
platforms. First, Mendonça and Fiedrich state that while full scale exercises are made to 
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replicate actual events, they are done with “minimal simulation” (p. 357).  This implies 
that Mendonça and Fiedrich see simulation as an imperfect learning scenario.  However, 
simulation is still seen as a useful component of training, as functional exercises, tabletop 
exercises, and drills (partial simulation) use it to some degree.  Second, Mendonça and 
Fiedrich note that all environmental variables may be manipulated within the last four 
training platforms (drills, tabletop exercises, functional exercises, and full scale 
exercises).  For example, in functional exercises, consequences of decisions can be 
determined by a computer or a human controller, the latter setup referred to as a Wizard 
of Oz exercise.  This implies that an external presence can be beneficial in the 
arrangement of training platforms.   
Organizations may provide training for embedded teams, and when they do they 
should strive to meet two conditions.  First, the relevant resources should exist 
somewhere in the organization (Hackman, 1987).  If this is not the case, the organization 
should bring in expertise from outside.  Second, there must be a delivery system for said 
training resources.  While this may seem obvious, it is important to understand that the 
first step of resource delivery is often the explicit demand for it by group members, an 
action not so common in organizations that are hierarchical in nature (e.g., military 
organizations) (Hackman, 1987).  The irony is that the teams that need the most training 
often belong to rank-and-file organizations; while these teams are usually differentiated 
from the rest of the system, their work necessitates a higher level of organizational 
integration. 
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Training schedules for action teams are different than most other team types.  For 
example, one way in which action teams prepare is by engaging in simulations.  Members 
of the team become familiarized with likely scenarios as well as with their teammates. 
Aggarwal, and colleagues (2004) detail the benefits of a simulated operating theatre for 
surgical teams, with the main advantage being that simulation allows surgeons to 
familiarize themselves with external influences such as distractions and crisis situations.  
Also, previously unknown scenarios are brought to light by playing out events with 
different inputs.  For example, a surgical unit may repeat a simulation that they have 
already completed, except this time they “accidentally” cut an artery.  What follows may 
play out in a familiar fashion to the unit.  However, it may create a scenario that creates a 
feeling of unfamiliarity in team members. The expectation is that simulations will 
uncover those feelings in a low-risk environment, eventually making them familiar.  
Simulation is crucial for action teams because there is no “redo” for what occurs during 
performance events, many of which have human lives at stake.  
We can highlight the value of simulation and preparation by examining the 
outcomes of training.  The quality of decision making, coordination, and execution in real 
events are partially dependent on the quality and quantity of the available resources, of 
which I will identify five.  One example is a physical resource: if a fire crew has more 
water when putting out a fire, they are more likely to be successful.  Another example is a 
knowledge resource: if a fire crew, or a member, can find water faster, they are more 
likely to put out a fire.  Another type is a skill resource: if a member knows how to best 
spray water, the crew is more likely to put out a fire.  Yet another resource type is 
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familiarity: chances for success are increased if a member has been in a similar situation 
previously.  Lastly, coordination is a resource; teams rarely achieve their potential 
(Steiner, 1972) because they frequently suffer from process losses due to lack of 
coordination (Stroebe and Frey, 1982).  An organization can increase a team’s chance for 
success by providing opportunities in which to increase the quality and quantity of these 
resources, such as simulation.   
There are a number of simulation systems available in fields such as critical team.  
One such system is CATS (Swiatek, 1999) which is able to calculate outcomes such as 
damage and loss estimates with limited field data.  Some systems are based on virtual 
reality technologies (Louka & Balducelli, 2001), but these are generally discussion- or 
experience-based.  Few simulation systems are operational-based—meaning full-scale 
and carried out in real time (DHS, 2004)—and even when they are, their potential to 
support training in improvised decision-making is limited (Mendonça & Fiedrich, 2006).  
Simulations cannot possibly be 100 percent accurate in mimicking the pressures and 
experiences of a real event. 
Simulation does not entirely remove the need for improvisational training. An 
organization such as a fire department may try to allow enough time for simulation so 
that most scenarios are commonplace to their teams, thereby attempting to provide the 
requisite resources for team success.  However, even with all the standard elements of 
team effectiveness, there are still situations in which critical team must enact improvised 
coordination: 
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“A team in a fast-paced action context thus might have a clear goal 
(putting out fires, saving patients’ lives, landing an aircraft), the right mix 
of experience and skills, adequate resources, and a task that calls for 
teamwork – structures that support effectiveness (e.g., Hackman, 1987) – 
yet still suffer a devastating breakdown in coordination due to 
miscommunication, interpersonal conflict, or poor judgment in the heat of 
the moment” (Edmonson, 2003, p. 1420). 
Unfamiliar scenarios will occur even with the most robust training and simulation in 
place, and training team members to deal with improvisation is an important facet of 
organizational context. 
 The practice of improvisation in critical team has been the focus of increasing 
research in recent years but the methods for training are understudied (Mendonça & 
Fiedrich, 2006).  An appropriate improvisational training regimen should provide 
theoretically-grounded knowledge and tools to enable trainees to practice them (Salas and 
Cannon-Bowers, 2001); for improvisational training, this refers to four specific training 
needs (Medonça & Fiedrich, 2006).  First, members must learn when it is appropriate to 
depart from planned-for procedures, as overreliance on familiarity can be detrimental to 
teams (Guzzo & Dickson, 1996; Larson, 2003; Weick, 1993).  They must also learn to 
make inferences about present and likely future states of complex systems (Rinaldi et al., 
2001).  Members must also learn how to develop and deploy new procedures in a serial 
fashion under time constraint.  New procedures must satisfy constraints and sometimes 
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must be searched for or assembled.  Lastly, members must learn to communicate and 
collaborate across multiple decision-makers.  
 The importance of communication as a training outcome is highlighted by types 
of musical training.  Because musical training often takes place in a group setting, there is 
a high emphasis placed on learning to communicate and collaborate without 
compromising performance (Mendonça & Fiedrich, 2006).  One method of training is 
called cognitive shadowing, in which one player is engages in active listening to 
determine the intention of a partner’s improvisation (Mendonça, Beroggi, & Wallace, 
2003).  Critical teams can use this strategy by having members observe the 
communication and decision making practices of a teammate or by looking over 
communication logs (Mendonça & Fiedrich, 2006).  Other simulation practices involve 
playing in groups of different sizes (Mendonça & Fiedrich, 2006), taking on other roles 
(Webb, 2004), and repetition of another player’s performance (Della Pietra & Campbell, 
1995).  Lastly, Berliner (1994) found that jazz musicians desired to be well-practiced in 
making a save, or recovering from errors; therefore, they would make mistakes on 
purpose in order to recover from them.  Mendonça and Fiedrich (2006) agree with the 
value of this strategy, stating that improvisers should introduce random choices or errors 
into simulations. 
 While there is analogical value in the application of musical improvisation, there 
are reasons why critical teams merit their own research on improvisation.  First, the 
weight of the outcomes associated with critical teams and musical groups could not be 
more different.  People can die if critical teams perform poorly, making stress levels and 
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degrees of error avoidance different between such teams and musical groups.  Second, 
improvised jazz musicians desire to improvise because it part of the performance, 
whereas critical teams only employ improvisation as a means to an end.  Third, musical 
groups will have different communication patterns than critical teams.  Additionally, the 
skills of emergency management are not easily borrowed from other professions (Dynes 
and Drabek, 1994). For these reasons, and others, those interested in communication and 
improvisation would benefit from the study of research on those subjects within the 
context of critical teams and their organizations 
Summary and Research Question 
 In this chapter I have summarized the literature relevant to the proposed empirical 
study.  First, I discussed teams and organizational context, which set up a review of the 
literature on critical teams.  Next, I discussed the unique temporal elements of action and 
critical teams, namely finality and epochality.  Then, I discussed various elements of 
improvisation, including its relationship to planning and training for critical teams and 
their organizations.  Here, I highlight the question that guide this study: 
RQ: Are critical team members primed and prepared to deal with 
improvisation by their parent organizations? If so, in what ways does this 
happen? 
I am very interested in the organization’s attitude towards team improvisation. The 
dilemma of organizational support for improvisation is that a team should be encouraged 
to improvise where necessary but discouraged at all other points.  I posit that action teams 
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that are provided a high level of structure and experience by their organization will 
theoretically activate feel a need to improvise less.  If members of a team are familiar 
with a scenario, they are more likely to enact an appropriate response.  A prominent 
example of this phenomenon is the series of management studies on the Mann Gulch 
disaster (Alder, 1997; Larson, 2003; Thackaberry, 2004; Weick, 1993).  A team of 
smokejumpers failed in part because they were presented with an unfamiliar situation that 
forced them to move past what they already knew, which created a spiral of 
unpredictability.  Organizations can potentially limit this by providing two types of 
resources.  First, training and simulations will increase familiarity with a wider variety of 
scenarios.  Increased clarity about the parameters of a performance situation includes 
information about constrains that might limit strategic options as well as the analytic 
tools necessary to evaluate probable consequences (Hackman, 1987).  Second, 
educational materials and directives (e.g., the 10 Standard Fire Orders, Ziegler, 2007) 
should be available to team members.  Directives such as lists and flowcharts give 
structure to member action (Browning, 1992). 
While it is important for organizations to provide structure and experience, it is 
impractical to expect that a team can gain familiarity with every possible scenario 
(Kendra & Wachtendorf, 2003).  Successful teams are able to transition seamlessly from 
highly structured organization to loosely structured teams in the face of emergencies and 
other unpredictable situations (Bea, 2008).  Returning to the Mann Gulch disaster, it is 
the members that did not “drop their tools”—in other words, those who did not 
improvise—who met disastrous consequences (Weick, 1993; Larson, 2003).  Critical 
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teams work in dynamic environments, and members would benefit by depending on 
sensemaking to continuously update their situational awareness (Weick & Sutcliffe, 
2006).  Part of the structure and experience provided by the organization should include 
the learning of cognitive processes designed to determine when to transition to 
improvisation, as well as the communication patterns necessary to interact flexibly.   
I argue that improvisation is more effective if the organization has configured 
interactive systems that enable teams to communicate efficiently in moments of 
improvisation.  Teams with more structure are less likely to improvise, and the 
implementation of improvisation implies that structure has been bypassed. In other 
words, there is an inverse relationship between the application of structure and 
improvisation for teams.  However, improvisation is ineffective unless teams can interact 
to coordinate efforts.  Teams must have open lines of communication to enable “real-
time, reciprocal coordination of action” in novel situations (Edmondson 2003, p. 1421).  
In this way, organizations should structure communicative arrangements so that teams 
have a way to communicate efficiently if they improvise.  
 In the next chapter I will detail the methodology for data collection and analysis 




CHAPTER 3 - METHODS 
This chapter includes the research methods used to answer the question posed in 
Chapter 2.  This study utilizes a qualitative method of participant observation and semi-
structured interviews in order to understand the roles of structure, improvisation, and 
training in critical teams and organizations. 
One of the challenges of studying critical teams is that it is difficult to get 
continued access to the same critical team over a long period of time. For example, one 
local fire department only allows citizens to go on a ride-along once every 90 days; this is 
the norm for most departments. Access to medical teams is limited because of privacy 
issues associated with patients.  While there are a plethora of studies that take place in 
hospitals, they are generally confined to patient visits in which the patient has the 
cognition to grant access.  Patients of emergency surgical teams may not have the time or 
ability to grant permission for observation.  In addition, many fruitful opportunities for 
research on critical teams are complicated by the very characteristics that make them 
intriguing: 1) their work is often dangerous for participants and observers (e.g., a 
S.W.A.T. standoff), and 2) emergency events are not scheduled and can happen at any 
time during the day in any location.  Therefore, I took any opportunities to observe teams 
and interview members as I did want to rely on the slim prospect of getting access to one 
team over an extended period of time. Though there are advantages to an in-depth study 
with one organization, I believe there are also advantages to a study with multiple 
research settings, primarily the chance to compare data between teams. 
 55 
Previous research on action teams is methodologically varied.  Studies interested 
in communicative practices have generally taken a qualitative approach.  Eisenberg and 
colleagues’ (2005) study of communication in emergency medicine primarily used 
participant observation in conjunction with unstructured interviews and retrospective 
event histories.  Methodologically, their study is an exemplar of the qualitative work on 
action teams and also serves as a loose model for my research study.  Other studies of 
action teams that use a similar approach include Murphy’s (2001) study of sensemaking 
during in-flight emergencies; McKinney, Barker, Davis and Smith’s (2005) work on 
swift-starting flight crews; Klein, Ziegert, Knight and Yan’s (2006) research on hierarchy 
in emergency medicine; and Murnighan & Conlon’s (1991) study of string quartets.  On 
the other hand, research geared at understanding communicative meaning has used 
quantitative methodology, such as surveys (Erickson, Cheatham, and Haggard, 1976; 
Halfhill, Neilsen & Sundstrom, 2008).  This includes many experiments published in 
Military Psychology (Bowers, Baker & Salas, 1994; Halfhill, Neilsen, Sundstrom & 
Weilbaecher, 2005; Stout, Salas, & Carson, 1994; Urban, Bowers, Monday & Morgan, 
1995), presumably because it is difficult to get access to military teams in situ.  Many of 
the studies of firefighters in the field of communication use some form of content 
analysis, such as Ziegler’s (2007) genealogy of the Wildland firefighters 10 standard fire 
orders and the various studies of the Mann Gulch disaster (Alder, 1997; Larson, 2003; 
Thackaberry, 2004; Weick, 1993).  While this demonstrates the methodological diversity 
of the field, most of the studies on action teams that are interested in observed 
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communicative practices have taken a qualitative approach combining observation and 
interviews, which is why I am also using qualitative methods. 
Previous research on temporality and communication is also methodologically 
diverse.  For example, much of the research on the experience of time has used 
quantitative methods (for examples, see Ballard & Seibold, 2000, 2004, 2006; Okhuysen 
& Waller, 2002).  Like with the research on action teams, temporal studies that use 
quantitative methods generally focus on meaning—here, the focus is on the meaning of 
time at work for individuals or groups.  On the other hand, temporal field research on 
communicative practices has used qualitative methods (for examples, see Gersick, 1988, 
Perlow 1999).  The qualitative temporal studies are more in line with my research, as I 
am less concerned with how meaning is constructed and more with communicative 
practices. 
Besides precedent, there are two main reasons I am employing qualitative 
methods in this study.  First, observing a team in situ will allow the data to come 
naturally, rather than forcing answers to particular questions.  Second, qualitative is 
appropriate for topics that are somewhat vague (Patton, 2002).  Indeed, while 
communication, timing, improvisation, simulation, and pauses can be clear as topics on 
their own, their interaction will create complexity that demands a qualitative approach.  
This is not to say that there are no drawbacks to qualitative methodology.  For instance, I 
am interested in issues of causality with respect to how simulation practices affect the 
success of action teams, and a quantitative approach is much better for studying causality.  
In addition, quantitative research can be less time and cost intensive, and can enable 
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rigorous statistical assessment.  However, qualitative research is generally superior in 
vividness, density of information, and clarity of meaning (Jick, 1979; Weiss, 1968).  
Also, overuse of surveys in organizational research can lead to the suggestion that the 
field is more interested in verbally expressed sentiments and beliefs rather than actual 
conduct (Van Maanen, 1983, p. 11-12).  Given the research questions at hand, it is 
imperative to be involved in the organizational experiences, as there is relevance to being 
close to organizational practice when developing theory (Berger, 1991; Redding, 1992).  
Therefore, a qualitative approach best fits this research study. 
Grounded Theory 
In this study I use an inductive approach known as grounded theory.  There are 
three main motives for using an inductive method.  First, it is essential that I study actual 
communication practices.  Second, the research questions in this study are exploratory.  
Third, I am interested in making theoretical advancements, not only collecting data.  
Therefore, I am taking a grounded theory approach because of its usefulness in building 
middle-range theoretical frameworks (Charmaz, 2000, p. 509).  Middle range theories fall 
in between working hypotheses and all-inclusive “grand theories” (Glaser & Strauss, 
1967, p. 32-33).  The purpose of a middle range theory is to explain one particular set of 
communication practices, as they are only applicable to limited ranges of data (Weick, 
1974).  Because I am only interested in action teams, my study will be well served by this 
approach. 
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 The first step in taking a grounded theory approach is to become familiarized with 
the field at study.  Many ethnographers approach their work as blank slates; while I 
respect such an approach, I believe that theoretically grounding the research questions in 
the existing literature will help me to have more direction in my study (Glaser & Strauss, 
1967; Strauss, 1987; Strauss & Corbin, 1990). By using grounded theory, I have the 
flexibility to internalize unexpected data and allow theories to emerge from the data 
collected, not a predetermined set of information (Strauss & Corbin, 1994).  While 
Charmaz (2000) writes that grounded theory strategies do not need to be rigid, I am 
choosing to base my research plan on few of her prescriptions.  I collected and analyzed 
data simultaneously and I engaged in a two-step coding process (see Data Analysis) and 
used the constant comparative method.  I also employ methods to ensure that my data is 
valid (see Data Authentication). 
Data Collection 
This study uses a qualitative methodology consisting of participant observations 
and semi-structured interviews.  Observations took place from June 2010 to February 
2012.  Interviews began in June 2010 and finished in April 2012. Because grounded 
theory involves analyzing data concomitantly with data collection, I started analyzing 
data shortly after what turned out to be the halfway point (in terms of data quantity), 
around September 2011. My review of qualitative research has given me a rough 
framework for a collection process that is helping to develop, refine, and connect 
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theoretical concepts, even though Charmaz (2000) notes that grounded theory methods 
generally do not divulge data collection techniques in detail.  
Interviews and Observations 
The majority of the data collected in this project has come from semi-structured 
interviews with participants. I conducted 31 interviews in all with members of teams 
from varied team types all over the country. I interviewed 10 members of fire crews, 
including both urban and wildland firefighters; in addition some urban firefighters had 
previously worked as wildland firefighters or in the military. I interviewed 11 members 
of what I would classify as medical teams: ER physicians, EMTs, critical care nurses, and 
a physician’s assistant who works on surgeries. This also included a ski patroller whose 
main duties are medical but also performs many other tasks. I also interviewed 10 
members of tactical teams, including military units, SWAT teams, and bomb squads. 
Interviewees were located across the country, including the Southwest (12), Pacific (11), 
Mountain (4), Northeast (2), and Southeast (1) regions of the United States. In addition, 
one interviewee was deployed in Afghanistan at the time of her interview. 
As a whole, I believe my interview sample has given my study variation and a 
thorough representation of team participants.  I used snowball and quota sampling in 
order to ensure a broad range of representation and to stratify my sample. Participants 
were recruited mainly using online posts on social networks and through casual 
conversations about my work. I know 12 participants personally, and 19 were friends of 
friends that I met through this project (please see the Appendix for the recruitment email 
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as well as a table of all participants). Semi-structured interviews took place in the 
participant’s free time; the locations were varied and included their workplaces, public 
spaces, their homes, and the homes of mutual friends. Some participants were 
interviewed over the phone when distance made collocated interviewing difficult. All 
interview procedures, including the obtainment of informed consent, were in compliance 
with the Human Subjects IRB for this study.   
As a requirement, interview participants should have been part of a critical team, 
as defined by Ishak and Ballard (2012), at the time of the interview. However, exceptions 
were made when an interview seemed likely to prove valuable to the study. Four 
interviewees fit this criterion. Larry is currently retired but was a smokejumper in the 
1970s. Because of the time that has elapsed since his tenure as a smokejumper, I took 
extra care to compare his statements with another interviewee who also served as a 
smokejumper more recently, and any noticeable differences have been mentioned in the 
results. The three other non-critical-team members are all in the medical field and have 
worked in emergency rooms. Greg is an obstetrician who has spent time in the ER and 
has led more emergency caesarian sections than he could recall. Hans has worked in an 
ER for decades and is currently a medical instructor at a technical college, as is his wife 
Nevine, who has also worked in the ER. Greg, Hans, and Nevine were my first three 
interview participants in June 2010, and they helped give me an excellent background on 
how teams work together in the ER before interviewing other participants. 
These 31 interviews were semi-structured in nature. An advantage of the semi-
structured schedule is that it gives the researcher a modicum of flexibility to explore 
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unexpected topics; choosing the right structure is vital because it can influence the way 
that data is collected.  (Frey, Botan, Friedman, & Kreps, 1992).  In addition to the semi-
structured interviews, I had many opportunities to conduct short (1 to 10-minute) 
informal interviews with observed participants.   
In the semi-structured interviews, I followed a general guideline of questions but 
asked unscripted probing questions when necessary to 1) deepen responses, 2) increase 
richness and depth, and 3) give cues to the participant about the desired level of response  
(Patton, 2002, p. 372). The interviews were of the ethnographic and informant types 
(Lindlof & Taylor, 2002); both ethnographic and informant interviews invite the 
participant to speak for the whole of the group.  The goal of such interviews was to 
secure details from the participant’s point of view regarding norms, process and culture 
of the their team and organization.  I used Wood and Kroger’s (2000) orthographic 
method for transcribing interviews.  Whether an interview was transcribed by myself (27) 
or an assistant (4), the transcriptions were standardized to include commas and periods to 
represent pauses.  I reviewed transcriptions completed by my assistant to check for 
accuracy and detail.   
There are three primary reasons I used interviews in this study.  First, they lend 
depth to the research study, and they also offer potential for openness and detail (Patton, 
2002).  Such depth can assist in creating vivid descriptions to help understand a given 
phenomenon (Miles & Huberman, 1984).  Another reason for interviewing is that I can 
learn about phenomena that are difficult to observe directly (Lindlof & Taylor, 2002).  
Third, interviews allow researchers to ask about “communication events too time-
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consuming or too private to observe” (Frey et al., 1992, p. 285).  By definition, time is of 
the essence for action teams, so they cannot slow down or pause their tasks and explain 
what they are doing to an outside source.  Therefore, any time spent with participants 
outside of their activities should prove to be worthwhile.  As for privacy, many action 
teams (such as military units) have strict hierarchical structures that require members to 
keep objections and emotions hidden during company time.  Members may be more 
willing to share their feelings outside of the hierarchical structure. 
The questions I asked were chosen to reveal how members felt about their teams 
and organizations.  I started with questions designed to relax the participant and 
encourage them to share details (Spradley, 1979).  These primary questions were broad 
and usually fact-based, not requiring a strong opinion of the participant; this is done in 
order to give the participant a sense of confidence and to build trust with the interviewer 
(Rabiger, 2009).  Such queries includes: 1) “Tell me about a typical work shift.” and 2) 
“Tell me about the workings of your team.” Once I gained a sense of comfort from the 
participant, I asked more specific questions about the workings of their team with regards 
to decision-making, stress, improvisation, simulation, pauses, and failure. I brought a 
letter-sized notepad with me to each interview, which included questions that could be 
asked of any participant as well as questions that were specific to that individual. I did 
not ask the same questions in every interview since I used a semi-structured schedule. 
Interview answers were broad and varied in nature, with some common themes as 
the exceptions.  Some participants gave me answers that fit the “company line,” and my 
challenge with them was to make them feel comfortable expressing their own opinions.  
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Regardless, these participants were valuable because they offer a window into the 
perspective of the organization. Other participants were much more specific and open.  
These participants were also valuable because they added depth and detail to the study. A 
third type spoke for the team or organization but from their own perspective.  These 
participants were most valuable to the study because it is likely that they are naturally 
inquisitive people who have knowingly and unknowingly given much thought to the 
research topic.  In some sense, they are my researchers on the inside—or informants—
and the transcriptions of their interviews provided exceptional worth to the project. In 
addition some interviewees continued the process by writing me emails after the 
interview with additional thoughts. In all, I received insightful details, thoughtful 
personal mantras, and interesting stories, the last of which were helpful in setting the 
scene in the Results section (Maxwell, Poeppelmeyer, & Polich, 1999).     
 I have also had the opportunity to interview participants during downtimes of 
observations.  While there may be concerns about intrusion or distraction of those being 
observed, I only asked questions after being approached and/or prompted by participants.  
These informal interviews have been valuable to the research project as a type of 
contextual recall: I am asking questions of participants while they are situated in their 
workplace, which supports them to answer questions in the mindset of a police officer, 
firefighter, et cetera.  These short sessions were also valuable to the participants in two 
ways.  First, by asking me to make inquiries related to my research project, they have 
gained comfort with my presence in their workspace.  Second, on more than one 
occasion, a participant lingered on a particular question in a way that led me to believe 
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they were engaging in productive analysis about their work process.  Of course, the 
disadvantage to these informal interviews is clear: I am studying how action teams use 
their time and my presence is changing their schedule.  However, I noticed that most of 
the participants do not pay any attention to my presence or questions.  In addition, the 
value of inquiries regarding their work is—in my estimation—higher than if I refrained 
from interaction.  While these interviews are part of my field notes, I am using many of 
the techniques associated with semi-structured interviewing when I conduct this form of 
data collection.  
 Interviewees were technically oriented in their responses, as the following 
chapters will show. I attribute this to two factors. First, the nature of their work is more 
technique-based then members of teams that are generally studied in the field of 
organizational communication. Second, critical team workers are trained to speak clearly 
and objectively so that nothing is misunderstood during events. There was very little 
philosophizing or theoretical analysis done by interviewees. Many of my probing 
questions received answers along the lines of “I’ve never really thought about that” 
followed by a re-statement of a previously given technical response. Again, I think this is 
closely related to the nature of communication in their professions. 
The interview data was supplemented with observational data. My observations 
came over a period of 20 months in a variety of settings1. In June 2010, I toured an ER 
                                                
1In addition to my scheduled and escorted observations, some supporting data comes from observing 
unscheduled, spontaneous firefighter action. Over the summer of 2011, by happenstance, I found myself on 
the scene of three different fires in an area west of downtown. Also, by sheer coincidence, the same shift 
was on the scene at all three fires. The first fire in April was actually two feet from my home in the 
neighboring unit. I was working in my office and I saw faint wisps of smoke outside the window. They 
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and spent time observing the interactions of physicians and nurses at the nurses’ station. 
In December 2010, I took part in a 12-hour ride-along in the downtown branch of a 
police department, getting the opportunity to attend morning and evening meetings and 
experience 10 hours in a patrol car. That was followed the next week by another 6-hour 
police ride along in an area east of downtown (“where the drugs are,” according to one 
officer; I did not observe any drug busts during my ride along). Also in December 2010, I 
spent 12 hours in a downtown station of a fire department. The next month, I spent time 
touring and observing at the headquarters of a SWAT unit that included two teams, and in 
February 2011, I spent a “Simulation Day” with a bomb squad, observing scenario-based 
training on site. In June 2011, I toured another ER and was able to spend some time 
observing interactions, and lastly, in February 2012, I spent a day with a SWAT team 
observing simulation activities. 
 My scheduled observations with teams and my escorted visits to ERs became 
more focused yet expansive with time. At the beginning, my observations and field notes 
focused primarily on documenting the team’s norms, processes, and culture.  As I 
                                                                                                                                            
were coming from my neighbor’s balcony, and after determining that he was not home, I called in the fire. 
When the engine came out, I observed their actions and conversations, and then I spoke with some of the 
firefighters as they waited on scene for their chief to take care of some administrative details. The second 
fire occurred in August during the hottest summer on record in Austin. I was driving to the grocery store 
and saw black smoke coming from the backyard of a home, I looped back around and the fire was large 
enough for me to call in again. This fire had already been called in. Along with the neighbors, we helped 
the homeowner get her child and pets out of the home safely, and again I stayed to observe as the same 
engine came to put out this fire. Again, I talked with some members of the engine once they fell into a 
holding pattern. The third time was on a rainy Friday night. We heard a clap of lightning that felt like…     
(continued) it was less than 200 yards away. Soon after, fire trucks wailed by our home and I followed 
them to what turned out to be a lightning-ignited home fire. Again, I was able to observe interactions, 
although unlike the first two fires, I arrived after the firefighters. When I noticed that it was the same shift 
(the chance of seeing them all three times is 1-in-9, as there are A, B, and C shifts in this area), I decided it 
would be better to refrain from re-introducing myself and asking about their experiences again. I do not 
directly reference these data in the following chapters, but I did use them to mentally elucidate my analysis. 
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continued with my observations, I also included references to the research goals.  I made 
sure to note my initial impressions, key events, and concepts that those in the field react 
to as “significant” (Emerson et al., 1995, p. 28).  The field notes were written loosely and 
flowingly, as prescribed by Emerson and colleagues (1995).  I also made direct 
quotations and theoretical memos where appropriate. I followed Geertz’s (1973) model of 
thick description in order to most accurately capture the intricacies of the events 
occurring in the field.  Thick description is necessary because fieldwork often observes “a 
multiplicity of complex conceptual structures, many of them superimposed upon or 
knotted into one another, which are at once strange, irregular, and inexplicit” (Geertz, 
1973, p. 9).   This is especially true in trying to understand the practices of action teams 
that deal in life-or-death terms because of complications from emotion and time 
constraints.   
I collected data until I felt that I had achieved theoretical saturation, which can be 
assumed when all new units of data can be categorized and explained by the research, 
offering no new conceptual returns (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Lindlof & Taylor, 2002; 
Snow, 1980).  I used Snow’s (1980) three-part test for information sufficiency.  First, 
data collection is sufficient when the world of research becomes taken for granted.  
Second, when no new data are being found to illuminate the categories, a project achieves 
theoretical saturation.  Third, when a researcher feels that their conceptual framework 




I used multiple methods to authenticate the data in this study.  Primarily, I used 
triangulation.  The value of triangulation is that the credibility of findings is strengthened 
if multiple methods, sources, researchers or theories provide similar results (Baxter & 
Eyles, 1997). I engaged in methodological triangulation by observing communicative 
processes, interviewing members about them, and reviewing training documents. I also 
engaged in source triangulation by using examples and quotes from multiple participants 
and multiple team types to support themes from the data.  Second, I engaged in member 
checking, a process by which findings are shared with the participants for further 
validation (Baxter & Eyles, 1997; Lindlof & Taylor, 2002; Lincoln & Guba, 1985).  I did 
so by sending brief summaries of my findings to some participants asking for their 
reactions.  While it is important to remember that participants do not have “privileged 
access to the truth” (Hammersley, 1992, p. 65), it can be valuable to see if the product of 
research study resonates with those who are being researched.  This process is also 
referred to as member tests of validity (Douglas, 1976) and host verification (Schatzman 
& Strauss, 1973).  In general, participants supported my thoughts about their work, 
although there were a few minor disputes of terminology. 
Lastly, I used peer debriefing to help authenticate my data.  Peer debriefing is the 
process of showing data and claims to another researcher in order to account for personal 
misinterpretation and suppression of themes and voices (Baxter & Eyles, 1997).  The 
process can also help uncover inconsistencies in analytical claims.  Peer debriefing is 
 68 
based on the assumption that a researcher cannot take an omniscient perspective on their 
data, thereby missing certain components and overvaluing others.  Under this assumption, 
it is important that the peer who will assist in authentication is not too similar to the 
researcher than they have the same blind spots, but also not so different that they desire to 
take the research in a completely different direction. Overall, while it may seem like four 
types of authentication are too many, I believe that data authentication is a process that 
deserves as much time and effort as possible.  
Data Analysis 
From my perspective, one of the advantages of qualitative research is that the 
researcher uses his own interpretations to shape categories, unlike quantitative research in 
which data is fit into preconceived codes (Charmaz, 2000).  While the perceptions of 
participants and past researchers are useful and valid, a qualitative researcher must have 
faith that the schema created by their personal lens are the most valid for a particular 
study.  
I took a thematic approach to coding both the observation and interview data, 
reducing the data and employing sensemaking as an attempt to “identify core 
consistencies” (Patton, 2002, p. 453).  I began by using an open coding scheme, using 
emergent categories to understand the roles of structure and improvisation in the process 
of critical teams (Emerson, Fretz, & Shaw, 1995; Browning, 1978). During this first step, 
I assigned a code to each thought. Codes were titled according to how they answered a 
research question or how they bonded to a major theme—from my subjective 
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perspective—of the research project. “Thoughts” varied in length; some were as short as 
four words (e.g., “There’s no perfect scene”) and others comprised an entire paragraph’s 
worth of words. By doing this, I followed the “unrestricted” strategy of Lindlof and 
Taylor (2002, p.219) by not yet defining the categories or their ranges, or specifically 
unitizing the data. The focus in this round of coding was on strength and repetition of 
comments (Owen, 1984).  The second stage consisted of focused coding, sometimes 
called selective coding (Lofland & Lofland, 1995).  Focused coding is more directed and 
conceptual than line-by-line coding (Charmaz, 1995; Glaser, 1978). In this stage, initial 
categories were examined for affinity to others with the purpose of collapsing the initial 
categories into broader meta-themes. The second round collapsed 197 codes (over 1,000 
“thoughts”) into 27 meta-themes. 
I used the constant comparative method (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Strauss & 
Corbin, 1994) to ensure that data fits both the initial categories of open coding and the 
meta-themes of focused coding. This method involves consistently reevaluating data and 
themes, taking care to confirm that each unit of data is placed in the appropriate category.  
Charmaz (2000) prescribes comparing data from: 1) different people and their 
perspectives and actions, 2) the same person at different times, 3) different incidents, 4) 
data with a category, and 5) one category with another (see Figure 3 for a visual 
representation of comparison types).  One of the advantages of the constant comparative 
method is that new data can be used to test the boundaries of conceptual categories and 
tentative hypotheses (Browning, Beyer, & Shetler, 1995).  On a macro level, all grounded 
theory researchers makes comparisons between data from the start of the collection 
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process by comparing what they find to things they already know from lived experience.  
Accordingly, the constant comparison method is a formalization of naturally-occurring 
human inductive analysis.   
Summary 
 In this section, I have detailed the research methodology I used to collect and 
analyze data for my dissertation. My methodological approach consists of semi-
structured interviews, informal interviews, and participant and even observation.  I used 
grounded theory because it allows theory to emerge from the data, and an inductive 
approach is appropriate because of the exploratory nature of this project.  I used two 
rounds of coding—open and focused—and I observed and analyzed data until achieving 
theoretical saturation. 
I am confident this research study meets Taylor and Trujillo’s (2001) criteria for 
rigorous qualitative research.  In terms of analysis, I believe I have: 1) demonstrated 
reflexivity between explanations and data, 2) used data that is representative of the larger 
set, 3) engaged in triangulation, and 4) saturated theoretical claims.  I provided evidence 
of a committed study and demonstrated verisimilitude. 
There is one additional measure from Taylor and Trujillo (2001) that I would like 
to discuss here.  Taylor and Trujillo (2001) call for researchers to use emic and inductive 
analyses in an effort to not succumb to totalization and reductionism.  However, my 
perspective on communication research is that the best studies are well generalized 
outside of the “naturally occurring features and discourse” of a particular organizational 
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scene (Taylor & Trujillo, 2001, p. 183); I believe that a good theory can act as a 
“hammer” to shatter the emic character of qualitative research (p. 183-184).  Ideally, the 
theory that has come out of the research will prove applicable to a larger set than just the 
observed group. This is a desire, but not a necessity, of this research project. 
However, the more realistic goal of this dissertation is development of a useful 
middle-range theoretical framework. Glaser (1978, 1992) established four criteria for 
evaluating a grounded theory (as referenced in Charmaz, 2000).  First, a theory must be 
developed from and fit the data and subsequent analysis.  Second, a theory must work by 
providing a useful conceptual rendering.  Third, it must display relevance by offering 
analytical explanations of actual problems or processes.  Fourth, a theory should contain 
enough modifiability that it can change to adapt to new, intriguing data.  With these four 
criteria in mind, I completed this research project.  
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Preface to the Results 
The following chapters present data collected about critical team training for 
improvisation. The data set and analysis is a response to this overarching question: How 
are critical team members primed, prepared, and equipped to deal with improvisation by 
their parent organizations? 
The data is presented in four chapters. Chapters Five, Six, and Seven each explore 
one of the three major “tools,” or training outcomes, that are used by critical teams to 
deal with improvisation: experience, communicative decision making, and sensemaking, 
respectively.  These tools are promoted in organizational training and continue to develop 
throughout the lifespan of teams.  
In each of these three chapters, I also explore how organizations that house 
critical teams have them progress through a particular phase to help nurture the 
corresponding improvisational tool: 
• In Chapter Five, I will explore how critical teams use simulations to develop 
experience. To set this up, I will position experience as both the primary basis for 
decisions as well as the primary process for learning.  
• In Chapter Six, I will explore how critical teams use the adaptation phase (i.e., 
timeouts) to allow space for communicative decision making. This follows a 
discussion of two main concepts of communicative decision making: discursive 
decision structures and team deliberation. 
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• In Chapter Seven, I will explore how critical teams use the debriefing process to 
enhance sensemaking. I will also explore situational awareness and organizational 
narratives, two forms of sensemaking that bookend the form that occurs in 
debriefing. 
These three phases—simulation, adaptation, and debriefing (which is technically a 
subphase of preparation, as I will explain in Chapter Eight) are what I term critical-
interactive phases. I use this term because they are specific to action and critical teams, 
and they are phases that are designed specifically for team interaction.  Please see Figure 
1 for a visual presentation of how the tools correspond to chapters and phases. These 
phases are taken in part from the nested phase model (Ishak & Ballard, 2012). 
 
 Before delving into specific tools and phases, in the next chapter I introduce the 
general framework of organizational training for critical team improvisation. The first 
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part of the results section, Chapter Four, is a study of dualities and dichotomies in the 
critical team process. First, I will discuss the duality of routine and non-routine events. 
Next, I will explore two complementary concepts: experiential structuring and 
improvising through critical thinking. Then, I will examine how critical organizations 
promote a structured yet flexible approach in the response process. Lastly, in Chapter 
Eight, I will explore the connection between this approach and the three tools and three 





CHAPTER 4 – STRUCTURED YET FLEXIBLE 
When Maggie joined the Marine Corps, they put her in a helicopter, strapped her 
into a flight seat, put blackout goggles on her eyes, and flipped her underwater. Then they 
told her to unstrap herself and swim on her own out of a window that she couldn’t see, 
shimmying out and rotating her body to make it safely to the surface before she ran out of 
air. This may seem like an extreme activity, but it is in fact standard for anyone who 
wants to be a helicopter pilot in any branch of the armed forces (if someone wants to be a 
jet pilot, they will have to do the same activity in the flight seat of a jet cockpit). Aspiring 
pilots have to escape the “helo dunker” multiple times in groups of six to eight.  First, 
they will do it upright with eyes open. They will do that one more time. Next, they will 
turn them upside down, but give them oxygen bottles, and ask them to do it all over 
again. Then again, with no oxygen. Then, eyes closed. Again. By the time you are done 
with the helo dunker, the experience of being trapped upside down underwater with no 
vision does not seem all that unfamiliar anymore. 
In addition, Maggie said that the end of every stage of training in the Marine 
Corps involves dealing with something called a compound emergency. This is when 
“more than one thing is going wrong at once and you have to figure out what order is best 
to address something that is going wrong. Some things will kill you faster than others so 
you put those fires out first.” Sometimes it is a literal fire, like if you are a helicopter pilot 
and “your number two engine is on fire and your radio goes out.” Sometimes, it is a 
metaphorical fire: what if your helicopter crashes in the middle of the ocean at night—
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which is difficult enough to deal with—and your own restraining harness will not come 
unbuckled? What if you cut through the restraining harness but the person in the flight 
seat closest to the window gets stuck trying to pass through the escape route? What do 
you do when you cannot do what you are supposed to do? 
These instances illustrate what I believe to be the main process-related goals of 
organizational training for critical teams and their members. Organizations want their 
members to increase familiarity and experience with critical team processes and the 
variables that affect them, such as environment, teammates, and resources. They also 
want members to develop senses of critical thinking, decision making, and situational 
awareness to help them deal with unique situations. These outcomes are used 
complementarily and concomitantly in the work of critical teams. 
More complex types of training may be aimed explicitly at advancing both goals. 
Success in full-scale simulations, which are designed to replicate an actual emergency, is 
contingent on accurate decision making as well as correctly enacted procedures. 
However, certain types of training can focus on or highlight one goal at a time. 
Familiarity training (goal 1) includes developing procedural memory (Moorman and 
Miner, 1998), which is learning how to perform skills and routines. Sometimes referred 
to as “motor memory” (Pressing, 1988), procedural memory is made up of “things you 
can do” (Berliner, 1994, p. 102), like a vocabulary of words and phrases, and can only be 
learned through repetition. For critical teams, this may include procedures like 
connecting a hose to a fire hydrant or landing a helicopter. These types of procedures are 
practiced over and over again until they become part of the “vocabulary” or “motor 
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memory” of members. From the organization’s standpoint, the goal of training that 
focuses on developing procedures, routines, and skills is to turn what is considered non-
routine into routine. 
Some types of training only highlight or focus on critical thinking and decision 
making (Goal 2). For example, tabletop exercises use scaled-down mockups of 
emergencies to help decision makers develop their understanding of the physical world 
(Mendonça & Fiedrich, 2006). These are sometimes referred to as sandbox or sand table 
simulations because symbolic or small-scale objects are often pushed around in a 
sandbox to mimic what would happen in an emergency. They are especially useful for 
practicing roles, interactions, and problem solving (Mendonça & Fiedrich, 2006), and 
variables can easily be manipulated to help decision makers become more comfortable 
with unexpected changes in the environment. Tabletop exercises are not particularly 
useful in developing or practicing procedures, with the possible exception of interactional 
procedures (e.g., a role call). From the organization’s perspective, the goal of this type of 
training is to help members understand how to make decisions in routine and non-routine 
events, including when to improvise. 
The difference between what is considered routine and non-routine is a salient one 
for critical teams. Interviewees repeatedly pointed out that routine events do not require 
improvisation whereas non-routine events do.  Based on analysis of the data collected in 
this research project, I argue that the primary goals of critical team training are 1) to 
increase familiarity with processes and variables, 2) to develop a sense of critical thinking 
to know when to enact particular processes, and 3) to develop a sense of situational 
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awareness.  In other words, the goals are to turn previously non-routine into routine 
events (in which improvisation is unnecessary), to better understand how to deal with 
non-routine events, and to understand the difference between the two. The distinction is 
important, as organizations prefer that teams work in routine events as much as possible. 
Why do organizations prefer that their embedded teams interpret events as routine, as 
opposed to non-routine? And why does the difference matter in a study about critical 
team training?  In the next section, I detail the difference between the two types of events. 
Routine and Non-routine Events 
The literature on organizational improvisation distinguishes between routine and 
non-routine factors for critical teams, such as tasks (Quarantelli, 1996), environments 
(Weick, 1993), and events (Dynes & Drabek, 1994). Distinguishing between the last of 
these—routine and non-routine events—is especially critical in this project. Many 
interviewees highlighted this duality by using the exact terms routine and non-routine, 
while some used their own terms or a set of terms provided by their organization. Most 
common in the medical field was the classifying term cut and dry (i.e., routine), spoken 
by three members of emergency medical terms. The term was used to explain that non-
routine situations require teamwork and critical thinking: “we use our critical thinking 
skills together to decide, because not everything’s cut and dry” (Tamara, ER Nurse). 
Other members differentiated events by commonality (“So like draining a wound—there 
are certain procedures that are very common. Cracking a chest open, that is a very 
uncommon procedure,” Nancy, ER Physician) and by referencing standard operating 
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procedure, or SOP (“You basically make decisions based on what you’ve seen. Some are 
SOP, some aren’t,” Tom, Firefighter). Heath, a nuclear electronics technician in the U.S. 
Navy, said that choosing the type of procedure or type of guidance to follow depends on 
the severity of the abnormal condition. He said there is a big difference between events 
that cause him to say: “oh, a light went off, do this”—meaning something small like a 
light-emitting diode needs to be replaced on a control panel—and “whoa, that’s the 
pump,” referring to a water pump that keeps the entire aircraft carrier from flooding.  
Three important facets of critical team work came out of the data regarding routine 
and non-routine events. First, some events (routine) are what would be considered cut 
and dry (originally cut and dried), meaning the correct action has been prepared in 
advance and lacks spontaneity, while other events do not have such an arrangement (non-
routine). Second, events that are non-routine require a different decision making process 
than those that are routine. Third, decision making in non-routine events usually becomes 
a communicative team endeavor. For example, Kristen, an EMT, said “communication 
depends on the situation” and went on to differentiate between communication in routine 
and non-routine calls. These three points substantiate the differences between routine and 
non-routine events and their importance in a study about team communication.  
 One of the main differences between organizational approaches to routine and 
non-routine events is that routine events are considered procedural whereas non-routine 
events are seen to be deserving of a more nuanced approach. Larry, a retired 
smokejumper, said: “most of the time, fighting fires was exactly like the training.” 
However, training seemed—at least from Larry’s perspective—more useful for non-
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routine events: “the time when training was most important was when it was a fire that 
was out of control.” At first glance it may seem contradictory for someone to say that 
routine events were just like training, all the while arguing that training was most 
important during non-routine events. However, this gives us some insight into the 
mindset of critical team members by showing us that training means something different 
for routine versus non-routine events.  Spencer, a firefighter in the Southeast region of the 
United States, explained how training is made up of everyday, specific activities as well 
as more general concepts: 
I think we're trained in two ways. One is things you just deal with every day. 
You're gonna have, people are gonna have heart attacks, people are gonna get in 
car accidents. Those are the types of things you can drill. Car fire: step A) lead the 
hose lines, step B) you know, put it through a straight stream, extinguish 
underneath the car, approach it as—go through: this is what's exactly going to 
happen. And then at the same time, you need to teach people more general 
concepts. One of the big things they teach is to use situational awareness, which is 
very broad idea. The idea of situational awareness is that you kind of like don't 
want your head to get lost in the fog, or you don't totally focus on exactly on what 
you're doing, but you want a general idea of like: okay I know the car is right 
there, the person is right here, there's um, a propane tank over there. If you know 
what's going on around you so that, that's a very general thing, you need to apply 
that anywhere you go, and they'll hammer you on that, too.  
 81 
Spencer’s comment elucidates how critical team training is made up of two components. 
One part of training is “the types of things you can drill,” meaning the common 
procedures, routines, and skills that will comprise the bulk of their work. This is what 
Moorman and Miner (1998) call procedural memory, which is based on familiarity with 
one’s routines. The second component of training is the general idea of not getting “lost 
in the fog” out in the field—in other words, keeping your wits about you. Many 
interviewees, including Spencer, use the term situational awareness, a concept very 
similar to sensemaking (Weick, 1993; 1995), and something that I will discuss in more 
detail in Chapter 7. However, here I will note one thing about it: situational awareness is 
important enough for critical teams that training leaders will “hammer” trainees on it, 
constantly reminding them to refresh their understanding of the situation and their 
environment. It is a tool that teams use to help make the right decisions in critical team 
work and the absence of it can result in feelings of vu jadé—I have never been here 
before--feelings that can lead to poor decisions and even death (Weick, 1993). Situational 
awareness must be present for decision making to be effective in both routine and non-
routine events, since decision making is based on situational elements. 
Most of the time, but not always, a person’s situational awareness is correlated 
with their comfort and experience in a given scenario. Kelly, a leader of an elite group of 
firefighters in the Mountain region of the U.S. known as a “hotshot crew,” explains what 
happens to new members during their first callouts: “Initially, there is a totally lost 
feeling: ‘what am I doing?’ It’s never scary, but you don’t understand.” As new members 
turn into experienced members, that feeling tends to go away (again, most of the time, but 
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not always). In this way, vu jade (“I’ve never been here before, I don’t know what to do”) 
is often a symptom of unfamiliarity. The potential breakdowns that could arise from 
feelings of vu jadé—combined with the mental, physical, and temporal pressures of 
critical team work—have pushed many organizations to believe that members will only 
perform as well as you train them to, and no better. This notion was expressed in a 
variety of ways, including idioms used by the organization to encourage robust levels of 
training. Damon, a downtown patrol officer in the Southwest, relayed a mantra from his 
police academy sessions: “We have this saying, which is: ‘you don’t rise to the 
occasion—you fall to your level of training.’” This shows why training is so valued for 
critical teams. 
This is not to say that team members perform poorer than expected during events; 
rather, it is an affirmation that people will do what they are trained to do. For example, 
when asked about the value of procedures, Spencer noted: “Those are the type of skills 
that I think people rely on when they’re in an emergency situation and they don’t have 
time to think everything out. They kinda have to fall back on what they’ve been doing.” 
Considering the epochality and finality—as well as the specialization and coordination 
needed to perform well—in critical team work, training is seen as a necessity, not a 
luxury (one SWAT team member mentioned the lack of training in his previous position 
with drug enforcement; this was the only mention of a dearth of training throughout the 
entire project). And when it comes to dealing with unpredictable scenes as critical team 
members do, training is necessary for drilling procedures, routines, and skills into 
members, and for “hammering” them on the general principles that make them able to 
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piece things together (things including procedures, routines and skills). The findings in 
this chapter revolve around these training outcomes.  
It is the non-routine events for which both of these outcomes are needed, as 
routine events are familiar to team members and rely most heavily on procedural 
memory, not critical thinking. Based on the thoughts expressed by interviewees, I argue 
that a member must satisfy three conditions for him or her to consider an event to be 
routine: 1) we know what to do, 2) we know how to do it, and 3) the what and how are 
fully applicable in the current situation. If any of these three conditions are not met, the 
event is likely to be considered non-routine by members. Another way to look at this 
three-condition set is that it is a method of determining if there are unknowns in decision 
making (team process), performance (taskwork), or in the situation. These three concepts 
relate to the three conditions listed, respectively. As for who “we” is, the term is used to 
refer to the relevant actors and decision makers involved in the event. In some fields (e.g. 
fire crews), this refers to the entirety of the team, potentially including as many as 20 
people. In others (e.g. ski patrol), this may refer to the single person who is present at an 
event before other members arrive. 
The concern in categorizing events like this as routine and non-routine is similar 
to the issue that Webb (1998) takes with Kreps and colleagues’ (1994) four-part method 
of coding structural forms: it can overemphasize the non-routine. In the case of Kreps and 
colleagues’ method, all four forms (domains, tasks, resources, and activities) have to be 
present for a structure to be considered an organization; otherwise, it is an organizing 
process. Webb believes this method overemphasizes improvisation. Here, in the case of 
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routine and non-routine events, I am arguing that all three conditions must be satisfied for 
an event to be considered routine; therefore, it could be argued that I am overemphasizing 
the non-routine.  However, as I stated in Chapter 2 with regards to improvisation, taking a 
continuum approach is more accurate and effective than creating a bipartition. I have not 
once used the word dichotomy to describe routine and non-routine events because, 
although many interviewees phrased it that way for emphasis, I do not believe that 
“routine” and “non-routine” are perfectly exhaustive and mutually exclusive. There is 
some overlap. Much like the difference between day and night, the two categories could 
be viewed as complete opposites, yet there are times when either (or neither) term could 
be used without being wrong (e.g., dusk; periods of midnight sun in the arctic circle). 
However, the difference between routine and non-routine events is still critical to 
understanding critical team training because it works as a way to understand events, as 
the categorization is salient to members of critical teams. In the next section, I will 
discuss how critical organizations train their members to gain experience and familiarity 
so that the set of events considered non-routine becomes smaller and smaller. 
Experiential Structuring 
 For a member to consider an event routine (and for his assessment to be accurate), 
it must mean that the level of training provided to him and his team has been sufficient 
for that event. The routine events are routine simply because members have been trained 
repeatedly to deal with those events. The challenge, then, is the set of non-
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that may present themselves in critical team work. How do teams and their parent 
organizations respond to non-routine events if the teams have not been trained for them? 
Some of the main goals of organizational training for critical teams are to increase 
familiarity with critical team processes and to develop a sense of critical thinking. The 
first goal, increasing familiarity with processes, is a way of building structural 
components into the response patterns of critical teams. In his discussion of 
improvisation in jazz and organizations, Barrett (1998) claims that building structure is a 
way for the organization to improve processes: “In an effort to guarantee consistency and 
efficiency, organizations often attempt to systematically avoid changes and ambiguity 
through creating standard operating procedures, clear and rationalized goals, and forms of 
centralized control” (p. 611). This is the core concept of the first goal of critical team 
training, which I will discuss below. 
Structure and Training 
From the start, basic training acts as a structural foundation for new members: “I 
think the structure is definitely there as a baseline we all start from. Then experience and 
personal relationships build on that foundation. I think the structure provides a common 
background to make working with new people more effective” (Kim, Wildland 
Firefighter). The importance of consistency in basic training was echoed throughout the 
interviews. Larry, a retired smokejumper, said that consistency in personnel was a key 
element in teamwork: “it's really important that you—the other guys that are around you 
have had the exactly the same training that you did and are going to respond to situations 
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exactly the same way you did.” Sometimes, the basic structure comes in the form of a 
degree or certification, such as attending medical school or a police academy. In other 
fields, such as ski patrol, some of the structure may present itself in team training days: 
“Every year, we do preseason; we do three days of training, two of which are exclusively 
medical focused, and one of which is kind of procedures and what’s going on on the 
mountain” (Trent, Ski Patroller). Trent said that one person missing the preseason would 
put the whole team at a disadvantage because it could cause a lack of consistency. 
 In the case of degree programs, major certifications, or academies, structure 
builds as training moves from somewhat theoretical to mostly applied. For example, most 
medical programs will require numerous hours of classroom learning followed by some 
form of observational learning. EMT certifications in most states require 120 hours in the 
classroom (half lecture-based, half skills training) followed by 20 hours of ride-alongs 
(10 hours in an ambulance and 10 hours in the ER). Spencer said that his firefighter 
training followed a similar pattern, going from mostly PowerPoint lectures to scenario-
based training: “as the course progresses, it gets more and more hands on, until at the 
end, we are, two times a week, sometimes three times a week, we are going to the 
firefighter training grounds and doing simulations.” Spencer’s experience serves as an 
exemplar for training in the medical and firefighting fields. All nurses, physicians, EMTs, 
ski patrollers, and firefighters recalled similar training experiences, as did some of the 
tactical team members (e.g., SWAT team and bomb squad members). The only critical 
team members who felt their training went slightly differently were those in the military, 
who felt that the physical component of their work played a larger role early on in 
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training than in other fields. However, all interviewees supported the idea that structure 
slowly builds as training moves from the classroom into the field. 
 Lt. Denton, leader of a SWAT team in the Southwest, used the phrase “Crawl, 
walk, run” to explain how training escalates in complexity in his unit. He said that new 
members cannot learn everything right away, “and they may not be ready to learn 
something if they don’t have the earlier structure in place.” Lt. Denton and two of his 
team leaders, Darren and John, were adamant that asking a team member to “run” before 
they have the right building blocks in place would probably be detrimental to their 
learning process, especially in an actual event. There is a similar notion in medical school 
expressed as “See one, do one, teach one.” The idea behind this process is that a person 
would have to observe something before they could attempt it; then, they would become 
good enough to start the process with someone else. Nancy said that this is how she has 
learned to do a number of procedures on the job as an ER physician. She explained how 
she became familiar with a complicated procedure using this approach—including what 
she should do if she made a mistake: 
I’ve seen one done before.  So you’ve heard in medicine – you can see one, do 
one, teach one? So I saw one (laughs). So, then yesterday I did one, but I told Jeff, 
I’m like: ‘Look, I’ve never done one. Can you do it with me but let me do it?’ So 
he showed me exactly what to do. He handed me the needles to numb up the eye, 
he handed me—he was holding the instruments—so he handed me the scissors to 
cut the ligaments, so I mean, he was good about walking me through it. So, I 
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mean, I knew the steps, I just wanted someone there by my side in case I did it 
wrong, or maybe had some type of difficulty in the procedure. 
The only interviewee who was able to recall a moment in training in which they 
were asked to do something that was well above their familiarity level was Spencer, who 
told a story about a being placed in a mass casualty simulation during the first week of 
training. Spencer said it was chaotic and went horribly wrong as he and his classmates 
found out that they were woefully underprepared. However, Spencer believes that was 
the purpose of the simulation: to learn how far they had to go. This “trial-by-fire” 
approach, while certainly dramatic, does not seem to be too common among critical team 
training programs. 
 A more common approach to increasing difficulty in training is to do so 
gradually, so that structure can build as simulations become more difficult. Larry, a 
retired smokejumper, recalls his last practice jump as the culmination of a series of 
escalating steps: 
The practice jumps were pretty thorough. And then the final one was in an area 
where there was no good place to land. And almost everybody landed with their 
parachutes draped over tall trees and you had to then lower yourself to the ground 
and figure out how to get your parachute out of the tree. 
The final practice jump built on the structure of earlier, easier jumps by adding a new 
component to the situation. Maggie’s story about the helo-dunker at the beginning of this 
chapter also had a gradual increase in difficulty: “So they run you through kind of what I 
would call a ‘crawl, walk, run’ phase to run through this stuff.” Maggie explained how 
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they first simulated a water landing by going in upright with oxygen tanks and eyes open. 
Next they did the exercise upside down, then they did it without oxygen tanks, and finally 
they simulated a night water landing by wearing black-out goggles. Maggie also said 
there was an explanation of what to do before every iteration, and they were encouraged 
to sit in the flight seats before the dunks and to become comfortable with the equipment 
and layout. In this way, organizations try to expand the comfort zones of the participants 
with each new component of training. 
  In many ways, the process of building structure though training is much like the 
workup cycle of an aircraft carrier. One iteration of the workup cycle starts when the 
vessel comes out of the shipyard, where it had been receiving maintenance. As Heath, a 
nuclear electronics technician with the U.S. Navy, explained, the ship “hasn’t really been 
doing anything. And so you go on the water a few times, no aircraft, and you test it out.” 
Then, in the next few months, Heath said the ship will go out again a few times with 
aircraft, and team members will check on a few extra capabilities of the ship. After 
building up more and more use, the aircraft carrier would be able to go out on 
deployment for a 12 to 18 months. In fact, the training cycle of the people on the aircraft 
carrier is often entrained with the workup cycle of the ship. In this way, the workup cycle 
is a mechanical manifestation of the process by which critical teams build structure. 
Summary 
 One of the main goals of critical team training is increasing experience and 
familiarity with events and situations for team members. This is a form of structure 
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building. This includes basic training, which acts as a structural foundation for new 
members. Organizations generally bring members along gradually by following a “crawl, 
walk, run” setup, allowing members to increase their familiarity and comfort with each 
new component of training. In this way, training is a continual process of building 
structure that will help the actions of critical teams. 
Improvising through Critical Thinking 
The second goal of training is to develop a sense of critical thinking that would 
allow for enactment of routines or new processes.  This is an important outcome of 
training because it is not practically feasible to run through every scenario or even for 
training coordinators to know every scenario beforehand (Kendra & Wachtendorf, 2003). 
In addition, team members themselves believe critical thinking to be an important 
component of their work; for example, Thackaberry (2004), found that wildland 
firefighters wanted a culture that promoted thinking; specifically, the firefighters viewed 
development of a safety culture “that encourages people to think rather than just obey the 
rules” as a highly favored solution to the safety problems they faced in their work (Tri-
Data, 1997, p. 10).   
Consequently, training exists in part to help members learn how to adapt in 
unfamiliar situations, or as one firefighter said: “You can train for everything, but the 
reason you train so much is to train for the thing you haven’t been trained for” (Mac). 
Adaptation is a precursor to improvising, which involves critically thinking about the 
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situation and composing previously known elements in a new way (Berliner, 1994; 
Crossan & Sorrenti, 1997). This is necessary in non-routine events.  
So training helps teams deal with non-routine events in two ways. First, training 
helps them turn the non-routine into routine, which comes through a process of building 
structure. This was covered in the previous section. Second, training helps teams 
understand how to use previously known (routine) aspects of their work to deal with non-
routine events through critical thinking. These two goals complement each other in a 
structurational pattern (Giddens, 1984). As stated earlier, routine events occur when 
teams 1) know what do to do, 2) know how to do it, and 3) what and how are fully 
applicable in the current situation. If one of these conditions is not met, a team must enact 
some form of improvisation in response to a non-routine event. According to Shibutani 
(1986), “if the normative framework does not provide an adequate guide to concerted 
action, the people involved in the situation must work together to improvise some way of 
coping with it” (p. 269). That is the essence of the findings in this section. 
One example of the interaction between structure and improvisation in critical 
team work comes from a story from Nancy, an ER physician, about an aortic dissection. 
Nancy was working in the emergency department of a community hospital on the 
overnight shift. Most times, she was not the only physician in the department, but on this 
night she was working by herself. A patient came in complaining of chest pain, and 
Nancy’s department was under-resourced for what that symptom could lead to, as it did 
not have a catheterization laboratory to perform emergency angioplasties or place a stent 
in case of a heart attack. Nonetheless, Nancy saw the patient and asked if he was still 
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having chest pains. He said no. However, 30 minutes later, the patient’s wife ran out of 
his room banged on the glass of the “fish bowl,” where the nurses and doctors sat: “Come 
see! Come see! Something is wrong with my husband!” Nancy and the nurses went to the 
room and the patient had turned blue. He started vomiting and he flat lined. Nancy tried 
to intubate him, but before she could do that, he woke up and said he was having pain in 
his side. Nancy grabbed the ultrasound machine and looked at his gall bladder; it was 
fine. He said: “No, it’s lower than that.” He started shaking his legs, so Nancy pulled up 
the sheet to see that his right leg was as white as the linens themselves. He had no pulse 
in his leg. Nancy decided that it might have been an aortic dissection, something she 
recognized from medical school and from previous experiences. She confirmed it with a 
cat scan. An aortic dissection is serious enough that a doctor will ask for family to come 
in that night, as the patient might die. In this case, the patient’s medical condition’s 
severity was compounded by the fact that this hospital was ill-equipped for the necessary 
surgery. Nancy spent all night trying to get the patient transferred to another hospital: 
“I’ll go through this the regular route which is calling each hospital to try to find someone 
who could accept the patient.” Eventually, a sister hospital agreed to accept him. 
However, the ambulance that was supposed to transfer him never showed: 
We called them and said: ‘Where are you guys?’ and they were like, ‘oh, we are 
coming—we’ll be there in a little bit.’ And I said, ‘no this is not in a little bit.’ 
Someone had told me you could call 911 and get an ambulance to come to the 
ER, so we ended up calling 911 which in hindsight, now that I know what I know 
after going through this experience, next time I am calling 911.  You can actually 
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call 911 from the Emergency department if that ER is not equipped to handle a 
patient. 
The 911 ambulance came and refused to take the patient unless a doctor chaperoned him 
there. Nancy went with him to the other hospital where he had a successful surgery, and 
he walked out of the hospital two weeks later. This shows how Nancy had to think 
critically and improvise. 
 Nancy’s story about calling 911 from the emergency department is an excellent 
example of the interplay between structure and improvisation during non-routine events. 
First, structure was present in the procedures Nancy used when the patient first showed 
life-threatening symptoms, and when she made calls to other hospitals. Second, Nancy 
remembered that someone said she could call 911 from the ER, which was a form of 
learning that occurred before the event, making it a type of structure. As for 
improvisation, Nancy demonstrated her ability to take structured information (“this 
patient needs surgery” and “I can call 911 from the ER”) and compose it in a way that 
was new to her. She had never done that before, and as she said: “now that I know what I 
know after going through this experience, next time I am calling 911.” In this way, 
Nancy’s improvisation ultimately became part of her structure. 
Improvisation is seen as a natural response to the unpredictability and time-
sensitive nature of critical team work. Interviewees were very matter-of-fact when asked 
about improvisation. Sarah, an ER nurse on the west coast, said, simply: “I mean, you 
improvise. [Our work] usually goes pretty smoothly and everyone just assumes their role 
but there’s always situations where it’s kinda chaotic or something unexpected happens.” 
 94 
Other interviewees acknowledged the routineness of non-routineness.  As an EMT, 
Kristen said there are times when she has no idea what is going on, and her job is to cover 
the basic life threats and get the patient safely to the hospital (she said that sometimes it is 
“a wild goose chase” trying to find the problem). As a, ER physician, Nancy said that 
patients can always throw her “a curve ball,” even when she does everything correctly 
according to the textbook. This does not mean that Kristen and Nancy are unprepared in 
any way. Rather, it confirms two ideas: 1) as Mac said: “You can train for everything, but 
the reason you train so much is to train for the thing you haven’t been trained for,” and 2) 
due to that, the expectation in critical team work is that you will have to improvise from 
time to time to the best of your abilities. Multiple interviewees said that there are 
unlimited variables in critical team work and they see improvising as a natural response 
to them. 
Sometimes, improvisation is seen as simply responding in a way that makes the 
most sense in a given situation. For tactical teams, this can mean improvising as a 
response to the unpredictability of a suspect. Lt. Denton said SWAT callouts are 
systematic and actions are driven by 1) intelligence (i.e., what they know about the 
situation) and 2) actions of “the bad guy.” A team may go outside of general orders to do 
what makes sense given the unpredictability of the suspect’s actions. Sgt. Carey, the 
leader of a bomb squad in the Southwest, pointed out that the majority of the so-called 
“bombs” that they deal with are technically termed “improvised explosive devices” in 
which the components are purchased from a place like Radio Shack and assembled in a 
garage: “It’s made out of whatever the maker can beg, borrow, steal, or buy.” As a 
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response to the improvised nature of the explosives, Sgt. Carey ensures that his team is 
familiar with as many components as possible and that his team is intelligently flexible in 
their own responses.  
In addition, environmental variables may lead to the need for improvisation. 
Trent, a ski patroller in the Mountain region of the U.S., said that extreme weather factors 
often lead to decisions that are sensible but go against standard operating procedure.  
I think for us there’s a lot of like: okay, is it better for me to sit here and do a real 
thorough full assessment and make sure I’m not missing anything on this person 
who blew their knee out, or is it better to get them the hell out of the 30 mile-an-
hour winds and negative 10-degree weather. I mean protocol says we sit there and 
do a head to toe, and a patient history, and all that stuff, but more often than not 
for us, it’s package and go, at a much more quick rate and with less assessment 
than other agencies due to the environment. 
Trent’s comments, along with those of the tactical team leaders, demonstrate that critical 
teams must often step outside of standard procedures in order to most effectively respond 
to the unlimited variables in their work environments. In addition, stepping outside of 
standard procedures is not considered taboo, or even uncommon, among team members, 
their leaders, or their parent organizations. In fact, it seems that most organizations give 
their members flexibility to act as they see fit, as long as their actions are considered 
sensible in the end. Such flexibility complements the structural components that members 
learn throughout training, and both flexibility and structure come into play for routine and 
non-routine event alike. Therefore, given that it is not as simple as saying: “routine events 
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demand structural responses” and “non-routine events call for improvisation,” how do 
critical team organizations train their members to have structure and flexibility 
complement each other in their work? 
Summary 
One of the main goals of critical team training for organizations is developing a 
sense of critical thinking in its members. Critical thinking is a form of adaptation, and 
adaptation is a precursor to improvisation. Training for critical thinking involves helping 
members understand how to use previously known aspects of their work to deal with non-
routine events.  According to Shibutani (1986), “if the normative framework does not 
provide an adequate guide to concerted action, the people involved in the situation must 
work together to improvise some way of coping with it” (p. 269). In this way, training 
creates spaces for flexibility that will help the actions of critical teams. 
A Structured Yet Flexible Approach 
The following passage is from a book on cooking techniques by Alton Brown (2006), 
host of the cooking show Good Eats: 
Let’s say I invite you to lunch. You’ve never been to my house so you ask for 
directions. I fax you a very precise list of instructions designed to get you where 
you’re going. Distances are calculated to the tenth of the mile and landmarks are 
described in Proustian detail. You arrive without a hitch. But do you know where 
you are? If a tree had fallen in the road or a road suddenly closed, would you 
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know what to do? Unless you have a global positioning system in your pocket, 
I’m eating lunch alone.  If only I had sent you a map instead (p. 6). 
Brown uses this analogy to set the reader up for the dearth of recipes in his book. He 
explains that recipes are like explicit driving directions, in that one misstep or missing 
ingredient could get somebody completely lost. Instead, his book is filled with general 
concepts of cooking, lists of substitutions, and many alterative strategies that help the 
user “know where we are when we get there” (p. 6). However, Brown says: “I not only 
use recipes, I try to memorize them from time to time so that I can ponder their finer 
points” (p.10). Brown’s philosophy of cooking is that one should know procedures but 
still think critically (“the most underused tool in the kitchen is the brain”) to do things 
differently if necessary or desired. 
 In the same way, organizations try to give their members a holistic understanding 
of critical team work by providing small forms of structure combined with methods to 
encourage flexibility. Instead of giving specific directions on how to handle entire scenes, 
organizations give their members roadmaps of events: detailed yet general and flexible 
understandings of what could happen.  The roadmap approach relies on resources, 
experience, smaller procedure directions, and other forms of decision support. It also 
takes critical thinking skills and situational awareness to be able to read a map correctly. 
The roadmap approach allows teams to make small adjustments and not feel lost or off-
track.  
While simpler tasks may have one applicable method that can be considered 
“best,” the complexity present in critical team work makes it difficult to identify one 
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perfect approach to an entire scene, which usually includes numerous interrelated 
decisions and actions. Put another way, “there is not one perfect way to do everything” 
(Sgt. Carey, Bomb Squad). This understanding allows teams the flexibility to change 
course or adapt when they feel it is appropriate; the roadmap approach is a team’s license 
to improvise. 
 Of course, the roadmap approach only works under the assumption that members 
are using, in their words, “common sense.” Common sense, of course, is in the eye of the 
person doing the sensing. As someone who is not familiar with the human body, or the 
intricacies of fire control, there are many aspects of critical team work that they might 
consider common sense about which I would be clueless. Consider this quote from Mac, 
a firefighter: 
But the focus has been on: stop worrying about following every rule to the T, just 
use your common sense. You know, don't waste time or energies trying to make 
sure you're following every protocol. If you see an obvious fix to it, don't let 
common sense go out the door. 
For a firefighter who has only been taught procedures using very specific, step-by-step 
directions, it would be “common sense” to follow every protocol, because he would not 
know how to approach the situation any differently; he would respond exactly as his 
training had taught him. This highlights the main caveat of the roadmap approach: it 
gives members a lot of flexibility, and consequently a lot of responsibility, to choose the 
right path.  
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 In the following chapters, I will talk about three process values that are desired by 
critical team members and valued by the organizations training them. These three process 
values are experience, communicative decision making, and situational awareness. I 
believe that “common sense,” as it relates to critical teams, is a combination of these 
three values. As a critical team member, do you have the experience to make a scenario 
“common”? Do you have the situational awareness to make sense of the scenario? And 
can you use these values to make a decision as a team? These are the questions that must 
be answered affirmatively for the roadmap approach to be an effective one. 
Communication Flexibility 
 The flexibility of the roadmap approach is also applied to communicating within 
critical teams.  Many firefighting and police crews previously used the “10 codes,” which 
are a series of numerical codes said verbally to represent common phrases. For example, 
saying the code 10-31 verbally over the police radio means that there is a crime in 
progress: “We have a 10-31 at Westover and Norwalk.” In his time as a smokejumper 
more than four decades ago, Larry said that they had to learn radio codes as part of the 
firefighting vocabulary: “We all knew, for instance, about the radio codes. So if 
somebody had a radio they would use it the same way, there 10 codes and 6 codes and 
10-4, 10-6, 10-20, what's your 20, all that kind of stuff, but the vocabulary was the same 
for everybody that was there.” However, in recent years many departments and states 
have phased out 10 codes in favor of plain English. Tom, a firefighter in the downtown 
area of a major city in the Southwest, said that they stopped using the codes because they 
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were too confusing among different jurisdictions, and that it was much easier and clearer 
to simply ask “Where are you?” instead of “What’s your 10-20?” His department stopped 
using them 11 years ago. The SWAT team in the same city switched away from the 10 
codes as well and uses what they call “plain talk.” Even within departments that still use 
the codes, there is an understanding that plain talk can be less inhibiting during events. 
Trent said that while ski patrollers still use them, there is a shift away from the codes. 
The National Incident Management System (NIMS)—an attempt by FEMA to coordinate 
critical team work across all public and private sectors—does not use them because: 
 Not all agencies know the 10 codes, and you have to memorize all this different 
numbers, and if you say the wrong one, you’re not communicating. So I know for 
NIMS, for which I have a cert, they get rid of that, and they say: screw that stuff, 
we just want to make sure you’re clear and concise. And that is coached for sure. 
Mac said that the leaders of his firefighter training were very clear that communication 
should not get in the way of getting the job done: “One of the big deals is saying: if you 
forget a particular code, or, you know, you don't quite know how to sound quite as 
professional on the radio as you’re supposed to…bottom line, if you just tell people what 
you need, no mater how sophisticated the language is, that's kind of been the new mantra 
in the department, because we have so many new people, kind of interchanging in and 
out of the department.” 
 However, critical teams still structure components of their communication 
patterns. For example, Sarah said that medical professionals practice what is called closed 
loop communication, in which the receiver repeats and responds to the command audibly:  
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So in a code situation, the MD supervisor would say: “let’s give 100 mg of 
epinephrine” then the one who’s actually administering the medication needs to 
say out loud: “giving 100 mg of epinephrine” or whatever. I find this very helpful. 
When you do it, it eliminates a lot of errors. Usually there’s too many people 
yelling and screaming.    
Sarah said that closed loop communication is emphasized by the organization in training 
and in simulations. It mirrors the communication pattern used in some branches of the 
military, including the Navy (“closing the pump, aye”). In this way, minimal structures 
(Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997; Kamoche & Cunha, 2001) exist in the communication 
environment around which other patterns can be flexible, clear, and concise. 
Role Flexibility 
 It is also expected that members should be flexible in the roles they assume within 
the team, because “you don’t know who’s going to be put into different situations” (Kim, 
Wildland Firefighter). Role improvisation has been well-documented in the emergency 
management (Mendonça & Fiedrich, 2006; Webb, 2004) and can be practiced by cross-
training members during simulations (Mendonça & Fiedrich, 2006). This is consistent 
with the patterns of the teams observed for this study. For example, a senior member of a 
bomb squad said that each member of the squad is cross-trained to perform every role on 
the team; he described his crew as “a team of individuals” in that they have to be ready to 
move from role to role without skipping a beat. Kim said that cross-training is critical in 
wildland firefighting because “you never know when you’re going to be the person on the 
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radio, or a situation pops up where you kind of, all of a sudden, are the only man around.” 
This idea was supported by other wildland firefighter and some urban firefighters as well. 
The nature of critical team work is that scenes are unpredictable and structures can 
change in an instant. Each member needs to be ready for a multitude of roles within the 
team. 
As with actions and communication patterns, roles are seen as flexible yet 
structured. Many medical team members have specializations based on their training and 
experience. Tactical team members mentioned that most of them have “unofficial” 
specializations; in addition, SWAT teams have official specialists, such as snipers. In 
other instances, roles are assigned on a daily basis. Sarah said that members in critical 
care centers are often assigned “code blue” roles—such as medication nurse or equipment 
nurse—at the beginning of each shift so that they know exactly who should do what in 
the case of a heart attack. She said that this type of role-specific response is practiced in 
training as well, and she supports the strategy: “I think that just helps to cut down the 
stress and eliminate communication problems because you have that one role that you 
know you’re doing and nobody jumps into another person’s role.” Sarah said that there 
are often too many members during a code blue and it can lead to decision making and 
environmental stresses that lower overall efficacy. By assigning temporary roles at the 
beginning of each shift, the hospital works to lower the average number of extraneous 




 Organizations that support critical teams give their members a holistic 
understanding of—and an allowance of freedom—in events by providing small forms of 
structure combined with processes that encourage flexibility. I term this the roadmap 
approach to critical team work because members are given a general view with details as 
opposed to specific step-by-step direction for entire events. The roadmap approach 
provides structure through experience and flexibility through encouragement of critical 
thinking processes. This approach also applies to communication patterns and roles. The 
roadmap approach’s quality is dependent on the sense of team members, which will be 
discussed further in Chapter 7. 
Chapter 4 Summary 
In this chapter, I explored how organizations conceptually prime and prepare their 
members for improvisation and flexibility in their work. First, I examined the duality of 
routine and non-routine events. Next, I discussed how members structure their actions 
through experience. Then, I examined how critical thinking encourages improvisation. 
Finally, I detailed a structured yet flexible perspective on events that I termed the 
roadmap approach. 
I have also identified three highly desired outcomes of critical team training. I discuss 
each of these outcomes as well as how they fit into the nested phase model (Ishak & 
Ballard, 2012) in the next three chapters: 
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• In Chapter 5, I discuss experience. Experienced members have a large 
repository of procedural memory—or routines to access—that help that feel 
familiar with their work. Organizations provide a low- to no-risk environment 
for gaining experience by running simulations. 
• In Chapter 6, I discuss communicative decision making, which is an avenue 
for accessing and compiling the right routines. Communicative decision 
making is a form of critical thinking that often occurs during the adaptation 
phase. 
• The third desired outcome is a way to make sense of it all, which happens 
through situational awareness and sensemaking (discussed in Chapter 7). 
Situational awareness is a form of sensemaking that is applicable to action 
teams; it is a way to understand surrounds so that decisions have the correct 
inputs. Retrospective sensemaking occurs in the debriefing process. 
These three outcomes are critical to effective use of the roadmap approach. In other 
words, balancing structure and flexibility in critical team work is a delicate process that 
requires experience, teamwork, and common sense. 
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CHAPTER 5 – TIME FOR EXPERIENCE 
What are decisions in critical team work based on? In Chapter 4, I discussed how 
emergency organizations provide structural elements (e.g., procedures, routines, and 
skills) for their members while still allowing space for flexibility in decision making. In 
this chapter, I will explore how experience serves the primary basis for decisions in 
critical team work. I will also discuss how experience also serves as the primary means of 
learning how to do work. 
These two values of experience create a paradox of sorts. Let us say a fire 
department wants to train members on skills and decision making processes in high-rise 
fires; the best way for them to do so would be to have them experience the scenario. 
However, putting them in a position to get experience in a real-life high-rise situation 
could be unwise because they have not yet developed their situation-specific decision 
making capabilities. How, then, do organizations get experience for their members? 
Organizations create safe spaces for experience in two ways. The first way is by 
using the “see one, do one, teach one” style of training, in which inexperienced members 
can be supervised by those with longer tenures. In this way, safety is ensured while new 
members (or experienced members learning a new procedure) get valuable experience 
that will serve them well in the future. This was discussed in Chapter 4. 
The second way that organizations create a safe space for gaining experience is by 
making time for it in training. Specifically, I am talking about scenario-based training 
(SBT), or simulations. In simulations, decision making and skill capabilities are exercised 
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in a low- to no-risk environment. Simulations are described in the nested phase model as 
a way of coping with the finality of the work of action teams (Ishak & Ballard, 2012). In 
this chapter, I discuss simulations as a way of “cheating” the paradox of the two values of 
experience described above. First, however, I will explore the two values of experience: it 
is the foundation of decisions as well as the primary method of learning. 
Experience as the Foundation of Decisions 
Viewing experience through the works of Dewey (1939, 1958) lends support to 
the idea that the two goals of critical team training are 1) to turn the routine into the non-
routine, and 2) to help teams enact new processes when necessary. Specifically, I will 
examine two dualities of experience in Dewey’s work. First, I will examine the 
distinction between primary and secondary experience. Primary experience is a gross, 
crude experience of subject matters, meaning it is based on interaction with physical 
senses, and not a process of reflection (Dewey, 1958).  By contrast, secondary experience 
is the reflection on primary experience; it is a rational process that involves making 
mental sense of the interactions with one’s environment or situation (Dewey, 1958). I 
will discuss this distinction, and the connection between the data in this project and 
Dewey’s view of experience, in depth in Chapter 8. 
However, there is another distinction that Dewey makes that is important to 
discuss at this point. Dewey (1938) posits that experience comes out of the collaboration 
between two principles: continuity and interaction. Continuity means that past 
experiences will influence present experiences, and interaction means that experiences 
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are based on situational elements in the present. Present experiences are created by the 
collaboration of these continuities and interactions. Like Dewey, Giddens (1979) argues 
that we reflexively monitor our past when deciding to engage in actions. In other words, 
decisions are founded on experience. 
Supporting the arguments of Dewey (1938) and Giddens (1979), interviewees in 
this project said that past experiences are a form of structure for current decisions. When 
asked what her decisions were based on, Kristen, an EMT and instructor, said: “I would 
say for me, it’s probably 95 percent experience.” She added: “It’s only by experience that 
you can learn how to identify, I mean as soon as you walk in a room, that person’s sick, 
or that person’s not sick. Are there exceptions to the rule? Absolutely, as with anything. 
But with experience comes the ability to make that differentiation.” This was a common 
refrain in medical, tactical, and firefighting interviews, and it recalls the triage process of 
Eisenberg and colleagues’ (2005) study of communication in emergency departments. In 
the triage process, nurses had to be especially skilled at determining if patients were sick, 
faking, or a hypochondriac. They also said that said that the ED staff makes quick 
decisions based on incomplete information by relying on information from past 
experiences (p. 398). The idea that decisions are based on past experiences is the 
foundation of this section. 
 An aspiring critical team member’s first exposure to real-life events comes during 
training. Strong training programs are ones that get their students experience early and 
often. Sarah said that exposure to real-life scenarios makes some programs better than 
others, and that exposure generally comes through clinical hours in rotation. She said a 
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good program “exposes you more,” which is beneficial because it offers opportunities for 
critical thinking and evaluation.  As an instructor for EMTs, Kristen said that a good 
program is one that speeds up the experience curve (“As instructors, we try to teach them 
how to get experienced”), which can come from something like scenario-based 
education. However, Kelly argued that you cannot “speed up the process; it just takes 
time.” She said that firefighters have to fight actual fires—not practice burns—to 
understand what’s going on. But how can a person get real-life experience if it takes 
experience to make the decisions necessary in those real-life experiences? This is a 
tautological issue for all action teams. Essentially, one needs experience to be 
experienced enough to get experience.  
Team leaders also value experience when staffing their teams. This means two 
things: they will 1) look for people with experience, and 2) try to get them experience as 
quickly as possible. Sgt. Carey said that he wants people with a proven track record and 
work ethic for his bomb squad, in part because it demonstrates “they have seen most of 
it” in their time as a patrol officer, meaning that he wants officers with a long tenure that 
will serve as a strong experience-based foundation. He also wants people who will join 
the squad for the long haul so they can get substantial experience with improvised 
explosive devices. Currently, most members of his squad have tenures of 5 to 10 years, 
and while an aspiring squad member can get certified in two years, Sgt. Carey will not 
allow them to make decisions until one to two years after that: “they still need that 
experience to be ready.” Other bomb squad members hinted that Sgt. Carey believes this 
because he places an especially high premium on experience within his squad; he 
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believes that previous experiences are not entirely transferrable. This raises the question 
of what is considered relevant experience, a question that I will address in Chapter 8.  
Sgt. Carey’s team is not the only one that gives credibility to those with the most 
experience. Senior members generally make teamwide decisions for critical teams. Part 
of this is that they may have the official title to make decisions, and part of the reason is 
that they have the most experience on the team. Larry explained that he deferred to 
experience in multiple aspects of smokejumping because he believed experience to be an 
indicator of quality decision making: “The team leader was always somebody who had 
more experience and had been in this situation more often than I had, and therefore what 
he said was what I was gonna do.” Kristen said that when EMTs are paired for shifts, 
they are designated as the senior and junior partner based on experience; she said juniors 
with less than a few years of experience are generally hesitant to make big decisions 
without the consultation of a senior member. This shows how experience is valued in 
team decision making. 
Summary 
 Past experience acts as structure for current decisions for critical team members. 
Experience helps members make decisions during stressful situations in which decision 
making must occur swiftly and accurately. This is why critical team training programs are 
considered better when they get their students exposure to real-life events early and often. 
Team leaders value experience when staffing their teams, and generally allow the most 
experienced members to have the final say in major decisions. I have discussed 
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experience as the basis for decisions, and in the next section, I will explore how 
experience is seen as the only way to learn how make decisions. 
Experience as the Only Way to Learn 
In the previous section, “experience” was the answer to the question: “how do you 
make decisions?” In this section, “experience is the answer to a slightly different 
question: “How do you learn to make decisions?” The distinction is subtle but important. 
In the previous section, I discussed past experience as a repository of knowledge, or the 
basis for current action and decisions. In this section, I will discuss how experience is the 
process by which critical team members learn how to do their work. 
In any critical team training program, there are two major components: classroom 
instruction and hands-on instruction. Members said these two types of learning have 
completely different roles in their decision making processes and physical actions. 
Namely, classroom instruction is seen as a good basis for hands-on instruction.  Kristen, 
an EMT, described the dichotomy in this way: “there’s what the book teaches you, and 
there’s what the street teaches you, and they’re two totally different things. And you need 
to know what the book says, but there is no way possible that any textbook is going to 
cover every situation that you come across.” When asked how she made decisions, 
Kristen responded by saying that her decisions are based mostly on what the “street” had 
taught her: 
I mean, certainly, you learn a lot in the classroom, and theoretically, everybody 
has the same foundation, but you can only learn so much about human being or 
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about the disease process by reading a book. You have to actually get your hands 
on patients, and see patients, and examine them and assess them, to see who’s 
sick and who’s not sick.   
Kristen’s response was echoed by numerous interviewees across all types of work: 
medical, firefighting, and tactical. Classroom instruction cannot teach things that hands-
on instruction can, things that are absolutely essential to the jobs of critical team 
members. Experiential learning is the key to good critical team work. 
Interviewees overwhelmingly pointed to hands-on experience as the most critical 
opportunity for building procedural memory. Spencer said that “you have to kind of just 
go out there and get it yourself,” at the same time arguing that it is difficult to absorb 
most material during “3-hour PowerPoint lectures.” Kelly, a hotshot crew leader, explains 
that all the teaching does not “make sense” until you have the hands-on experience: 
You know your basics in the classroom, but to be honest, you have nothing in 
which to base those basics upon until you get into the field and start doing your 
work.  When you start doing the work then you start to see you can apply the stuff 
you learned in the classroom and it makes more sense…you have your 40-80 
hours of training that you have to have before you go out with the hot shot crew, 
but it really doesn't make sense till you are doing it. 
One way to phrase this phenomenon is that there is an epiphany or “a-ha” moment that 
comes from hands-on experience in critical team training. This is why “you have to 
actually get your hands on patients (Kristen, EMT)” and “until you actually do it, it’s 
kind of hard to understand what they are talking about” (Kelly, Wildland Firefighter). In 
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some sense, knowledge cannot be part of one’s structure until it is supplemented by 
enough experience. 
As for learning how when to improvise in critical events, the interviewees again 
pointed to experience. Nancy, an ER physician, was asked how she knew what the best 
course of action was during a non-routine event. She said: “We don’t have classes on 
this. I mean maybe we did in medical school, I can’t remember. But this kind of stuff 
comes with experience.”  
Particularly in the medical field, interviewees explained that learning from 
experience is how critical team workers expand their comfort zones. Some interviewees 
expressed a strong willingness to learn on the job: “He was my patient and I actually 
wanted to do it because I have never done one before. So I wanted the experience” 
(Nancy, ER Physician).  This shows how critical team members who are hungry to learn 
may actually look forward to somewhat unfamiliar situations. Others spoke matter-of-
factly about the way that their jobs require them to try new things. As a physician’s 
assistant, Miguel said that “pushing the envelope” helps him learn in his job. He said he 
is regularly put in positions in which doctors trust him more than Miguel feels they 
should, but that is what helps him learn “[The physicians] think that you’ve seen it 
enough to help, and you’re in that gray area: I don’t know if I’ve seen it enough yet. And 
then the doc’s like: ‘Well you need to help, and now you’re gonna have to learn.’ So 
that’s on the job.”  One of Sitkin’s (1996) characteristics of what he calls “intelligent 
failure” is that the potential failure takes place in a space that is familiar enough to permit 
effective learning. This may be what Miguel describes as “that gray area:” a domain that 
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has enough familiarity to permit learning but not so much that one’s comfort zone is not 
expanded.  A question that arises from this is if and how the senior physician knows if the 
procedure falls in the gray area of the physician’s assistant. 
In some cases, the prospect of failure is not particularly daunting. Nancy 
explained that physicians are often willing to take more risks with patients who are less 
likely to survive. In fact, more recently she had another patient with a similar hematoma, 
and this time the patient was much closer to death than the previous one. Because of this, 
Nancy felt more comfortable trying a new procedure: 
I am sure there are some physicians that would say, “I haven’t done one before” 
and just defer and say well she is going to die anyways and not do it.   For me, I 
want to learn.  If there is anything I haven’t done I want to do it.  And I don’t 
want to sound morbid or anything, but this particular patient might die anyway – 
she was bleeding in her brain, bleeding in her legs – so this would be a case – I 
don’t want to say practice on, but learn on because if any bad outcome with the 
procedure – this particular patient is probably going to die anyways.   
Nancy shared another story about a time she learned on a patient who was near death. 
The quoted section is long but worth printing here as another example of what practicing 
during production sometimes means to critical teams. Working on a patient who had a 
multiple gunshot wounds and was basically brain dead became an opportunity to learn 
how to crack a chest open: 
I would actually pronounce him dead but my partner Tamer who—he is the 
gutsiest ER physician I have ever met in my life. I mean he does procedures I 
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have never even heard of—he turns to me—it was my trauma but he walks into 
the room and asks if I am okay. I said yeah, I am fine.  Did you get a GSW [gun 
shot wound] and I said yeah I am going to call it—pronounce him dead.  Well 
Samir said: ‘Do you want to crack his chest open?’ I said: ‘Well, I’ve never done 
one. Will you walk me through it?”  He said yes, and before I even had a chance 
to put a gown on, he cut the chest open.  Take grip cutters, pulled back the ribs, 
and opened his chest.  He said: ‘Here’s the heart. Grab the heart. Here’s the hole 
from the gunshot wound,’ and we fished around to see – because usually you have 
to put a clamp on the aorta to prevent blood from going out so that you can repair 
what is going on in the heart if there is a wound so they don’t bleed out.  But the 
guy—whoever had shot him—did a good job.  He obviously died, but for me it 
was a good learning experience because I had never done one.  But I’d seen one –
kind of from afar – I‘d read up on it so I was familiar with it.  So for me it was 
great. 
Practicing on what could be called a “lost cause” is seen as a way to gain experience in a 
low-risk environment, much like a simulation or another training exercise. In fact, Nancy 
pointed to those situations as much more useful because they are real: the patient is real, 
the symptoms are real, and the outcomes are real. The only variable that is slightly 
different from a non-“lost cause” would be that the stress involved in the situation is 
lower because the expected outcome is death. Other than that, working on patients for 
which there is very little hope is a useful way to be experienced for the next patient who 
comes in with similar symptoms.  
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 Not all practice during the production phase is as morbid as that in the medical 
field. Sometimes, teams like fire crews use routine events to help bring along new 
members—usually with strict supervision—or to practice new techniques: “In the middle 
of a fire, there may be a good opportunity for, say, a newer person on the fire to get to do 
a new role. To work as a lookout or whatever—and they are never alone, so they always 
take advantage of those times. So yeah, we will stop in the middle of fighting a fire and 
using a training opportunity” (Kelly, Wildland Firefighter). Again, this type of experience 
is seen as superior to simulation-based experience, mainly because it is the more realistic: 
“And I think it is easier for people to understand - because this is what is happening right 
now - and now you can see and understand why we are doing this” (Kelly). Learning 
during the production phase can also come through responsibility. Sgt. Shaw, the head of 
a SWAT team, lets his two team leads make decisions during events, with Shaw’s silence 
implying consent with the decision. By using this strategy, the team leads have to think 
through the decision making process on their own with about the same level of stress as 
they would if Sgt. Shaw was not present. Again, this is more realistic. In summary, 
practice during production is beneficial to because it is the most realistic type of 
experience that teams and members can have. 
Sometimes learning from experience comes in planned opportunities for failure, 
usually during simulations and scenario-based training. Failure often creates spaces for 
critical thinking and discussion. Leaders of SWAT teams, bomb squads, and wildland fire 
crews concurred that they let their members make mistakes in training because failing 
will push a person to think about their process and what they can do differently. This is 
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especially true with people who are competitive by nature, a trait that is very common in 
critical team workers (this notion came up regularly in training observations and was 
confirmed multiple times in interviews). Mac said that failure was a critical part of the 
training process for him as a firefighter. He told a story about a training scenario in which 
he and his fellow trainees had to find their way into a “burning” building. The training 
facilitators gave the trainees space to make common mistakes, such running out of air 
because they took too long during some procedures. Mac said that allowing the trainees 
to make mistakes—and explaining why afterwards—was helpful in understanding the 
challenges of a real scene: 
They want things to go wrong. Or, complications to occur, because that's what's 
going to happen in reality if this presents itself at a real scene…Say you're 
running out of air, which is a big no no. And maybe they'll let you run out of air 
on a sim because this is a controlled environment. And so, if something goes 
awry, they'll shut down this particular scenario. They'll say: ‘okay this scenario's 
over. Everybody come out. Alright, everybody failed, and this is what happened. 
You ran out of air, you didn't report, you spent too long trying to get through here, 
you know, you didn't handle the stress well, you freaked out, and you kinda forgot 
all your training. Why did this happen? Okay, let's do it again.’ 
Mac said that he and the other trainees were given space to recover on their own; they 
were interrupted at the moment of error unless their safety was in danger. They only 
received new instruction after each round of the scenario was over. This is related to 
Berliner’s (1994) idea of practicing the save, in which a jazz player will be asked to 
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recover from an error in decision making. Berliner found that jazz musicians often made 
mistakes on purpose when practicing to help them understand how to recover. This helps 
them in developing a set of routines and skills that be called upon in a variety of 
situations. This illustrates how failure often serves as a catalyst for learning (like in 
Mac’s example, this is especially true when it is coupled tightly with communication, 
such as a team debriefing after a simulation. I will discuss the iterative process in of 
simulation debriefing with more detail in Chapter 7). 
 Lastly, working with people who have more experience is seen as an efficient way 
to “learn the ropes,” so to speak. In working with team members with a long tenure, 
critical team members have the opportunity to learn lessons from both the experiences of 
others and by common experiences. Trent, a ski patroller with less than 10 years of 
experience, explains how simply being around those with more experience is one of the 
best ways to learn how to do his job effectively and save lives: 
So our longest-term ski patroller it’s his 34th year this year, ski patrolling. So I 
would say that one of the things I get most out of training is, we might be working 
with a certain splinting system or talking about a certain issue if you come across 
somebody with a broken hip and they’re laying on the broken side, what’s the 
best way to move that person? Typically it’s an excruciatingly painful injury, that 
if you get within 2 feet of them they’re screaming at you, typically. So what I love 
is that when we’re talking about that, there’s at least 30 years of experience next 
to you, and so many chances for people who have been doing it long enough to 
say: ‘Yeah yeah yeah, the book says that, but listen, in my experience the best 
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thing to do is to get a blanket. You get a blanket and you tie it around their hips 
and do it pretty snug and that’s really holds and stabilizes that joint and then you 
can move them much easier.’ People, things like that that aren’t in the book, that 
only exist in the spoken word and the wisdom of people who have been doing it 
for 35 years. 
The relationship between two team members with varied tenures gets at the idea 
presented at the beginning of this section: there’s what the book teaches you, and there’s 
what the street teaches you. Sometimes the book explains the best way to do something 
because an experienced person wrote it, and other times it does not. The latter may 
happen because the book is outdated, and a new, better method has been introduced since 
publication. It may also happen because the book has a method that is mandated to be 
taught, but is not actually followed by practitioners in the field. Working with people who 
have a longer tenure is an efficient way to learn from experiences.   
Summary 
Critical team members cited experience as the more prominent way in which they 
learn how to make decisions.  Experience, or hands-on learning, teaches things that book 
learning cannot, or as one EMT said: “there’s what the book teaches you, and there’s 
what the street teaches you, and they’re two totally different things” (Kristen, EMT). 
Experiential learning is the most critical opportunity to build procedural memory, as well 
as the best way to learn when to improvise. Experience helps members expand their 
comfort zones by taking on incrementally more responsibility, both in real events and 
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simulations. Simulations are of special importance here because critical teams take time 
out of their schedule to run them. The goal, of course, is to get experience in a low- to no-
risk environment. The emphasis on simulations in the work of critical teams is much 
higher than for non-action teams (e.g., management or service teams). In the next section, 
I discuss how simulations are a time for experiential learning as well as a source of 
experience for decision making.  
Time for Experience: Simulations 
Experience is highly necessary as a precursor to decision making for critical 
teams; at the same time, experience is also the only process by which new critical team 
members (and seasoned members learning new things) can learn to do their jobs. 
Organizations that support critical teams bypass this conundrum by using simulations. 
Simulations are experience-based activities that replicate the processes of real-life events; 
they are used to replicate aspects in an interactive manner (Gaba, 2004). While they have 
been used in a variety of contexts, they are especially important for critical teams because 
of two temporal features of their work. Critical team work is final, meaning that surgical 
crews and military units cannot “redo” their work later. And because the outcomes of 
critical team work are often that a person lives or dies, it means that mistakes on the 
operating table or battlefield can result in irreversible casualties. Critical team work is 
also characterized by epochality, which is to say that it is composed of events 
(Whitehead, 1978). There are usually dramatic starting and finishing points for critical 
teams: a fire alarm goes off to start an event, or a suspect is killed to end it. Therefore, 
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critical teams cannot choose to delay their work to a later time. In addition, the timing of 
events in critical team work is unpredictable. Finality, epochality, and unpredictability 
combine to make the temporal structure of critical teams (and action teams) different than 
other team types.  
Simulations are a response to the finality and epochality of the work of critical 
teams (Ishak & Ballard, 2012). Once an event starts, there is generally no time to practice 
procedures, skills, routines, and decision making; once an event ends, there is no time to 
do it over. So simulations are a method of gaining experience and becoming familiar with 
situational elements in a low risk-environment. Here, I will identify five main purposes of 
simulations that surfaced during interviews and observations.  
 First, simulations are used to introduce to and familiarize members with 
situational environments and other variables. Without referring to one type of scenario in 
particular, Mac, a firefighter, said that the main purpose of simulations is familiarizing 
the team with the pressures of critical team work by suppressing feelings of vu jadé 
(Weick, 1993) or being “lost in the fog” (Spencer, Firefighter) that can result from a lack 
of situational awareness. He said that many situations are “highly, highly stressful, very 
complicated, very intense, and they want to make sure that we're as trained as we can be, 
and that we handle (the situation) as best as we can” (Mac, Firefighter). Therefore, 
simulation facilitators will often create realistic intensity levels to get members used to 
the stress. Simulations are also valuable for familiarizing teammates with each other. Mac 
also mentioned that his department will pair up volunteer and paid firefighters to mimic 
“what’s it’s actually like on a larger scene.” In this way, one of the main outcomes of 
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simulations is familiarity with event variables. This is consistent with the research of 
Aggarwal and colleagues (2004) who argued that the main advantage of simulation is 
familiarization with external influences such as distractions and crisis situations. 
Second, simulations are used to instill new procedural memory into members. 
Kelly said that her wildland crew runs two types of simulations: sandbox, which I will 
discuss below, and drills. Drills are chances to become familiar with the procedures and 
routines necessary in firefighting, or as Kelly put it, “more of a time to practice things 
like, running our pumps and things, and putting hose lines out, and knowing how to 
connect all the pieces, and learning what pieces you're gonna need, and lengths of things 
like that.” Drills are useful for developing skills needed to execute procedures as well as 
for developing knowledge about how multiple “things you can do” (Berliner, 1994) can 
be combined based on a given scenario (Mendonça & Fiedrich, 2006).  
Drills must be repetitive to become part of procedural memory. Larry, a 
smokejumper, said that his training involved practicing how to jump out of an airplane 
safely, which was especially unfamiliar to him: 
And so the end of the training involved seven airplane jumps—you know, 
practice airplane jumps. And on my first of those, I had never been in an airplane 
before. So the first seven times I went up in an airplane, I didn't come back down 
on it. Which was pretty exciting for an 18 year-old kid in Montana. 
Repetition is necessary for becoming motor memory, but also for comfort. Larry said that 
by the seventh jump, he felt extremely comfortable jumping out of a plane. However, 
landing was a little more complicated. Before the jump simulations, they practiced how 
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to safely land by using a zip line much more than seven times in order to instill 
procedural memory: 
They had a big tall tower that was probably sixty feet tall and you would climb up 
to the top of that and latch into a cable and kind of do a zing line down until you 
smashed into the ground. And that simulated the speed and angle of attack of a 
parachute coming down. So we jumped out of that a lot of times. And we 
practiced a lot in, uh, what does it feel like to come down out of a big tall tree, 
you know lowering your self out of a tree without killing yourself. We did that 
over and over and over again, probably 100 times.    
Larry said he landed more off the zip line than he landed an actual parachute jump during 
real fires; this ratio is not surprising considering the disastrous outcomes of a poor 
parachute landing. The key is that the first real jump should not feel like the first.  
 The third value of simulations is that they can be used to engage in decision 
making practices. Van der Heijden and colleagues (2002) suggest that one of the main 
benefits of scenario-based training is that it provides a space for mental experimentation 
and formulation of strategic options, which leads to increased confidence in decision 
making. This is consistent with the findings of this project. 
Simulated decision making plays out in two distinct forms. One way is through 
sandbox or tabletop exercises in which problems and solutions are discussed in depth 
around a small-scale mockup of the environment (Mendonça and Fiedrich, 2006). While 
sandbox exercises do not involve practicing physical skills or routines, they are still 
considered useful by scholars; for example, Spencer (1978) argued that a skillful surgery 
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is 75 percent decision making and 25 percent dexterity; therefore, simply practicing 
decision making is a useful outcome of a training session. Tabletop exercises have an 
advantage over other types of training in that members can focus on communication in 
their decision making processes: 
The sandbox simulations give you more of a chance to discuss things, and really 
talk about things, because when you're out maybe in the fields, you're physically 
apart from people more. So you're more face-to-face talking about it and running 
through a scenario (Kim, Wildland Firefighter). 
By being able to talk about decisions face-to-face, teammates who might have mountains 
between them during a real event are able to better predict how everyone else will react. 
Kim also said that sandbox simulations are beneficial because they allow members to see 
events from a unique perspective: “You’re looking down from the sky. If the fire’s over 
here, and this is the access road, what do you do? Or where would you put a lookout?” 
By seeing events from different perspectives in simulations, members can have a better 
understanding (and hopefully awareness) of situational elements during a real event. 
Besides sandbox simulations, the other way that teams can simulate decision 
making is through functional or full-scale exercises. Functional exercises are real-time, 
facilitated exercises that are used to practice a specific experience. They are very 
common among teams that do not spend a lot of time in the production phase. For 
example, ER physicians are constantly with patients; therefore, they will rarely be asked 
to participate in functional exercises. Most tactical teams, on the other hand, may have 
only one or two callouts a week (a SWAT team I spent time with had exactly 52 callouts 
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last year). This means they have more time for functional exercises that require a 
facilitator, physical space, and an entire team.  
 Functional exercises are used to engage critical thinking in a specific scenario. 
For example, I observed a bomb squad simulation in which the facilitator (an assigned 
member of the team) created constraints in a way that pushed members to do two things, 
according to Sgt. Carey, the team leader: 1) “to practice the new X-ray,” and 2) to “think 
outside the box.” In other words, functional exercises on the bomb squad are for 
practicing a specific aspect of their work and critical thinking while practicing said 
aspect. In this case, the bomb squad had just gotten a new X-ray machine2, so the 
facilitator put the simulated improvised explosive device (IED) in a sealed cardboard 
package so that the team had to use the X-ray. In addition, the facilitator designed the 
simulated IED in such a way that there would be conflicting ideas about how to proceed, 
forcing the team to deliberate about the best possible course of action. This is how 
functional simulations are usually for the bomb squad, as each weekly session involves a 
novel scenario that promotes critical thinking among team members (Sgt. Carey: “We 
might put a bomb 10 feet in the air so you can’t use the robots. What do you do then?”). 
An observation of a SWAT team corroborated this model. Lt. Denton said they try to 
incorporate quick decision making processes into their scenario-based training (e.g., “Is 
he holding a gun or a cell phone?”) because that helps them practice split-second decision 
                                                
2 The team had also gotten a new robot two weeks prior. They broke an arm off a previous robot “sword 
fighting,” according to one member. 
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making. All types of simulations, from drills to full-scale exercise, can be used to practice 
decision making abilities. 
The fourth value of simulations is that they help teams maintain procedural 
memory and decision making practices, or what many tactical team members referred to 
as “perishable skills,” which can only be maintained through repetition (Sgt. Carey, 
Bomb Squad). For example, Lt. Denton (SWAT) has his team members practice their 
shooting at least three times a week—his snipers are there every day—because weapons 
training is considered a perishable skill. Another perishable skill is readiness. Heath said 
that the leaders of his aircraft carrier would frequently call for General Quarters (also 
known as “Battle Stations” in some organizations), in which every member on board 
should “go where you are supposed to go.” His captain would also test the crew by 
creating an “abnormal condition,” which sometimes involved flipping a switch to shut 
down the nuclear reactor on the ship: 
It’s not unheard of to be on a submarine or whatever, and the commanding officer 
will go down to the reactor space and be like: “Oh, let’s see how my crews doing 
today.” BUNK and he’ll punk out the reactor, and just trip it out, flipping a 
switch, and ‘ooooh, there you are.’ BEEP BEEP BEEP all the lights go off. 
‘Somebody just scrammed the plant!’ And sure, do what you gotta do to get it 
back online.   
Heath said this was done to check response times when getting things “back and 
corrected,” as well as to keep crew members on their toes. Those kinds of simulations are 
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“planned and random,” and will happen throughout a workup cycle. In this way, 
readiness is treated as perishable skill to be constantly maintained.  
 Lastly, simulations are used to assess member competencies (Aggarwal et al., 
2004; Shapiro et al., 2004). When asked about their experiences with simulations 
multiple health care interviewees mentioned that they were familiar with them as a 
testing tool. Sarah said that simulations were part of CPR certification and what was 
called a “skills update day” in her intensive care unit, in which skills were tested more 
than updated. Trent said that preseason training for ski patrollers involves a setup of five 
different scenario-based stations—all run by paramedics or physicians—in which 
members must prove their competency. The facilitator will explain the situation as well 
as resources at hand, and say: “Here’s your stuff—what are you going to do?” This kind 
of simulation is a chance to experience critical thinking as well as demonstrate 
competency. 
 Organizations are likely to place an emphasis on communication in simulations. 
Essentially, practicing communication processes is a combination of the first two 
simulation outcomes: familiarity and skills training. By communicating with teammates, 
members familiarize themselves with their teammates. Mac said that part of the purpose 
of simulations is  “joint” training simulations, which involves multiple agencies, are 
“really beneficial because not only do you get to work with one another, you're 
communicating with one another.” He said that it is important to practice communicating 
with people from other teams because that mimics what it would be like in a real 
emergency. In addition, members enhance their communication skills by simulating 
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them: “part of the purpose of the sims is to build better teamwork, and improve the 
communication, because we are reliant upon one another” (Mac, Firefighter). Sarah said 
that a segment of her training as a critical care nurse involved learning and simulating 
basic communication skills. So practicing communication processes is valuable because 
it familiarizes teammates with one another, and it is a skill in and of itself. However, it is 
also challenging to simulate communication because it is more variable than other skills: 
 You can’t simulate communication personalities. People might talk one way at the 
sandbox, then they get in there and all of a sudden they’re somebody else. You 
can’t simulate pulling rank, but it happens. People are people, they’re gonna act 
the way they’re gonna act. But fighting the fire won’t change. They’ll do what has 
to get done. (Tom, Lieutenant Firefighter). 
In context, Tom’s quote was a response to the validity of simulations. His quote 
highlights how communication patterns are not as easy to replicate in a simulation than 
the skills that are directly related to “fighting the fire.” This remains one of the bigger 
challenges of scenario-based training. 
Summary 
 Simulation is a temporal “cheat” of sorts for organizations that support critical 
teams, meaning that they act as a workaround for the temporal stresses of critical team 
work. Once an event ends, there is no time to redo it—the finality means that decisions 
and actions must be right the first time. However, there is generally no time to practice 
procedures, skills, routines, and decision making once an event starts—the epochality of 
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critical team work means that teams must be familiar with the decisions, actions, and 
situation variables before the situation occurs. In other words, they must be experienced 
before the experience itself; they must overcome a tautology. Simulations are a method of 
gaining experience and becoming familiar with situational elements in a low risk-
environment. They have five main purposes for critical teams: 1) they introduce to and 
familiarize members with situational environments and other variables, 2) they are used 
to instill new procedural memory into members, 3) they can be used to practice decision 
making, 4) they help maintain procedural memory, and 5) they are used to assess member 
competencies. Simulations are a safe space for experiential learning and make up an 
essential phase of critical team work. 
Chapter 5 Summary 
In this chapter, I have discussed experience, the first major outcome of critical 
team training, and simulations, a process through which critical teams gain valuable 
experience in a low- to no-risk environment. The reason that critical teams run 
simulations is because of a paradox regarding experience; it is both the primary basis for 
decisions in critical team work as well as the primary means of learning how to do work. 
This paradox presents a challenge to organizations that want their teams to be well 
prepared to make decisions and take actions (because there is no time to do so once the 
event starts) but does not want to put their teams is a position where they are likely to 
make a fatal mistake due to inexperience. This is why simulations make up a crucial 
phase for critical teams, as they are times for experiential learning. 
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In the next chapter, I will discuss the second major outcome of training: 
communicative decision making. I will also explore the adaptation phase, or how critical 
teams make time that is solely dedicated to communicative decisions in the heat of battle. 
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CHAPTER 6 – TIME FOR DECISION MAKING 
This isn’t to try to make us sound more badass than we are, but like, a lot of times 
people look at what we’re doing and are like: ‘Holy cow, how do you do that?’ 
But for us, it’s routine. We’ve practiced this, we’ve trained for this. So if 
something requires us to really stop our work and get together, that means the 
shit’s hit the fan. That means, you’re like: ‘This isn’t normal. This isn’t planned 
for. The fire shouldn’t be behaving this way, or the building shouldn’t sound this 
way.’ (Ben, Firefighter) 
The work of critical teams is marked by finality and epochality. This means that 
decisions and actions have to be made swiftly and correctly the first time. At the same 
time, decisions are not always easily apparent, especially with a number of variables in 
critical team work, so teams will often deliberate together to come up with effective 
ideas. While this sometimes happens concomitantly with taskwork, sometimes it cannot, 
and sometimes it should not. The need for effective, situation-based, team-oriented 
decisions is so important that action teams will sometimes stop what they are doing to 
come together and talk about how to proceed, even as a fire rages, as Ben’s quote 
explains. This chapter works towards an understanding of the role of the timeout in the 
process of critical teams as a temporal space for team deliberation and decision making. 
This chapter first details two main concepts related to decision making--discursive 
decision structures and team deliberation—before discussing timeouts. Discursive 
decision structures are minimal structures (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997; Kamoche & 
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Cunha, 2001) that both constrain and enable improvisation in critical teams.  I also 
discuss team deliberation as a way to counteract unpredictability of the variables in 
critical team work. Numerous interviewees highlighted both their training’s focus on 
effective communication principles as well as their own personal regard for 
communication in their work. Team deliberation is a way to employ a communicative 
form of decision making that satisfies the requests of the organization as well as the 
personal preferences of critical team members. Then, I discuss the adaptation phase. The 
process of action teams contains various iterations of this phase, colloquially known as 
the “timeout,” as a way to counteract the challenges to quality decision making in critical 
team work. The fact that teams will stop to communicate, even in the face of oncoming 
dangers, demonstrates the importance of communication in the work of critical teams. 
The chapter ends with a summary of how adaptation is used as a temporal space for 
communicative decision making and for the use of discursive decision structures. 
Discursive Decision Structures 
 One of the challenges of critical team work is making the right decisions in time-
sensitive, high-pressure situations (Cannon-Bowers & Salas, 1998). To help teams make 
decisions in such environments, organizations create minimal structures (Brown & 
Eisenhardt, 1997; Kamoche & Cunha, 2001) that are discursive in nature and help teams 
make decisions. They both constrain and enable improvisation in decision making 
processes by containing some structure as well as some room for interpretation. Cooren 
(2004) argues that texts have agency if people use them to accomplish action in 
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organizations. This applies to description of discursive decision structures, which are 
used by the organization to constrain and enable the actions of its members.  
In this section I will talk about three types of discursive decision structures: lists, 
typologies, and god terms. The types are not mutually exclusive. For example, safety is 
the most popular god term among critical teams, and it also appears in many lists that 
critical team members use. However, I will address them individually in the following 
section for the sake of clarity. 
Lists 
Lists provide formulas for action that lead to predictable outcomes (Browning, 
1992). In the world of critical teams, one of the most prominent lists is the 10 Standard 
Fire Orders used by wildland firefighters across the country. In addition to the 18 
Watchout Situations, the 10 Standard Fire Orders are designed to guide the actions of 
firefighters towards organizationally preferred procedures and routines. While the 
structure of the 10 Standard Fire Orders has changed multiple times since its inception, 
the first nine entries serve as prerequisites for the tenth in its current iteration: “If 1-9 are 
considered, then fight fire aggressively, having provided for safety first.”  Ziegler (2007) 
argues that this list is a tool for risk management for critical teams as well as a permission 
slip for aggression.  It is also the opposite of the meaning of hegemony—if you break any 
of these rules, you have broke them all. This is consistent with the ideas expressed by 
wildland firefighters in this study, who said they feel the lists first constrain and then 
enable freedom to act as they see fit. Kim said that learning about the lists early on in 
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training was a good way to guide actions for people like her who did not have much 
experience or understanding of fire situations. Then, as she gained more experience, the 
lists gave them a license to be flexible—in other words, a permission slip for 
aggression—because they were made up of concepts as opposed to detailed, specific 
procedures. This shows how discursive decision structures both constrain and enable 
flexibility. 
A specific type of list, the mnemonic is especially common in critical team work. 
A mnemonic is a device used to jog the memory, such as using the imaginary name “Roy 
G. Biv” to remember the colors of the rainbow in order (red, orange, yellow, etc.). 
Mnemonics are used to by organizations that support critical teams to combat feelings of 
vu jade and to recall priorities. Kristen said that EMTs will use a certain device when 
faced with a non-routine scenario: 
The first thing you do when you feel like “I’ve never dealt with this before”, is 
you go back to basics; you go back to your ABCs. Do they have an airway, are 
they breathing, and is their circulation effective, meaning they are breathing, 
they’ve got a good heart rate, and so on and so forth.   
Most of the devices were simple and serve a foundational value in their respective fields. 
For example, urban firefighting uses “LIP” to help firefighters remember their priorities 
when fire arriving on a scene. LIP stands for Life, Incident Stabilization, and Property 
Conservation. Using this mnemonic, a fire crew would first look to save lives when 
arriving on scene. Then, its attention would turn to controlling the incident, which may be 
a fire, a car accident, or something else, as urban firefighters respond to a wide range of 
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event. Lastly, the third priority is saving property. This mnemonic helps firefighters 
understand their priorities when faced with decisions in the heat of battle. Another 
mnemonic used by urban firefighters to remind them of their tactical assignments is 
RECEO-VS, which is less memorable but more specific; it stands for Rescue (of 
civilians), Exposure (protection), Confinement (of fire), Extinguishment (of fire), and 
Overhaul (of other potential fires). The last two parts, Ventilation and Salvage, are 
considered “sliding tactical assignments” (Lee, 2008) that should be considered at all 
times.  
Mnemonics are effective because they are usually simple and correspond to the 
basics of an emergency member’s job. In the case of urban firefighting, LIP reminds a 
firefighter of his or her priorities. In the medical field, ABC is used to focus a member on 
the three most important vital signs of a patient. Mnemonics are also always in the 
background; Kim mentioned that the wildland mnemonic “LCES,” which stands for 
Lookouts, Communication, Escape Routes and Safety Zone, is used to “constantly 
reassess” to insure crew safety. Organizations must be encouraged by the ever presence 
of such structural devices that help embedded teams constantly keep their priorities in 
line, even when in the middle of a non-routine event.   
Typologies 
Another way that organizations support the decision making process of their 
embedded teams is by promoting the use of typologies. In their study of communication 
in emergency departments, Eisenberg and colleagues (2005) found that the challenge of 
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triage is determining if incoming patients are either 1) in urgent need of medical care, 2) 
worried about their status but not in urgent need, 3) lacking another source of medical 
care, or 3) emotionally disturbed and faking an illness: “triage nurses must be especially 
skilled at distinguishing between those people who are ‘really sick’ due to disease or 
injury” and those who are not (p. 399). This form of typology was referenced regularly in 
interviews. 
By categorizing patients, situations, or adversaries, critical team members are 
primed to take two actions. The first action is to quickly identify salient characteristics of 
the current scenario, or as Kristen put it, “to figure out real quick what questions I need to 
ask and what I need to look for.” The second action is to see the current patient, situation, 
or adversary through the lens of a previous one, thereby lending routineness to what may 
feel like a non-routine event. For example, Kristen mentioned a saying that her EMT 
training organization uses to bifurcate situations: “There’s two types of patients: sick 
patients, and not-sick patients.”  Kristen said they run a game early on in training called 
“Faking, Sick, or Death,” in which the new trainees have to ask questions of a simulated 
patient to find out who is sick, who is faking it, and who is about to die. This helps to 
hone the skills necessary to assess situations in the field and echoes the triage process of 
emergency departments explored by Eisenberg and colleagues (2005). In addition, when I 
interviewed SWAT team members, they would often uses phrases such as “a barricaded 
criminal is different than a suicidal citizen.”  This recalls a study of fire ground 
commanders by Kaempf and colleagues (1993) in which almost 90 percent of decisions 
observed were made using situation prototypes. Typologies help an emergency member 
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to see a new situation through the lens of familiar one by placing situations, patients, or 
adversaries into categories based on their characteristics.  
God Terms 
Another type of discursive structure that constrains team decisions is the god 
term. A god term is the “ultimate motive” of a community of practice (Burke, 1945). It is 
the most powerful persuasive argument, or an “expression to which all other expressions 
are ranked as subordinate” (Weaver, 1953). If a person invokes a god term as a support 
for a decision, the opposite side would have a very difficult time making a compelling 
argument against them.  For example, Lingard (2009) argues that a god term in health 
care education is competence.  Certainly, the case can be made that experience (which, in 
critical teams, is sometime conflated with competence) serves as the ultimate persuasive 
argument within critical teams, and I believe that it has some persuasive value when 
making decisions. However, in this data set, I found that the most popular god term in 
critical team work is safety.  Every single interviewee, without exception, mentioned 
safety as a consideration of critical team decision making. Not only did each interviewee 
say that they valued safety, but each person also mentioned that their organization has 
made safety its top priority: “Every organization has its focus, and first and foremost, 
ours is safety and that is, like, huge” (Kelly, Wildland Firefighter). The emphasis on 
safety is usually passed from the organization to each of its members during training: “I 
guess 90% of everything they do and teach is based on safety” (Kim, Wildland 
Firefighter). Everything should be done safely, and recklessness is not a valued trait. 
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Safety as a god term is also used to justify decisions after the fact. This was 
especially common among firefighters when explaining a decision to not fight a fire: 
“Boy, this fire is way too dangerous for us to be close to” (Larry, Smokejumper); “We 
didn’t really have any options—we had to go the one way that was safe” (Kim, Wildland 
Firefighter); “Your safety is absolutely necessary” (Kelly, Hotshot Crew Leader). By 
asking their embedded teams to err on the side of safety, organizations accomplish two 
things: 1) they mitigate the adrenaline rush that comes with critical team work, and 2) 
they attempt to avoid catastrophic outcomes, including deaths of their own members. 
Kelly, who runs training as a hotshot crew leader, explained that new members will run 
into situations without thinking because they are often so “excited and overcharged” to 
fight fires that they will “run into a road of oncoming traffic.” Reminding them that 
safety is the organization’s top priority is a quick and effective way to balance out the 
distractions in decision making that come from being too inexperienced (or 
overconfident, at the other end of the experience spectrum). Essentially, instilling safety 
as a god term in an organization is a form of insurance or risk management. 
 In other fields, the god term is not safety but a mantra derived from it. Sgt. Carey 
explained that bomb squads say: “It’s a bomb until it’s not a bomb,” reminding everyone 
not to get too complacent at the risk of being blown up. A few different safety-based 
mantras were mentioned in the medical field. Some mentioned, “Do no harm,” which is 
part of the Hippocratic oath taken by physicians and other health care professionals. 
Many interviewees said that decisions are based on the patient’s symptomology, saying 
something to the effect of: “the bottom line here is, what’s best for the patient?” (Tamara, 
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ER Nurse). At the same time, medical professionals were ambiguous in their analysis of 
this mantra: “You’re in essence trying to do what’s best for the patient, whatever that 
means” (Miguel, ER Physician’s Assistant, emphasis added). Miguel’s quote shows that 
while discursive decision structures are in some sense designed to constrain the potential 
actions of critical team members, they also allow for flexibility by being strategically 
ambiguous (Eisenberg, 1984). One can imagine that many different actions could be 
defended under the umbrella of “what’s best for the patient.” This shows how discursive 
decision structures both constrain and enable flexibility. 
Summary 
Discursive decision structures act as minimal structures (Kamoche & Cunha, 
2001) in that they both constrain and enable flexibility of critical team workers. In this 
section, I detailed three types of discursive structures: mnemonics, typologies, and god 
terms. Much like basic song structures in jazz music (Barrett and Peplowski, 1998), 
discursive decision structures act as bases for spontaneous actions and decisions. They 
are a way in which decision making is both simplified and created.  
Team Deliberation as a Way to Counteract Variables 
Deliberation among critical team members during events is considered a critical 
component of the decision making process, as it allows teams to share information and 
regroup effectively. Regrouping, or coming together as a team to decide on the best plan 
moving forward, is often necessary in critical team work for two interrelated reasons. 
 139 
First, a correct plan of action is not always readily apparent because of the 
unpredictability, stress, and complexity of critical team work. Second, team decision 
making can be more effective than individual decision making (Bonito, Decamp, & 
Ruppel, 2008; Cannon-Bowers, Salas, & Converse, 2001; Fisher, 1970; Tropman, 1996). 
Therefore, the process of deliberating together to make decisions is valued in critical 
teams (Cannon-Bowers & Salas, 1998; Cannon-Bowers et al., 2001; Holzman et al., 
1995). 
 Crossan and colleagues (1996) describe improvisation as where planning meets 
opportunity, and moments of deliberation serve as communicative opportunities.  While I 
believe that discursive decision structures may constrain flexibility more than they enable 
it—for example, lists provide structure to decision making (Browning, 1992)-- I argue 
that deliberation enables more than it constrains. I base this on the quality and quantity of 
the data in this project in which interviewees said that team decision making led to 
creative or improvised solutions. In moments of deliberation, teams can choose to re-
align onto a previous plan or decide on a new one. Most likely, teams will draw on 
“available cognitive, material, affective, and social resources” (Cunha et al., 1999, p. 
302) to guide “action in a spontaneous way” (Crossan & Sorrenti, 1997, p. 156). 
Deliberation is often the seed for improvisation in critical team work. 
Team deliberation happens regularly because it is considered a valuable aspect of 
critical team work. Members of all types of teams—fire, medical, and tactical—either 
directly mentioned or told stories that demonstrated their high regard for communicative 
decision making. Tom, who is a lieutenant firefighter, referenced “size-ups,” which are 
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completed by the first members arriving on scene. They will try to get a 360-degree 
understanding of the fire, both literally and metaphorically, and then share with everyone 
else as they arrive on scene. Decisions will often be made in these conversations. Larry, a 
retired smokejumper, said that even two-man teams “would talk over any decision that 
potentially had danger involved in it.” Tamara, a nurse in the ER, said that she prefers a 
style of decision making in which teams do their critical thinking together and out loud. 
Darren, a member of a SWAT team, said that team leaders will eschew the radio and 
meet face-to-face (if the situation allows) with people in the command post so that they 
can have as many communicative resources (e.g. nonverbals) as possible at their disposal 
when making decisions. Lastly, Nancy told a story that demonstrates how communicative 
decision making applies in life-changing situations: 
A guy came in; he was at the court house and he had just had a domestic violence 
charge against him.  He was in handcuffs with the cops after the hearing and he 
got away—I don’t know how but he got away from the cops—and jumped out of 
the second story of the court house.  Paramedics brought him in, obviously wasn’t 
breathing.  So we intubated him put the breathing tubes down and put him on the 
breathing machine and we did a cat scan of everything, his head, his neck, his 
chest, his skull, his pelvis. He cracked his ribs, he had a hemothorax—he was 
bleeding internally, bleeding in his brain, oh and he cracked his neck—his spinal 
cord was completely severed.   
While we were waiting for a bed, I was waiting for results from the CAT scan to 
come, well the results from the CAT scan showed he had air trapped inside and 
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outside of the lung, and blood in the lung, too. Half and hour later I was looking at 
the monitor and the guys pulse goes from 90 to 30 to 20.  So I am like okay well 
let me call the trauma surgeon.  So I called him and he said: ‘Look, we are not 
going to save this guy. He is bleeding in his brain, he severed his spinal cord, he 
cracked his neck, he’s got a hemothorax and he broke both hips, so he is probably 
bleeding into his pelvis, too’ and it was not operable. 
We didn’t have family there to tell us do everything or do nothing, so we kind of 
took it upon ourselves.  He said: ‘Look, I don’t think it is worth trying to use all 
these [resources].’  We had already given him so many units of blood, and these 
are all resources we are using.  So the question is, you know…this is where it gets 
difficult because we are technically kind of playing God, but we are not God.  The 
question comes: ‘Well, do I do everything to save this mans life even though I 
don’t think he will live or live past an hour or not?’  So we decided not.  We 
decided: ‘You know what?’ Because his heart stopped in a minute after I got off 
the phone with [the surgeon] and the surgeon said: ‘Let him die, let him go,’ and I 
said ‘fine.’  You know, it made sense to me since we had already used all these 
resources, and his outcome, even if he had made it he would be a vegetable on a 
ventilator, so we stopped CPR and his heart rate went to zero and that was it.  We 
called it and let him die at that time.  So that is a situation where you have to 
decide: what do we do?  Do we do everything, do we do nothing, do we do 
something?  So I tried to do something, you know we put a chest tube in and we 
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intubated him but with all his injuries there was no way that guy was going to 
walk ever. 
The way we make decisions is based on a lot of things. It’s based on his injuries 
and what his outcome would have been. You know, it is based a lot on the mantra:  
‘First, do no harm’ and so we do we first do no harm.  And a lot of the training 
and this comes in the middle of experience.  We don’t have classes on this.  I 
mean maybe we did in medical school, I can’t remember.  This kind of stuff 
comes with experience.   
Nancy’s story highlights a critical value of communicative decision making. The more 
people that are involved in a decision, the more experience is brought to the table when 
making the decision. She had to make a difficult decision, which she later mentioned can 
be complicated by emotions and stress. She called on a surgeon who had experience with 
the outcomes of similar patients, which helped her connect her decision to his experience. 
By including a small group of experienced members in a conversation, teams can connect 
relevant, expert experiences to the situation at hand. As Kim, a wildland firefighter, said: 
“as you build relationships and come to know an individual's experience, what decisions 
are made can vary based on those relationships and knowledge of yours and others 
experience” (Kim, Wildland Firefighter). 
The challenge for teams that want to deliberate is finding time to deliberate. 
Making decisions, or team process (Marks et al., 2001), in a stressful environment can be 
difficult on its own; on top of that, it is important to remember that critical teams are also 
tasked with the physical work as well, known as taskwork (Marks et al., 2001). 
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Taskwork, by itself, requires focus and attention--for critical team members, this includes 
spraying water on fires, making incisions, and positioning a team around a building with 
a suspect in it—but teams also have to interact and make decisions as well. If critical 
team situations are intricate, time-sensitive events, how do teams make time for critical 
thinking and deliberation among members? 
Time for Decisions: Adaptation 
 Based on the nested phase model (Ishak & Ballard, 2012), critical teams make 
time for deliberation and decision making during the adaptation phase. The adaptation 
phase is a chance for teams to “realign members onto a previously determined trajectory 
or to discuss coordination onto a new path” (Ishak & Ballard, 2012, p. 19). It is a slowing 
or stopping of work so that teams can engage in communicative decision making and 
decision hearing. For critical teams, the fact that they would stop their work or slow it 
down to communicate—even though the fire or heart attack will not stop—is a sign of 
how much they value focusing on deliberation. Other types of action teams can pause the 
event, meaning that the rules of the “game” cease to govern proceedings (Coleman, 
1969); this includes sports teams (calling a timeout) and legal teams (calling for recess). 
Critical teams cannot do that. Instead, they have two options: 1) deliberate and perform 
tasks at the same time, or 2) stop their work to communicate while the “adversary” (e.g., 
fire, heart attack, or opposing military unit) continues its progress. The latter option, 
taking a timeout, is the focus of this section, as emergency teams use timeouts as a 
temporal space to promote deliberate, communicative decision making. 
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 To be clear, teams do not always use the term timeout when their work is paused 
to deliberate. As I will explicate in this section, teams in this study used the terms 
regroup, crew brief, after action review (AAR), huddle, assessment, deliberation, and 
others to denote a pause in work used to adapt as a team. In addition, the term timeout 
refers to something different in the medical field; it is a pre-event discussion designed to 
align a team before a procedure (a concept I will discuss further in this section). 
However, I use the term timeout because its popular definition, derived from sports, has a 
strong fit with the concept that I am discussing: when action teams deliberate during a 
voluntary or involuntary pause in their taskwork during a production event.  A timeout is 
an implementation of the adaptation phase in the process of action teams (Ishak & 
Ballard, 2012). 
Taking a timeout is a chance for teams to regroup, assess the situation, and 
consider alternatives. Leaders of multiple units including a bomb squad, SWAT team, 
and a wildland fire crew, said that the mere act of taking time to discuss work is 
beneficial because it gets team members to think critically about their work. This is 
consistent with Okhuysen and Waller’s (2002) stance on temporal pacing; by evaluating 
progress, they “consider alterative paths and determine the direction their group should 
follow in the subsequent work period” (p. 1057). 
A bomb squad that I observed used a timeout in exactly these ways (regroup, 
assess, consider alternatives, think critically) during a simulation. After using their robot 
and new X-ray to find information about a potential improvised explosive device (IED), 
they met at the back of their command truck. Sgt. Carey said they do this to “brief 
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everyone on the situation and discuss options” (they do not specifically call them 
timeouts). A few members stood on the truck and some stood on the empty robot lift. In 
this case, they wanted to find an option that would separate the cell phone detonator from 
the IED but still preserve evidence, which was especially important. Why? Because in 
this scenario, the IED was the latest in a string of explosives that had been placed behind 
mostly-black churched in the South, which meant that the evidence could help prevent 
another attack. One member pulled out a whiteboard and started drawing a crude diagram 
of the package for everyone else. He said he was thinking about something called a “PAN 
shot”, which is essentially a shotgun barrel full of water (because liquid does not 
compress, it gets in between all the components and split them apart). They considered 
other options, but in the end, they agreed that a PAN shot would be the best course of 
action given their goals. The timeout took about four minutes. Everyone returned to their 
stations and continued their work. 
 Not all critical teams can take four minutes for a timeout. Sgt. Carey described 
bomb squads as slower and more methodical than other tactical teams, at least after a 
perimeter has been created so that no human lives are at stake. However, other teams still 
use timeouts, both formal and informal and of varying lengths, as a way to “counteract 
variables.” Heath said that he has seen nuclear environments in which regular “crew 
briefs” are called to “assess conditions” during a real-life event: 
And so right in the middle of it they would be like: ‘CREW BRIEF.’ And 
everyone would stop what they were doing, and they would chatter back and forth 
and they would say: ‘Let’s assess all conditions right now,” and just go down: 
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‘boom, reactive powers this, pressure’s this, we have these assets, we don’t have 
these things, boom boom boom. What do we have, what we do need, what do we 
don’t have?’  
This shows how a timeout might be more regulated and formalized than that of the bomb 
squad. At the opposite end of the spectrum, multiple wildland firefighters said that their 
breaks to discuss strategy were on an as-needed basis. They were not formalized in any 
way and varied in length depending on the complexity and containment of the fire. This 
shows how different organizations will apply a different level of formality to planning 
timeouts.  
 The difference between informal and semi-formal adaptations in the medical field 
is worth noting. Informal moments for deliberation occur all the time and may only 
involve as few as two members discussing the next steps. One member may consult 
another while physically standing over a patient in the ER, or they may choose to leave 
the room; this of course depends on the urgency of the patient’s health. Informal 
deliberations may also include people who are remotely located. In some areas of the 
country, EMTs en route to a hospital can phone a physician on call to discuss options. 
There is no term to describe informal deliberations, but critical team members would call 
it “making decisions as a team,” “team discussions,” “deliberating,” or simply “talking 
about” the situation and its elements. 
 Semi-formalized adaptations also occur in ERs. While other teams refer to such 
pauses as timeouts, briefs, crew briefs, recesses, conferences, consultations, or breaks, in 
the medical world they are called huddles. While there are many studies of team 
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communication in ERs, there only a few mention of huddles and a dearth of formal 
definitions. They are referred to as a tool to “regain situation awareness” (Salas et al., 
2008, p. 340) as well as a time for team members to determine a strategy that best meets 
the needs of the patient through organized collaboration (Shafer et al., 2006).  
 In this data set, the interviewees define a huddle in this way: “When we stop to 
talk about decisions, we call it huddling” (Tamara, ER Nurse). Huddles are a time to 
“have some creative thinking” (Tamara, ER Nurse), a way to “re-group” (Sarah, ER 
Nurse), a time “in the midst of a crisis situation” to “huddle for a second and say: what 
are your thoughts? What are your thoughts? What are your thoughts?” (Tamara, ER 
Nurse. Multiple ER Physicians (Magda, Nancy, Frank) confirmed these ideas about the 
usage of huddles and the commonality of the term itself (standardization of the term is 
certainly beneficial to physicians and nurses who work multiple shifts at different 
hospitals). Nancy said: “The huddle is a communication and a consultation among your 
colleagues about what to do when something is either going wrong or you’ve had a 
situation you haven’t dealt with before.”  A huddle is a site of improvisation in the 
medical world, a form of adaptation used to deliberate, extend critical thinking, and make 
decisions. 
 While the standardization of term huddle across may make things simpler for 
medical professionals, another standardized ER term presents problems for temporal 
scholars (especially those who are sports enthusiasts). In the medical world, a pre-
surgical meeting used to make sure all participants are on the same page is referred to as 
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a timeout. Note that this is not an in-event phenomenon; medical timeouts occur just 
before events.  
 Medical timeouts are structured verbalizations of checklists used before 
procedures to ensure accuracy and understanding among team members, or “just a 
verification basically of the correct patient, the correct body part, correct procedure” 
(Nancy, ER Physician). One of the more popular checklists has been developed by 
Haynes and colleagues (2009), and it is used internationally. This checklist includes 
multiple phases, including a “Time out” portion that is to be completed by the entire 
medical team before skin incision.  
Medical checklists have been implemented in most hospitals over the last decade: 
“They’re officially called timeouts in the hospital. And you document that in the medical 
record, you know: the timeout was done before surgery. You’re required to do it” (Sarah, 
ER Nurse).  They have been widely implemented because routine checklist briefing is 
both feasible (Lingard et al., 2008) and effective at reducing communication failures 
(Haynes et al., 2009; Lingard et al. 2008). Every person I interviewed for this project who 
has worked in an ER (8) praised the value of the checklists, saying that the time saved by 
not making communication errors more than makes up for the nominal time that the 
timeout takes. However, time also plays a role in the feasibility of timeouts. Tamara said 
that they are required by the state “unless it’s an emergency situation.” This shows the 
pressures on critical teams: even when something is seen as saving time, lives, and 
probably money, it may be eschewed if time pressures are too great.  
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I have brought up medical timeouts for three reasons. First, from a scholarly 
standpoint, they are an interesting topic at the intersection of temporality, 
communication, and critical teams. Lingard and colleagues (2008) argue that they have 
positive perceived effects on team communication and teamwork. Second, the 
terminology is of interest to a study of teams. Exponentially more people are familiar 
with sports than are familiar with the standards of care in an emergency departments 
operating room. Because the term timeout colloquially refers to a break in the action, it is 
worth discussing how its meaning is different within the setting of this study. Third, the 
difference in meaning is relevant and thought-provoking. Medical timeouts act as sort of 
a pre-brief and actually may negate or reduce the need for medical huddles because it 
“groups” before there is a need for a “regroup.” In other words, a pre-brief is a sort of 
adaptation before the adaptation phase. There may be something to learn here for other 
critical teams. 
Summary 
In this section, I have discussed how critical teams use the adaptation phase as a 
time for deliberation and communicative decision making. Taking a timeout is a chance 
for a team to regroup, assess the situation, and consider alternatives. They will do this 
even in the face of emergent danger because of the value of communicative decision 
making. I also discussed the difference between medical huddles and medical “timeouts.” 
What is referred to as a timeout in the medical field is actually a pre-brief of sorts; 
medical timeouts are checklist-based meetings that occur prior to production phases. It 
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can be argued that the act of grouping before an event negates some of the need to 
regroup during the event itself. Medical huddles are similar to what would be considered 
a timeout in other fields; they come in the middle of the production phase and they are 
used to regroup the team. The act of stopping taskwork to focus on team processes, 
including decision making, is a critical aspect of critical team work. 
Chapter 6 Summary 
In this chapter, I have explored decision making, the second major outcome of critical 
team training, and the adaptation phase, an opportunity for critical teams to engage in 
team deliberation. I explored two main concepts related to decision making: discursive 
decision structures and team deliberation. Discursive decision structures are minimal 
structures (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997; Kamoche & Cunha, 2001) that both constrain and 
enable improvisation in critical teams.  I also discuss team deliberation as a way to 
counteract unpredictability of the variables in critical team process. hen, I discuss the 
adaptation phase. The process of action teams contains various iterations of this phase, 
colloquially known as the “timeout.” The fact that teams will stop to communicate, even 
in the face of oncoming dangers, demonstrates the importance of communication in the 
work of critical teams. 
 In the next chapter, I will discuss the third major outcome of training: 
sensemaking through situational awareness. I will also explore how teams engage in learn 
through narratives and engage in retrospective sensemaking through the debriefing 
process.  
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CHAPTER 7 – TIME FOR SENSEMAKING 
 On some of the coffee cups at a downtown fire station in the Southwest, the words 
mortui vivos doscent are printed in bold block letters. The Latin phrase is translated as 
“The dead teach the living,” a saying often used to justify the use of cadavers for learning 
in the medical field. In a firefighting context, it serves more as a reminder to those in the 
station: be aware of those who have died doing the very things that you do every day. 
Organizations want their members to know past tragedies so that they do not repeat them. 
More accurately, to be prepared for upcoming events, the organization wants members to 
“comprehend, understand, explain, attribute, extrapolate, and predict” based on past 
events (Starbuck & Milliken, 1988, p. 51). In other words, they should engage in 
sensemaking (Weick, 1993; 1995) by understanding what has happened in the past, from 
the deaths of their predecessors in previous years to a change in weather that happened a 
split-second ago. 
 Sensemaking is a continuous process in which people retroactively create rational 
order from their context (Weick, 1993; 1995; Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 2005), or a 
way to “structure the unknown” (Waterman, 1990, p. 41). It has been deemed crucial in 
critical team work (Weick, 1993; Landgren, 2005), especially with regards to teamwork, 
as it allows critical team members to turn complexity into something that is 
“comprehended explicitly in works and that serves as a springboard into action (Weick et 
al., 2005, p. 409). Weick (1995) argues that organizations can be good at decision making 
but still make major mistakes due to poor sensemaking. Therefore, organizations that 
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support critical teams strive to develop situational awareness in members much in the 
same way that they do with communication decision making skills. 
 In this chapter, I will discuss how critical teams use sensemaking principles to 
enhance the quality of their work during the production phase. I will explore how critical 
teams engage in three types of sensemaking. First, I will discuss the concept of situational 
awareness, which is a form of sensemaking that is widely prescribed in critical team 
training. Second, I will examine how teams learn by sharing and making sense of 
narratives related to their work. Third, I will explore the debriefing process in which 
teams engage in retrospective sensemaking to synthesize the details of a just-past event. 
This last section will include an examination of the debriefing process in scenario-based 
training as well. Then, I will summarize the findings of this chapter on sensemaking and 
the debriefing process. 
Situational Awareness: Making Sense of Surroundings  
Along with experience and communicative decision making, situational 
awareness is considered by critical team members to be one of the key outcomes of 
training. To be situationally aware is to perceive elements in the environment defined by 
a volume and space, to comprehend their meaning, and to have the capacity to project 
their status in the near future (Endsley 1987, 1988, 1995a, 1995b). It has been recognized 
as a crucial component of flight crews as far back as World War I (Press, 1986). As 
Endsley (1995b) explains, situational awareness is especially critical for critical teams 
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because of the dynamism of their environments as well as the potentially catastrophic 
outcomes: 
Firefighters, certain police units, and military command personnel rely on SA to 
make their decisions. They must ascertain the critical features in widely varying 
situations to determine the best course of action. Inaccurate or incomplete SA in 
these environments can lead to devastating loss of life. (p. 33) 
It has been argued that the main challenge of critical team work is in fact having good 
situational awareness and being able to recognize decisions and their variables (Endsley 
1995b, Kaempf et al., 1993). 
 How is situational awareness different than sensemaking? After all, sensemaking 
has been defined as a way to “comprehend, understand, explain, attribute, extrapolate, 
and predict” (Starbuck & Milliken, 1988, p. 51). This sounds very close to the definition 
of situational awareness by Endsley (1995b), in which one perceives, comprehends, and 
projects. I argue that situational awareness is a form of sensemaking that is both focused 
and unfocused at the same time. What I mean by this is that one must focus on relevant 
tasks and situational elements, but not to the point where other elements may go 
“unsensed.” This idea is exemplified by a quote from Spencer, a firefighter: 
One of the big things they teach is to use situation awareness, which is very broad 
idea. The idea of situational awareness is that you kind of like don’t want your 
head to get lost in the fog, or you don’t totally focus on exactly on what you’re 
doing, but you want a general idea of like: okay I know the car is right there, the 
person is right here, there’s um, a propane tank over there. 
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Therefore, to be situationally aware, one must not just “focus on exactly what you’re 
doing.” There is no specification of sensemaking to say that it is always focused on all 
situational elements; a person could conceivably engage in sensemaking of a task while 
being unaware of surroundings. However, situational awareness is a process that requires 
simultaneously focusing on the task at hand and perceiving, comprehending, and 
projecting the statuses of relevant situational elements. In some sense, it requires 
unfocusing on the task at hand.  Consider this explanation from Larry, a retired 
smokejumper: 
In any big fire, there’s going to be retardant bombers that are coming in from 
some direction and dropping retardant, which is essentially wet cement. When it 
hits the ground, it’s cold and sometimes it’s heavy muddy stuff. And if it hits you 
it could knock you—it could kill ya. So what do you do to make sure you’re not 
in the path of that, but you know, you’re fighting the fire, and every so often a 
plane goes by and drops this shit on you. And so you have to be very situationally 
aware and know what you’re supposed to do. In this case, what you’re supposed 
to do is get behind a big tree, face the direction the plane is coming, lay down 
with your helmet pointed at the plane, so that if some of this horrible stuff hits 
you, it doesn’t crush your skull. 
In this situation, a person could be so focused on making sense of the firefighting aspect 
of the job that they overlook the other elements, including the retardant bombers. This is 
why situational awareness, as a more unfocused form of sensemaking, is highly necessary 
in critical team work. 
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Wildland firefighters were most vocal about their training being focused on 
situational awareness. Kelly said that the term comes up in “your first ever class in the 
forest service.” She said that they cover situational awareness because most fatality fires 
result from a chain of events that could have been broken with stronger awareness of both 
environmental and teamwork elements, such as weather, fire behavior, terrain, and 
communication patterns. Kelly said they use the phrase “Is your SA up?” as a reminder to 
perceive and comprehend surroundings, and that being able to demonstrate situational 
awareness (e.g., pointing out important details) will give someone more credibility that 
rank during a debrief. Kim said being situationally aware is “a huge thing” in wildland 
firefighting, especially in leadership—because the situation should guide actions. She 
said that training is critical in developing this concept. For example, Kim talked about 
how tabletop simulations gives team members the opportunity to see scenarios from 
multiple viewpoints, and she implied that this helps build awareness: 
You can kind of see it from a different perspective of, well, if the fires over here 
and this is the access road, and you have, you know, houses over here, and this is 
where you are, you know, what do you do? Or where would you put a look out? 
This highlights one of the unique aspects of situational awareness: it is a highly spatial 
concept, and having a better understanding of space is useful for determining which 
aspects of the environment are critical and which are not (Endsley, 1995). Kim implied 
that she gained an understanding of different spatial perspectives in with the use of 
sandbox simulations, which is critical to her awareness during events. This demonstrates 
how training is often focused on developing on situational awareness. 
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 Spencer said that the concept of situational awareness was “hammered” into them 
during his firefighter training. Trainees in Spencer’s program, and in others, were 
constantly reminded to be mindful of environmental elements while working on 
particular tasks, “whether it be the weather, or the behavior of the fire, or the terrain, or 
the fuel type, or you know, the people you have with you, what their training level is, 
what their experience is” (Kim, Wildland Firefighter). The firefighters who led his 
training program were very conspicuous about the point of such drills, and they told 
trainees that situational awareness was the goal. In particular, Spencer learned that it’s 
now what they are teaching you to be aware of, but how they are teaching you to be 
aware of it that was important: “Yes, it’s important to know where the bag [with the 
firefighting tools] is, but the general idea that they’re teaching you to be successful is that 
you need to be aware of everything that is going on.” Mac’s comment about training was 
that the reason firefighters train so much is to be prepared for the situations that they have 
not been trained for; Spencer echoed this statement by saying that “you can’t train for 
that exact situation when you are thrown into an unpredictable situation…but you’ve 
trained yourself to be aware.” One of the benefits of situational awareness is that decision 
making and improvisational processes are improved when variables are accurately 
assessed. By training their members to be aware, organizations that support critical teams 
train them to be better decision makers and improvisers.  
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Summary 
 In this section, I have argued that situational awareness is a form of sensemaking 
that is particularly important to critical team members. This is because it involves both 
focusing on the task at hand and being aware of situational elements. As a concept, it is 
promoted heavily by organizations in training as a tool that members should use to make 
sense of their surroundings. While good situational awareness does not guarantee good 
performance (Endsley, 1995b), it increases the chances that critical team members will 
make good decisions in unpredictable circumstances.  
Sensemaking and Organizational Narratives 
Another way that critical teams use sensemaking to improve their decision 
processes is by making sense of organizational stories. This is a form of narrative 
rationality (Fisher, 1970; Browning, 1992) that helps shape future decisions and 
protocols. As Boje (1991) explains: “Stories are to the storytelling system what precedent 
cases are to the judicial system” (p. 106). In the same way, stories serve as precedent for 
actions among critical team members. 
The temporal coupling of sensemaking and decision making is different for 
narrative learning than it is for situational awareness.  In this case, sensemaking and 
decision making are loosely coupled, meaning that the process of sensemaking is 
separated temporally from the decision making processes it will eventually impact. In the 
case of situational awareness, sensemaking and decision making are tightly coupled, 
meaning that critical team members make sense of what happened moments ago to make 
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a decision moments from now. Both types of sensemaking contribute to decision making, 
with situational awareness as a way to perceive variables, and narrative learning as a 
form of surrogate experience for members. 
When telling me a story about fighting a fire in Alaska, Larry, a retired 
smokejumper, mentioned how important it was to make sense of past disasters when 
making decisions. Specifically, Larry referenced the Mann Gulch disaster, a story that 
has an indelible place in organizational communication research, in which 13 firefighters 
died in part because of poor decision making. In Alaska, Larry said his department 
dropped “24 of us” on a fire, and they realized that they were majorly undermanned to 
fight the now 100-acre fire by the time they hit the ground. Larry described the spread of 
the fire as “a fast walk in all directions:” “so we simply looked at the fire and said ‘no 
way are the 24 of us going to put this fire out.’” The crew members knew that they were 
in severe danger, so they had to act quickly. They looked around for the safest place and 
saw a snowfield on top of a small hill five miles away. They ran, with their gear, straight 
to the field, “and when they came to get us three days later, that fire was probably 
200,000 acres and still growing!” Larry pointed to learning about the Mann Gulch 
disaster in training as a critical factor in his crew’s decision to run: 
Basically what happened [at Mann Gulch] was, they hit the ground, decided to 
fight it, and the fire was running too fast and they had landed in the wrong place 
and the fire was coming up the hill towards them, and they couldn’t run uphill and 
they couldn’t run downhill fast enough to get away from the fire and seven (sic) 
guys lost their lives. And that’s a place where training should have said: run 
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sooner, run sideways, don’t try to run uphill because you can’t outrun a fire 
uphill, you might be able to get out of its way if you run sideways. 
In part because Larry’s team leaders had previously spent time making sense of the Mann 
Gulch disaster, they made the right decisions in Alaska. And because the crew members 
had become familiar with the disaster during their training, they knew which actions 
seemed like the right ones—or more accurately, they were familiar with the wrong ones. 
This is an example of how making sense of organizational stories can help critical teams 
avoid mistakes in their work. 
 Narrative learning also exists within the artifacts of organizations that support 
critical teams. Trent talked about a notebook in the ski patrol locker room in which 
important information about that day’s events are written. The notebook is designed for 
people who were not able to attend the debrief that day, and it includes both technical 
information that all patrollers on the mountain should know (e.g., a part of a certain ski 
run has had multiple accidents), as well as stories that patrollers can learn from (e.g., we 
had Situation X and we handled it in this way—here was the outcome). This is consistent 
with the notion that teams can engage in cognitive shadowing (Mendonça, Beroggi & 
Wallace, 2003) by reviewing logs.  Trent notes that the book has been around for a long 
time: “It’s called Chalkboard News (laughs). The patrol’s been around since ’64. There’s 
a lot of cool history. I do not know the origins but it’s called Chalkboard News. It’s 
literally a spiral notebook sitting on the table.” The notebook incudes reports of accidents 
and fatalities, and it serves as a physical repository of “precedent” for ski patrollers to 
access. Much like the Latin phrase, Mortui vivos docent, on the coffee cups at the fire 
 160 
station, the notebook is an artifact of the way in which organizations encourage their 
members to learn from past narratives. 
Another way that members learn from stories is through the embedding of real-
life scenarios into training. Many organizations teach new members by packaging 
previous experiences as learning opportunities in what is often referred to as Scenario-
based Training (SBT). In SBT, scenarios can be culled from many resources, including 
textbooks. However, Kristen, who works both as an EMT and as an instructor for 
aspiring EMTs, noted that most instructors use stories from their own careers: 
As instructors, we try to teach them how to get experience. And basically, we do 
that through scenario-based education… you just try to paint the picture by just 
giving them scenarios. You know, there’s plenty of educational books that will 
give you scenarios, but a lot of instructors will try to pull from their experiences. 
In this way, stories are used to build the decision making frameworks of new members in 
a structurational pattern (Giddens, 1984). This is an example of the iterative relationship 
between technical and narrative rationality in critical teams (Browning, 1992; Eisenberg 
et al., 2005). 
Kristen’s assessment of stories as a source of training structure is supported by 
my observations of a bomb squad’s weekly simulations. This particular squad performs 
hands-on simulations every Wednesday morning, and it generally bases their simulations 
on recent real-life scenarios.  On one Wednesday I spent with the team, they were 
replicating a series of church bombings in the South. The training facilitator took me out 
before the rest of the team to place the improvised explosive device in a delivery package 
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and to place it near the back door of “The Parachute Hangar of Christ.” This “church” 
was actually a dilapidated World War II parachute hangar on the grounds of a defunct Air 
Force base where the bomb squad trains. Then, when the rest of the team arrived, the 
facilitator explained the value of this scenario to them (i.e., why a church bombing is 
unique and why they are training on it now), and then let them go to work. He also played 
the role of preacher to give them a witness to talk to. This shows how an immersive form 
of SBT can include learning from narratives, even when the narrative is an amalgamation 
of others. 
Implementing stories into training and simulation is a way to combine the effects 
of narrative and experiential learning. Regarding the use of stories in SBT, Sgt. Carey, 
head of the bomb squad, explained that being familiar with relevant national and regional 
events is critical to the squad’s work because there are trends in the variables involved in 
IED events. This idea was supported by a SWAT teams’ use of recent events in their 
training as well. Using stories is an effective way to create a dual learning process in SBT 
and simulations. 
Summary 
Critical teams make sense of organizational stories as a way to improve decision 
processes. This is a form of narrative rationality (Fisher, 1970; Browning, 1992) in that 
stories serve as guides for future decisions and actions. Numerous interviewees 
mentioned the value of making sense of past disasters so that they are not repeated. This 
is how the “dead teach the living” for critical teams. Narrative learning also exists within 
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artifacts of organizations as well as in scenario-based training, both of which are 
examples of the continual relationship between technical and narrative rationality in 
critical team work.  
Time for Retrospective Sensemaking: Debriefs 
In the nested phase model (Ishak & Ballard, 2012), we highlighted two phases as 
being of special interest to team communication scholars. These two phases, simulation 
and adaptation, have been explored in the Chapters 5 and 6 as incubators of experience 
and communicative decision making, respectively. Earlier in this chapter, I discussed 
sensemaking as the third desired outcome of critical team training. The stage that 
corresponds with this outcome is actually a subphase of a larger phase (preparation). In 
this section, I will discuss how the debriefing process—a subphase of preparation—is a 
time for retrospective sensemaking. 
It may seem counterfactual to say that an activity coming after action is a part of 
the preparation phase, as I am arguing with the debriefing process. However, it is 
important to note that the work of critical teams is marked by finality. In other words, 
anything that happens after the end of the event has literally no effect on the event itself. 
It simply cannot have an effect because the event is over. Therefore, debriefing about an 
event is, instead, a form of preparation for events that follow. That is why I am 
categorizing the debrief process as a component of the preparation phase of the nested 
phase model.  
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This does not mean debriefs are inessential to critical teams; in fact, the opposite 
is true. Debriefs are necessary because critical teams often cannot stop during events to 
discuss how to make sense of what is happening. Debriefs help transform experiences 
into learning opportunities (Proctor & Gubler, 2001) by having members engage in 
retrospective sensemaking. Here, the coupling between sensemaking and decision 
making falls in between that of organizational narratives and situational awareness. 
Organizational narratives demonstrate a loose coupling between sensemaking and 
decision making, and situational awareness is marked by tight coupling. Debriefs 
demonstrate coupling that is as loose as the time between one event to the next.  
Also, I should note that it may seem redundant to add the modifier retrospective 
in front of sensemaking. This is because, as Weick and colleagues (2005) argue, all 
sensemaking is retrospective, even sensemaking that happens in the heat of the moment. 
As support, Paget (1988) argues that an act can only be seen as a mistake after it is made. 
However, this is where I believe the coupling of sensemaking and decision making to be 
a salient relational variable. When sensemaking is enacted as situational awareness, the 
one making sense of the situation is doing so in order to take almost simultaneous action. 
Weick and colleagues (2005) explain tight coupling of the two processes: “If the first 
question of sensemaking is ‘what’s going on here?,’ the second, equally important 
question is ‘what do I do next?’’ (p. 412). This demonstrates how situational awareness is 
equally concerned with the past/present and future. However, sensemaking in a debrief 
session does not ask the second question literally, or immediately, because the time for 
action has finished. This is a unique feature of action teams, in that they can really only 
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take critical action during the production phase. If the first question of sensemaking in 
debriefing is “what happened here?,” the second question is “what do I do next time?” In 
this way, sensemaking during debriefing sessions deserves the retrospective modifier 
because it is more concerned with the past (and to a lesser extent, the future) than the 
present. 
Debriefs play out in variety of ways. On one hand, SWAT teams and bomb 
squads generally have formal reviews in which certain questions are mandated and 
interpretations are recorded for posterity. On the other hand, most members of fire teams 
said that they only have serious debrief processes after a non-routine or casualty event. 
Kelly described debriefs as “a way for people to come together and look at something 
that has happened to make things better without pointing fingers at people.” This is the 
essence of the debrief process for most teams. 
Some fire crews and tactical teams use something called an after-action review 
(AAR), a process designed by the U.S. Army to enable soldiers to discover “for 
themselves” what happened during an event, why it happened, and how they can improve 
their work (U.S. Army, 1993, p. 1). AARs were initially designed to play out in a formal 
manner and provide three things: 1) insights into strengths and weaknesses from various 
perspectives, 2) insights critical to training, and 3) details that may not be found in 
evaluation reports (U.S. Army, 1993). Kelly said that her wildland crew uses the AAR 
process, but it is not always formalized. When it is formalized, everyone must speak and 
there are certain questions and details that must be covered. When it is not formalized, 
there is less structure. Kelly said team leaders use the informal AAR on smaller or routine 
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fires. This distinction was echoed by Trent, who said that his ski patrol unit has an end-
of-day meeting that can be as short as a few minutes or as long as 30 (with recordings in 
the Chalkboard News notebook), depending on what had happened that day.  
 Teams debrief because there is always something to be learned from critical 
events—or in the words of Lt. Denton of the SWAT team: “The day we have a perfect 
callout, I’ll turn in my shit and leave.” Lt. Denton’s statement was a response to why his 
team has debriefing sessions after each callout. He explained that debriefing is a process 
that helps his team members get better by analyzing their actions as well as the team’s. 
This fits Dismukes, Gaba, and Howard’s (2006) argument for the value of debriefs: 
For trainees to become true experts and to continue their professional growth 
beyond formal training, they must also develop subtle metacognitive skills. 
Among these skills is the ability to critically analyze one’s own performance 
retrospectively—not just what went well and what went wrong, but why it went 
that way (p 23). 
Dismukes and colleagues’ statement that trainees must develop metacognitive skills to 
continue the learning process beyond formal training is exemplified in action by what I 
observed during a SWAT team simulation debrief. After 30 minutes of simulation 
exercises, the team gathered around the truck for discussion. Without being prompted, a 
newer team member pointed out his own mistake during the simulation and explained 
what he could have done differently. Another member then chimed in with another 
potential strategy based on something he had read about a SWAT team in California. 
This interaction demonstrated to me that open, honest criticism was the norm with this 
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team, especially self-criticism and analysis. As Lt. Denton told me: “Typically they’ll 
dime themselves out beforehand” when people make a mistake. The goal of debriefs is to 
make sense of the situation by organizing, comparing, evaluating, and analyzing (Raths, 
1987), and to understand how the experience can improve future processes. 
Debriefs in Simulations 
 Debriefs do not only occur after real events.  Organizations also use debriefs after 
simulations as a site for organizational and member learning (Lederman, 1984; Petranek, 
Corey, & Black, 1992; Savoldelli et al., 2006). Much of the literature on simulation 
debriefs argues that they are essential to the training process. Debriefing after simulations 
is a reflective method of learning (Lederman, 1984) through which the student absorbs 
information and “makes sense” out of experiences by mutual sharing of ideas with 
teammates (Petranek et al., 1992). Simulated crisis training offers less benefit to medical 
trainees if they do not include constructive debriefing afterwards (Dine et al., 2008; 
Savoldelli et al., 2006). And Harry (1971) simply said: “a post-game discussion is 
necessary for maximum effectiveness of any simulation game.” Despite all this, the 
debriefing process during simulation-based education has been understudied and 
underused (Savoldelli et al., 2006).  
By reviewing actions after a simulation, team members can focus on areas for 
improvement and make connections between classroom and hands-on learning. 
Sometimes trainees are told what they have done wrong. Sarah said her medical training 
facilitator gave her “a lot of input” on how she “handled things” in a one-way 
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conversation during her skills update day. In other cases, trainees are asked to do the 
reflecting on their own. Mac said that a particularly grueling fire simulation was followed 
by a period of reflecting on why things went wrong: 
They'll say: okay this scenario's over. Everybody come out. Alright, everybody 
failed, and this is what happened. You ran out of air, you didn't report, you spent 
too long trying to get through here, you know, you didn't handle the stress well, 
you freaked out, and you kinda forgot all your training. Why did this happen? 
By asking Mac and his teammates to reflect on why something happened—not just that it 
did happen—the training facilitators are pushing them to practice making sense of their 
environment, their actions, and other variables in the scenario. This is something I 
noticed in a bomb squad’s simulation debrief as well. After disarming the mock 
explosive, the team went over to the site of the disarming and scanned the area for the 
detonator, the explosive itself, and other evidence. Sgt. Carey asked questions of 
Michael, the newest member of the team: “Why do you think the grenade ended up over 
there?” and “What should you do with it now?” There was not necessarily one right 
answer to each question. These questions were designed to elicit Michael’s critical 
thinking skills in a communicative environment, encouraging a thoughtful sensemaking 
process next time Michael has a role in the disarming.  
Summary 
The debriefing process is a form of retrospective sensemaking in which teams ask 
two questions: “what happened here?,” and “what will we do next time?” Teams run 
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debriefs in a variety of ways, including the after-action review, which is a formalized 
process adapted from the U.S. Army. Debriefing comes after events and is technically 
part of the preparation phase because it occurs after the finality of critical team work. It is 
a valuable process in that it helps transform experiences into learning opportunities 
(Proctor & Gubler, 2001) and it allows a temporal space for discussion about what 
happened, what it means, and what should be changed for the future. Dismukes and 
colleagues (2006) argue that trainees should develop metacognitive skills so that debriefs 
serve as reflective learning processes.  This includes debriefing after simulations, in 
which members can practice making sense of the environment, actions, and other 
variables to help improve their work going forward. 
Chapter 7 Summary  
In this chapter, I have explored sensemaking as a major outcome of critical team 
training, as well as the debrief process, a time for teams to engage in retrospective 
sensemaking. I examined the concept of situational awareness, which is a form of 
sensemaking tightly coupled with decision making. Situational awareness requires 
unfocusing, in that attention should be paid not only to the task at hand, but to all 
situational variables. I also discussed how organizations that support critical teams 
encourage the concept of “the dead teach the living,” which is to say that teams should 
make sense of organizational narratives to improve their own processes. Then, I explored 
how the debrief process allows for retrospective sensemaking of events. 
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In the next chapter, I will introduce a model that examines the interaction between 
critical-interactive phases of critical team work—simulation, adaptation, and 
debriefing—and training outcomes: experience making, decision making, and 
sensemaking. I will also explore how phases are constructed to support other phases in 
the process of critical teams, as well as examine a structurational perspective on 
improvisation. In addition, I will introduce an adapted theory of critical team experience. 
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CHAPTER 8 – IMPROVISATION: TEAMS, TIMES, AND 
TRAINING OUTCOMES 
 In this chapter, I explore the contributions of present research project to the fields 
of organizational communication, team communication, and chronemics. I do this in part 
to satisfy the qualifications of a well-constructed study (Richardson, 2000). The central 
purpose of this study was to answer the following question: Are critical teams primed and 
prepared to deal with improvisation by their parent organizations, and if so, how? I 
believe the analysis of this study creates a useful middle range theory of improvisation 
planning in critical team work (Charmaz, 2000; Glaser & Strauss, 1967), the purpose of 
which is to explain a set of communication practices to a limited range of data (Weick, 
1974). Diagrams and models can serve as a “possibly helpful way of generating concepts 
from what otherwise might be a chaos of data” (Bryant and Charmaz, 2007, p. 24). 
Therefore, I introduce the Critical-Action-Response Training Outcomes Grid, or 
CARTOG, which is designed to help scholars understand how the three main outcomes 
of critical team training—experience making, communicative decision making, and 
sensemaking—interact with each of the three critical team-specific phases discussed in 
Chapters Five through Seven (the name comes from the idea that the grid can apply to 
critical, action, and response teams). These interactions are theoretically valuable because 
well-constructed grounded theory elucidates relationships between various internal 
elements of the theory (Kearney, 2007). Each of these interactions is helpful when 
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implementing the structured yet flexible roadmap-style approach for critical teams 
explored in Chapter Four.  
 In the following sections, I will explain CARTOG, a grid designed to show how 
the main outcomes of critical team training are present in various phases. Next, I will 
introduce an adapted theory of critical team experience based on the three main 
outcomes. Then, I will explicate these concepts by taking a structurational perspective 
(Giddens, 1984) on improvisation. This is followed by practical training 
recommendations, implications for researchers, limitations, and future directions for 
research.  However, because the data and models in this study use the nested phase model 
as a framework (Ishak & Ballard, 2012), I will first highlight three phases, explain how 
debriefing fits into the nested phase model, and summarize how certain phases are used 
overtly by critical teams to support others. 
Highlighting Critical-Interactive Phases, Including Debriefs 
The meaning of an activity that takes place in a particular moment must be 
considered within the context of other timescales (Streeck & Jordan, 2009). This is the 
basis of the nested phase model, which posits that that nested timescales (van Orden and 
Holden, 2002) are of high importance to the process of action teams, including those in 
critical teams. In the case of the nested phase model, the action/transition setup of the 
recurring phase model (Marks et al., 2001) is nested within itself to contextualize action 
and transition phases within larger phases of action and transition. And although infinite 
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nesting of phases is both possible and intriguing, we used a single nesting to create four 
distinct phases as shown in Figure 2 (Ishak & Ballard, 2012). 
 There are three features of the nested phase model that are especially salient for 
the purposes of this section. First, the production phase is where critical teams do the 
work they are paid to do (e.g., put out fires, apprehend suspects, perform surgeries). 
Second, simulation, preparation, and adaptation phases all exist to support the production 
phase, because success for critical teams is generally measured by what happens during 
production. Third, production phases are marked by finality: once they are over, they 
cannot be redone in any way. 
I highlight these three features because the emergence of debriefs as an essential 
activity in this study is problematic for the nested phase model. They are not part of the 
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production phase because they occur directly after events, and the end of an event is 
marked by finality. In addition, they are not part of the adaptation phase because there is 
no event left to adapt for, and they are logically not part of the simulation phase.  
I argue that a debrief session acts as a firm start to the next preparation phase, 
which in turn is used to support the following production phase.  The work of critical 
teams is marked by cycles (Ishak & Ballard, 2012; Marks et al., 2001; also see Ancona & 
Chong, 1996 and Ballard, 2009 for more about cycles). In some sense, debriefs act as 
links between phase cycles; they connect the end of one event to preparation for the next 
one. The critical use of debriefs is that they are used to identify potential organizational 
learning opportunities based on the particulars of just-past events (Proctor & Gubler, 
2001). In addition, discussing thought processes after non-routine events can lead to 
improvements in training for decision making for those situations. (Edelson et al., 2008). 
Therefore, what is discussed in a debrief may end up is likely to end up future training 
activities as well as real-life event decisions. In this way, the debrief session is used to 
support the other phases. 
I argue that the debrief subphase, along with simulation and adaptation, are phases 
of particular importance to critical team scholarship, highlighting them here as critical-
interactive phases. I use this term to say that they are specific to action and critical teams, 
and they are specifically used to engage in interaction as a valued component of team 
process.  
If the production phase is the only phase that “counts” for action teams, including 
critical teams, why highlight three other components of team process? Essentially, it is 
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the ways in which certain phases are used to support other phases that makes the process 
of action teams so rich as concept. Simulations exist only to help teams be better in the 
production phase. Adaptations exist because something in the current production phase 
needs to be determined, corrected, or continued. Debriefs exist so that teams can gain a 
better understanding of how they work in events for the next production phase. Of 
additional interest to communication scholars is that each of these phases is defined by 
team communication: simulations are opportunities to familiarize with interaction, 
adaptations are chances to deliberate as a team, and debriefs are used for teams to review 
their actions together. In this way, they are forms of communication used to support 
action. 
In the next section, I explicate paths of phase support as a useful concept in 
understanding the process of critical teams. And even though I argue that debriefs are 
contained within the preparation phase, I think it is useful to show debriefs as a subphase 
from a diagrammatic perspective. This is in order to better understand the implications of 
debriefing for critical teams. In Figure 3, I demonstrate the paths of phase support. 
Because part of this research study involves the exploration of the debriefing process, I 
include it in the explication of phase support in order to further understanding of this 
important communicative activity.  
Paths of Phase Support 
 I offer a qualitative model of phase support in order to better understand the 
processes of critical teams. In this model, I demonstrate how each phase of the nested 
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phase model (Ishak & Ballard, 2012), as well as the debrief subphase, supports the others. 
To determine paths of support, I examine the process of critical teams by asking: which 
other phases is this phase designed to support? 
 The most obvious form of phase support is that which preparation provides to 
three other phases. First, the preparation phase exists for support of the production phase, 
a connection that has been made previously (Ishak & Ballard, 2012). Second, the 
preparation phase is used to improve upcoming simulations. Mac, a firefighter, said that 
full-scale or functional simulations take “considerable pre-planning.” Mac said that his 
department’s quarterly full-scale exercise with other departments in the area are “usually 
much better than our usual weekly trainings because there’s so much preparation put into 
them, so they’re real thought out, they’re efficient. They’re actually very, very good.” 
This demonstrates how preparing for simulations can increase their effectiveness.  Third, 
adaptations are prepared for by familiarizing members with teammates and discursive 
decision structures. 
The simulation phase also supports three phases: production, adaptation, and 
debriefing. Simulations are used to support the production phase by increasing member 
experience, familiarity, and decision making abilities. They are used to support 
adaptations by practicing and developing skills related to decision making and 
communication. In addition, although teams I observed did not simulate the debriefing 
process that is used after real events, they did engage in simulation debriefs. This creates 
the expectation that members will discuss their actions, thus supporting the debriefing 
phase. 
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Production and adaptation are more focused in the phases they support. The 
production phase is not used to support other phases, at least overtly. This is because the 
production phase is most time-limited and most important—it is the celebrity of critical 
team phases. The focus must be on the phase itself.  The adaptation phase is used solely 
to support the production phase, also because of its time-limited nature 
Debriefs support all four main phases of the nested phase model in some way. 
They are used to support preparation and simulation phases by establishing the ways in 
which critical teams need to prepare for and simulation future events. Debriefs support 
production phases by calcifying just-past experiences as inputs for future experiences. 
Lastly, the debriefing process supports future adaptations because a review of decisions 
during a debriefing may lead to different decisions the next time.  
I have mentioned the ways in which certain phases support others in the process 
of critical teams because an understanding of these relationships will help in interpreting 
the value of the model that I introduce in the next section. 
 Critical/Action Response Training Outcomes Grid 
 In this section, I introduce the Critical/Action/Response Training Outcomes Grid 
(CARTOG) and its components. CARTOG is designed to help scholars understand how 
the three main outcomes of critical team training (experience, communicative decision 
making, and sensemaking) are utilized within the three critical team-specific phases 
(simulations, adaptations, and debriefings).  All nine interactions created in CARTOG act 
as forms of structure while concomitantly creating avenues for improvisation for critical 
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teams.  Therefore, these interactions are valuable in implementing the structured yet 
flexible roadmap-style approach discussed in Chapter Four.  
To be clear, the true main outcome of training is to make critical team members 
better at their jobs, which is to say that organizations train teams to be better at taskwork 
and team process within the confines of the production phase. Organizations want 
members to be experienced so they know how to do things. They want them to make 
sense of their surroundings to avoid catastrophic decisions. And they want them to 
engage in communicative decision making so that decisions are as effective as possible.   
What makes CARTOG valuable, then, is the fact that training outcomes designed to 
make members more effective in support phases eventually have an effect on the 
production phase. Consider that a team may not have the time or available channels to 
consult with its parent organization by the time it is engaged in a production phase. In 
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addition, by the time a team is in a production phase, there is generally no time to 
develop decision heuristics or create communication patterns from scratch. I argue that 
most of the legwork of critical teams is completed by the organization in the support 
phases, much in the same way one might argue that most of the legwork of parenting is 
completed before children find themselves in “non-routine” events (e.g., they are offered 
illicit drugs at school). With regards to critical team training, each phase supports 
production, so how the training outcomes affect each phase matters.   
 In the following sections, I define each of the three main training outcomes and 
explain their status within each of the three critical-interactive phases. Then, I discuss 
how the three outcomes interact with each other. 
Experience 
 I define experience for critical teams as involved familiarity. This means that one 
must participate to gain experience, as opposed to simply being exposed to something. 
Experience is a unique conceptual term in the process of critical teams because it plays 
multiple roles. Members engage in simulations to gain experience—or to “get 
experienced” (adjective), in the words of an EMT training facilitator. In adaptations, 
members draw upon their experience (noun) to make decisions. In the debrief process, 
members ask: “what did we experience?” (verb). I will discuss the role experience in 
each of these three phases. 
Simulations are a time for becoming experienced. Simulations are a kind of 
temporal workaround for critical teams in that they allow organizations to get their 
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members experienced without exposing them to the risk and responsibility of production 
phases. The existence of simulations constitutes a reaction to the finality and epochality 
of critical team work (Ishak & Ballard, 2012). Simulations are used to familiarize 
members with situational environments and variables (Aggarwal et al., 2004), and to 
instill and maintain procedural memory (Moorman & Miner, 1998) in members.  
Simulations cannot perfectly replicate experience that would be gained during a 
production phase. Nancy, an ER physician, said that real events have more stress but less 
direct critique than simulations. Speaking about a recent simulation, she said that 
knowing she was being videotaped and critiqued made her act differently than she would 
during a real event.  This is a drawback of simulations and something I will discuss in the 
Limitations and Future Directions section in this chapter.  
 Adaptation is a time to use experience as a framework for decisions. During the 
adaptation phase, a member may draw on the structure of past experiences when making 
an individual decision or when engaging in communicative decision making. By doing 
so, a member calls on procedural memory. Alternatively, a member may use their 
experience as a form of confidence in deciding to improvise. Experience is the basis for 
improvisation, as “what you already know” is used to “go beyond what you currently 
think” (Bruner, 1983, p. 133). Improvisation is not “making something out of nothing” 
(Berliner, 1994, p. 492); it is always based on some sort of structure, which includes past 
experiences for critical team members.  
Debriefing is a time to consider how to translating experience to future events. By 
this, I mean that debriefs are the cognitive link between just-past event and future events. 
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One must first review decisions and engage in sensemaking—both discussed below—
before understanding how to create value out of a just-past experience. For the next 
production phase, past experiences only matter insomuch as they are used to shape 
actions and decisions. Starbuck and Milliken (1988) argue that people automatically 
consider subsequent events when creating memories of past ones. Therefore, it is how 
experiences are remembered, not what actually happened, that matters. With regards to 
critical teams, members translate and encode the memories of a critical event in 
debriefing while accounting what they expect to happen in the future. This generally 
means that experiences are turned into prototypes (Kaempf et al., 1993) for future events. 
Communicative Decision Making 
Communication decision making is a process by which a member deliberately 
interacts with teammates to draw on their resources, as well as his own and those of the 
teams, in order to improve decision quality. Resources include personal heuristics, 
discursive decision structures, experiences, and situational awarenesses.  While I have 
explicated communicative decision making from the individual perspective to be 
consistent with the other sections, this is a tool whose effectiveness is heavily reliant on 
the participation and quality of one’s teammates. In the following paragraphs, I will 
discuss how communicative decision making comes into play during the three critical-
interactive phases. 
Simulations are a time to develop decision making abilities in a low- to no-risk 
environment. One of the main benefits of scenario-based training is that it provides a 
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space for mental experimentation and formulation of strategic options, which leads to 
increased confidence in decision making (van der Heijden et al., 2002). Decision making 
in real events is stressful and time-limited, and therefore must take place with as little 
drag as possible. This is not the case for simulated decision making, in which options can 
be discussed, explored, projected, and magnified. Put another way, members can explore 
the contexts, variables, and outcomes of a variety of decisions in simulations, whereas 
they can only do so for one in a real event. As van der Heijden and colleagues (2002) 
explain: “The significance of scenario thinking lies in its ability to help overcoming 
thinking limitations by developing multiple futures” (p. 7). Simulations act as a safe 
space for the decision making process. However, due to the explorative nature of 
simulated decision making, it is sometimes carried out more informally than in real 
events (Goodwin and Wright, 2001; Wright, 2005).  
From a teamwork standpoint, practicing communicative decision making fosters 
team trust. Trust between teammates helps limit concerns that might arise from 
improvising during non-routine events. Multiple interviewees, particularly in the 
firefighting field, noted that having consistency of personnel was critical to making 
decisions and acting quickly. By having the same training, members are more likely to be 
able to predict what their teammates will do. Otherwise, “they might be using a different 
decision making process” and respond in an unpredictable way (Larry, Smokejumper). 
One way to promote trust between teammates is to go through certification programs, 
training sessions, and/or simulations together in which decision making skills are 
practiced. Kelly, who leads an elite wildland firefighting crew, said that she prefers when 
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personnel on her hotshot crews remain consistent so that she can trust their decision 
making skills sets. Therefore, practicing decision making together has a positive effect on 
the speed in which decisions are made in real events. 
 Adaptations are a time to make decisions communicatively. They are 
opportunities for members to re-align “onto a previously determined trajectory or to 
discuss coordination onto a new path” (Ishak & Ballard, 2012, p. 19), and they give 
temporal space to team members to determine a strategy that best meets the variables of 
the event (Shafer et al., 2006). While it is possible for members or leaders to make 
decisions without any input from others during the adaptation phase, decision making 
that involves interacting with others is the norm for critical teams; it is also considered 
good practice (Bonito, Decamp, & Ruppel, 2008; Cannon-Bowers, Salas, & Converse, 
2001; Fisher, 1970; Tropman, 1996). This is why I use the term communicative decision 
making, since considering the resources of others in the decision process is one of the 
benefits of working in teams. 
 Debriefs are a time as a team to review the quality of decisions made in the just-
past event. The benefit of hindsight allows members to ask questions about the decision 
process that could not be asked before the effects of the decision played out. In other 
words, now that we know what we know, what do we think about what we thought we 
knew then? Debriefing allows for a review of perceptions and decision techniques, 
whether the results of the event are considered good or bad (Starbuck & Milliken, 1988). 
The review process, along with retrospective sensemaking which I will discuss in the 
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next section, is an input into translating experiences to improve the quality of future 
events. 
Sensemaking 
Simulations are a time for sensemaking prospectively about future events. Wright 
(2005) supports the claim that scenarios can be used for prospective sensemaking, and 
Gioia and colleagues (2002) argues that making sense of the future requires an ability to 
envision the future as if it had already occurred. I believe that simulations can create a 
world in which it is easier to envision future events as having occurred, due to having 
been simulated. And Godet and Roubelat (1996) use the term la prospective to define a 
future oriented attitude that encapsulates making sense of the future: rather than focusing 
on a single future, la prospective is an outlook that is sensitive to relationships and 
phenomena that are really important, as well as a natural attenuation to weak signals. In 
this way, simulations are used to develop a sense of situational awareness, a form of 
sensemaking, for future production phases.  
Adaptations are a time to be situationally aware. Situational awareness is seen by 
critical team members as one of the key elements of their work in being able to 
understand what to do and when to improvise. I argued in Chapter Seven that situational 
awareness is a type of sensemaking that involves unfocusing. This means that a person 
has to simultaneously focus on the task at hand and perceive, comprehend, and project 
the statuses of relevant situational elements. An example from an ER physician shows 
how adaptations can be used to become situationally aware. Nancy talked about a time 
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when she was about to intubate a patient (i.e., remove fluid from a patient via a tube), and 
all of a sudden she forgot how to do what she was doing. She said she froze and could not 
think of what to do next. Carla, her nurse, noticed this and said: “hey, do you want to get 
a bougie?,” which is a long wire used to help in intubating. Nancy said she would have 
forgotten this critical step because “all of a sudden my brain went away.” Nancy said that 
everything went back to normal after that. By talking with her nurse, Nancy was able to 
adapt and regain the situational awareness that she had lost earlier. This demonstrates 
how adaptations can be beneficial with regards to situational awareness.  
Here, in the adaptation phase, I argue that it is wise to leave the retrospective 
modifier off of the sensemaking concept. Weick (1995) says that decision making and 
sensemaking occur in an almost simultaneous fashion, but that people are making 
judgments about the causal relationship, making it retrospective. However, as Wright 
(2005) says about sensemaking: “It is its retrospective nature that results in its practical 
benefits being questioned. For if sensemaking is exclusively retrospective what 
advantage could there be to developing the capacities that comprise it?” (p. 91). 
Therefore, I feel it is valuable to exclude the term retrospective when referring to 
sensemaking that is tightly coupled with decision making, as it is in the adaptation phase. 
Debriefs are a time for sensemaking retrospectively. While Weick and colleagues 
(2005) argue that all sensemaking is retrospective, it is in the debriefing process that 
sensemaking truly looks backward towards decisions made in the previous phases. Here, 
sensemaking is more concerned with the past (and to a lesser extent, the future), than the 
present.  If the first question of sensemaking in debriefing is “what happened here?,” the 
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second question is “what do I do next time?” By sensemaking retrospectively, members 
demonstrate subtle metacognitive skills that help them critically analyze the outcomes of 
their actions and decisions as well as the reasons for the outcomes (Dismukes, Gaba, and 
Howard, 2006). Retrospective sensemaking, when combined with reviewing decisions as 
a team, helps members translate their experiences to improve future events. 
An Adapted Theory of Critical Team Experience 
Here I would like to return to Dewey’s (1938) theory of experience to understand 
how the three main training outcomes are connected to each other. Dewey argued that 
there are two main inputs into present experiences: continuity and interaction. 
Continuity’s effect on present experience is that past experience are accounted for, and 
interaction’s effect is that present experiences are based on situational elements. Dewey 
argued that current experiences are understood as the interaction of these concepts: past 
experiences and situational elements. I believe this can be applied to the three training 
outcomes. 
In addition to the relationship between continuity and interaction, Dewey also 
makes a distinction between primary and secondary experience. Primary experience is a 
gross, crude experience of subject matters, meaning it is based on interaction with 
physical senses, and not a process of reflection (Dewey, 1958).  By contrast, secondary 
experience is the reflection on primary experience; it is a rational process that involves 
making mental sense of the interactions with one’s environment or situation (Dewey, 
1958). In Dewey’s (1958) words, secondary experience comes out of “the intervention of 
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systematic thinking” (p. 4). Dewey (1958) argues that primary and secondary experience 
have a symbiotic relationship with one another. For one, the reflection of secondary 
experience is based on the interactions of primary experience. In addition, the 
sensemaking process of secondary experiences feeds into primary experiences.  
The distinction between primary and secondary experience helps me to explicate 
what I am referring to as experience in this project. Dewey says that the distinction is 
relative, not absolute. Therefore, in some sense, experience (as it is being defined here) 
contains components of primary and secondary experience, meaning that it is both 
physically experienced and mentally reflected upon. It involves doing (decision making 
and/or acting) and sensemaking.  
Dewey (1958) also argues that the distinction is “purely relative to the intellectual 
progress of an individual; what is abstract at one period of growth is concrete at another.” 
To experience something in the primary sense is to experience it concretely, whereas to 
experience something in the secondary sense it to synthesize it in an abstract way. 
Therefore, just as one of the goals of training is to turn the non-routine into the routine, 
one of the goals of experience is to make the abstract (secondary experience) into 
something concrete (primary experience). 
The distinction of primary and secondary experience can also be viewed as 
parallel to the distinction between continuity and interaction.  The more useful 
comparison for the purposes of this argument is that of the latter terms: interaction and 
secondary experience. Dewey’s (1938) concept of interaction is that experiences are 
created by one’s relationship with situational elements in the present. In a similar way, 
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secondary experience involves reflection upon what is happening in the current situation. 
Interaction and secondary experience, then, are both processes of sensemaking, which 
helps teams enact new processes when necessary. 
In summary, Dewey’s (1938, 1958) view of experience lends support to the idea 
that the two goals of critical team training are 1) to turn the routine into the non-routine, 
and 2) to help teams enact new processes when necessary. The concept of continuity 
shows that present experiences are based on those in the past, with abstract (secondary) 
experiences becoming concrete (primary) over time and repetition. The concepts of 
interaction and secondary experience demonstrate a process of critical thinking and/or 
sensemaking that helps teams enact new processes—or improvise—in situations that 
necessitate it. Therefore, Dewey’s perspective on experience in education is inline with 
the data on critical team training gathered and analyzed in this project. 
Based on Dewey’s (1938, 1958) ideas of experience, I put forth an adapted theory 
of critical team experience. In this version, the concepts of continuity and interaction are 
still present, but the inputs have changed. In addition, the output is now actions, 
decisions, and outcomes, which are processed through the way in which teams make 
decisions together. These outputs then become experience and are cyclically fed back 
into experience as an input for future events. 
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In this adapted theory, continuity refers to the idea that past experience has an 
effect on how teams make decisions in the present. Interaction refers to the concept that 
teams make sense of their current situation when making decisions. Experiences and 
sensemaking abilities of team members interact through a process of communicative 
decision making, which leads to team decisions. Experience include past experiences, 
familiarities, and procedural memories. Sensemaking includes what members 
“comprehend, understand, explain, attribute, extrapolate, and predict” (Starbuck & 
Milliken, 1988, p. 51) in the current situation. Communicative decision making is the 
process by which teams move towards decisions, actions, and eventually event outcomes, 
as decisions made have an effect on actions taken and outcomes produced. I believe these 
interactions are theoretically valuable because well-constructed grounded theory 
elucidates relationships between various internal elements of the theory (Kearney, 2007).  
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A Structurational Approach to Improvisation 
I believe there is value in exploring the contributions of this project to the 
dialectical nature of training for improvisation. I believe the middle-range concepts 
explored in the previous section can be contextualized within structuration (Giddens, 
1984). The two complementary components of structuration theory are rules and 
resources.  Rules are seen to constrain behavior and are made up of principles or routines 
that guide human action (Poole and McPhee, 2005). Resources are enablers of behavior, 
comprised of physical and mental elements that people can use in their actions (Poole and 
McPhee, 2005). In organizational communication, the interplay between rules and 
resources is referred to as the “action-structure dialectic” (Conrad & Haynes, 2001, p. 
56). Both action and structure are readily apparent in any understanding of training for 
improvisation by organizations that support critical teams.  
What makes the work of critical teams so intriguing with regards to structuration 
is that many concepts act as both rules and resources at the same time. In other words, 
there are numerous concepts I have discussed in the last five chapters that both constrain 
and enable improvisation. 
For example, experience’s main role is that it acts as structure for current 
decisions for critical team members. This is in line with Dewey’s (1938) 
conceptualization of experience. At the same time, members with more experience are 
given more freedom and autonomy in their decisions, according to interviewees. For 
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example, Kelly said that new members of her fire crew are expected to protocol more 
than more experienced members are. 
Another example is discursive decision structures, such as lists, typologies, and 
god terms, which are seen to constrain the decisions of critical team members. In the case 
of lists, they do this by providing formulas for action that lead to predictable outcomes 
(Browning, 1992). At the same time, because they are minimal structures (Brown & 
Eisenhardt, 1997; Kamoche & Cunha, 2001), they are designed with a certain amount of 
flexibility, sometimes in the form of strategic ambiguity (Eisenberg, 1984).  For example, 
some lists (e.g., LIP, RECEO-VS) provide guidance for top level priorities but allow 
freedom in terms of the procedures used to follow them.  
 The aggregate result of these dualities is that organizations prime, prepare and 
equip their embedded critical teams to take an approach to improvisation that is 
structured and flexible at the same time. Returning to the example of the driving analogy 
in Chapter Four, organizations give their critical team members roadmaps, as opposed to 
detailed single-route directions. They teach them how to read the map, they ask them to 
go on test drives, they show them what to look for, and they have them update the map 
with their own perceptions. They show them the routes that have been proven effective 
and they also show them small detours along the way. Suppose that sections of the fastest 
route are unavailable; organizations give critical team members the freedom to take the 
most logical path in a scenario given the situational elements. When improvising a path, 
critical team members draw partially on the structure of the map, their experiences, and 
other variables, but also on the flexibility of the very same elements. This detailed, single-
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route directions are not appropriate for critical teams. Too little structure makes it 
difficult to improvise because there is nothing to base the improvisation on, but too much 
structure makes it hard to move (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997, p. 29).   
  The roadmap approach is further explicated by the thoughts of two interviewees, 
Kim and Miguel, on the interplay between structure and flexibility in their work.  I would 
describe Kim, a wildland firefighter, and Miguel, an ER physician’s assistant, as the most 
interested and thoughtful interviewees because they continued thinking about meaningful 
constructs well after their interviews ended4. Kim wrote me an email the day after our 
interview expressing thoughts about structure and flexibility, while Miguel surfaced ideas 
during a meal we shared for non-research related reasons. 
 Kim and Miguel explained that improvisation is both constrained and enabled by 
the structure in their work processes. Kim said the structure was a “base line” that 
everyone starts from, and things like experience, personal relationships, and personalities 
“build on that foundation.” Here she explains how the foundational structure in training 
also has a flexible nature: 
I would look at it more as providing structure in how to learn different 
components and what they are, what they mean, what they're gonna do, how it's 
                                                
4 Kim and Miguel’s expressions of interest in these underlying concepts was Throughout the interviews, in 
asking directly about structure and flexibility, I never pushed anyone to give construct-based answers as 
Kim and Miguel offered. Most responses fit one of four prototypes: 1) “I guess we have structure 
sometimes and flexibility other times,” 2) “Structure is there in some components and we can be flexible in 
other components,” 3) “We do what we need to do to get the job done,” or 4) “I don’t know.” I present 
these four statements here in a casual tone because this is how they were spoken to me. It is important to 
note that while some interviewees expressed interest in my research questions from a theoretical standpoint, 
most of them felt like approaching them from a pragmatic perspective, and they were doing so for the 
first—and maybe last—time. To them, the way they work may be complex, but it is matter-of-fact at the 
same time.  
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gonna affect you and your decisions, how they interact with each other, whether 
with fire behavior, or terrain, and those kinds of things. And I think when you put 
it all together and make a decision is where the flexibility comes in, where you 
know, you might not being able to have a structure to tell you what that decision 
is going to be.  
Kim also said that there are common factors in each situation, like communication, 
equipment, and fire behavior, but that no two situations are alike. This demonstrates how 
structure and flexibility are not seen as opposed concepts in the work of critical teams 
Miguel’s perspective on his work as a physician’s assistant was consisted with 
Kim’s thoughts. When assisting on surgeries, he said that and said that 80 percent of his 
work is routine. The flexibility in procedures comes from the details, which will change 
depending on the patient’s symptoms and on the preferences of the physician, or in 
Miguel’s words, “you’re just gonna adjust the minute things:” 
Where (it) is becomes different microscopically is, once you get in there doing the 
case, the construction part of it, is different per patient because, one might have 
more osteophytes (bone spurs), one might have less osteophytes. One might have 
more bone degeneration on the tibia on the medial side, one might have more 
bone degeneration on the lateral side of the tibia. So you have to make 
adjustments in your cuts. 
Miguel also pointed out that the strategically ambiguous wording of the PA Scope of 
Practice—“the physician assistant is allowed to do anything that the doctor deems fit”—
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allows for a large amount of flexibility. This is an example of how critical teams are 
marked by a structured yet flexible approach to their improvisation. 
 The challenge for organizations that wish to promote a structured yet flexible 
approach for their embedded critical teams is that they have to consider each of the three 
training outcomes at each of the three critical-interactive phases described in the 
CARTOG model. Some of these considerations are easier than others. For example, 
becoming experienced is a relatively simple outcome of simulations because simulations 
are usually run for the expressed purpose of building experience. In comparison, 
developing decision making abilities and sensemaking prospectively are outcomes that 
take conscious effort, both by the organization in facilitating the training and by members 
in engagement. By considering each of the nine interactions created in the grid, critical 
team members will be better equipped to handle the unpredictable events that are 
inevitable in their work. 
Training Recommendations 
Based on my observations, findings, and analysis, I detail three practical 
recommendations that may be of interest to those involved in the training of critical 
teams. 
1. Practice timeouts.  If teams ever take time to make decisions as a team during 
real events, they should practice doing so in simulations as well. I noticed that 
teams generally simulate in chunks, meaning that, from time to time, they stop 
to talk about what they are doing in a way that pauses the simulation. This is 
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fine some of the time, but teams should also practice the moments when they 
have to recover when something goes wrong by engaging in team 
deliberation. 
2. Add simpler simulations to the schedule.  The value of scenario-based training 
is being able to practice the skills that are necessary in critical events. In 
addition to regularly-scheduled functional exercises, schedule simpler, shorter 
simulations that allow members to engage team process skills together or 
alone. For example, members can sit together and read through scenarios in 
textbooks and discuss what they would do to develop decision making skills. 
Or, they could work on their communication skills by sitting in different 
rooms and using the radio to work through a simulation. Most mistakes made 
in the work of critical teams have to do with decision making and 
miscommunication, so practicing these skills is of the utmost importance.  
3. Encourage analysis of temporal and communicative aspects of work. One of 
the most common responses to questions I asked in the interview process was: 
“I’ve never really thought about that.” While the job description of most 
critical team members does not include analyzing the conceptual roles of time 
and communication, I feel that consideration of these constructs could help 
some team members gain a deeper and more holistic understanding of their 
work. Specifically, I believe that analysis of temporal and communicative 
aspects of work can help in the processes of situational awareness and 
retrospective sensemaking. 
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4. Consider outside facilitators for simulations. One wildland firefighter noted 
that debriefs are better when run by an outside facilitator because of their 
objectivity. This concept can be applied to simulations as well. I noticed that 
simulations are almost always run by members of the applicable team or 
organization, and many members of tactical teams told me that simulations 
can become unpredictable when run by an outside member. Unpredictability 
is the point, from my perspective. The problem with only using inside 
members is that they have the same mental models as the rest of the team and 
their actions can be predicted, to an extent. Utilizing an outside member—for 
example, a member of a SWAT team from another city, or a retired 
firefighter— from time to time could help in replicating the unpredictability of 
emergency response. This will also help in exploring and developing decision 
making processes. 
5.  
I believe that these simple enhancements of the training process can improve teamwork 
and effectiveness for critical teams.  
Implications for Research 
In addition to the middle range theory and practical recommendations explored in 
this chapter, this study has multiple implications for our understanding of organizational 
communication and improvisation.  
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One important implication of this study is that it strengthens the understanding of 
how teams train for improvisation. Many of the previous studies of team improvisation 
are on improvisational jazz (Berliner, 1994; Nettl, 1974; Weick, 1998). While these 
studies have analogical value for critical teams, there are critical differences between jazz 
groups and critical teams. First, the weight of the outcomes associated with critical teams 
and musical groups are completely different, as people can die if critical teams perform 
poorly. Second, improvised jazz musicians desire to improvise because it part of the 
performance, whereas critical teams only employ improvisation as a means to an end.  
Third, musical groups have different communication patterns than critical teams, 
especially in relation to verbal communication.  Fourth, the skills of emergency 
management are not easily borrowed from other professions (Dynes and Drabek, 1994). 
Fifth, and most important from an organizational communication standpoint, jazz groups 
may exist without organizational context, whereas critical teams are almost always 
trained by a larger organization. For these reasons, this study is valuable as a study of 
bona fide (Putnam & Stohl, 1990) critical teams. 
The question that led me to this study was: do organizations that support critical 
teams encourage or discourage improvisation? The answer is both and neither, which is 
confusing, but here is what I mean: What I found is that they first discourage it. 
Organizations create structure in the actions of their critical team members so that simple 
events are seen as routine events. Then, they try to get members as much experience as 
possible to turn previously non-routine events into routine events. While the non-routine-
to-routine process is well under way, organizations also encourage critical team members 
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to gain a holistic understanding of their work in case they need to deviate from 
procedures. This is how organizations both encourage and discourage improvisation. 
At the same time, this is my—the researcher’s—interpretation of what happens. 
As I mentioned, most interviewees were technical and pragmatic in their responses and 
did not express feelings one way or the other about improvisation. In sum, their response 
to the above question was: we do what makes sense given our experiences and the 
situation. For the most part, they did not look at what they do as improvising or not 
improvising until I brought it up in that way. While it is true that many interviewees 
discussed improvisation, they used the term loosely and sparingly. More salient to them 
was the distinction between routine and non-routine events. 
An implication of this study for chronemics and scholars interested in 
organizational training is the way in which phases interact with training outcomes. This 
study posits that improvisation is a function of experience, sensemaking, and 
communicative decision making. This complements and extends the arguments that 
improvisation involves using knowledge, intuition, or experience to meet the demands of 
the given situation (Mendonça et al., 2001; Crossan & Sorrenti, 1997; Weick, 1998). 
However, there could be a tendency to say that these inputs only occur during events 
themselves. One of the findings of this study is that experience, sensemaking, and 
communicative decision making are functions and features of multiple phases, including 
three critical-interactive phases: simulation, adaptation and debriefing. 
Scholars of organizational training can take note that the three training outcomes 
for improvisation are present in the simulation process. This is where many team 
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members get their first experiences, start to make sense of events, and develop their 
decision making abilities. Therefore, organizational scholars should consider the 
simulations as a multi-faceted input of team effectiveness. 
Chronemic and communication scholars may find value in how each of the three 
critical-interactive phases interacts with training outcomes. These three phases are 
communicative by nature for teams and there is value in understanding their role in the 
process of critical teams. Studies of bona fide simulations are rare, as most studies are 
experimental and take place in aviation and surgery. This study observed and interrogated 
bona fide simulations of multiple types of teams. Studies of adaptations are even rarer, 
and while this project delves into the phase, I look forward to future research on the topic 
as I believe it is ripe for theoretical findings about the value of communication in critical 
teams.  
As for the debriefing process, almost all studies pertaining to the phase have been 
conducted on simulation debriefs. This study illuminated what I think is a fascinating 
activity. Especially when one considers that the work of critical teams is final, meaning 
that it cannot be redone, the fact that most critical teams still take time out of the schedule 
to discuss what has happened is a testament the value of retrospective sensemaking and 
the review of decisions for future events. In simple terms, the debrief is a time to discuss 
what just happened, but when considered within the cyclical, stressful, phase-based 
context of critical team process, it is much more than that. In the next section, I call for 
future studies on the debriefing process as well as other concepts that have sprung from 
this project. 
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Limitations and Future Directions 
I see this study as an early step in a series of research projects dedicated to 
creating understandings of the communicative and temporal processes of action teams, 
specifically critical teams. In addition to the findings of the current project, this study 
points to future directions for the development of organizational and team 
communication research on action team processes. Most of the future directions are borne 
out of the limitations of this project, so I will discuss limitations and future directions 
together in the form of questions for future research projects. 
First, what is actually happening during timeouts and debriefs for critical teams? 
One of the limitations of this study is that most critical teams perform work this is highly 
guarded (e.g., military units), private (e.g., surgical teams), or dangerous (e.g., police 
squads and fire crews).  Therefore, it is hard to get access to those events. In this project, 
I was able to observe some timeouts and debriefs, but most came during simulations. In 
addition, the “real” timeouts and debriefs that I did witness were few and far between. 
This is because the work of critical teams can be fairly mundane most of the time. For 
example, during a 12-hour ride along with a fire station, there were four callouts, and one 
was a false alarm. The other three callouts were for routine traffic (2) and medical (1) 
reasons. Most of the time was spent observing members in the station and conducting 
impromptu interviews with members who were interested in the project. The challenge 
for me may be one of patience, as engaging in enough ride-alongs would eventually 
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result in desired observations. Observing actual timeouts and debriefs would be both 
beneficial and intriguing for this line of research. 
Second, what are the parameters of team deliberation, and what marks the start of 
an adaptation phase? There are two limitations of this study with regards to deliberation 
and the adaptation phase. The first limitation is that it was hard for interviewees to 
express if deliberation occurred at the same time as action. This is one of the challenges 
of phase models, as it can sometimes be hard to delineate where one phase stops and 
another starts. The second limitation is that “timeouts” are sometimes taken for physical 
rest as well, due to the physical demands of the work of critical teams. So if a team takes 
a timeout to rest, and—while resting—discusses plans, can we still say that the team took 
a timeout to adapt? In other words, does the reason they took a timeout matter, or does it 
only matter that they are deliberating? 
Third, how does the concept of team situational awareness play into the processes 
of critical teams? One limitation of this study is that teams and members were often 
muddled together. There were times in the interview process when I had difficulty 
determining if someone was speaking on behalf of the team or simply stating their 
personal opinion--for example, the phrase “you have to improvise.”  To this end, I hope 
to better understand how the concepts discussed in this study are different for teams than 
they are for individual members. One of the critical concepts in this study is 
sensemaking, which is examined from the individual perspective. Weick (1995) explored 
the concept of team sensemaking: “Sensemaking is grounded in both individual and 
social activity…Sense may be in the eye of the beholder, but beholders vote and the 
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majority rules” (Weick, 1995, p. 6). The last part of this quote gets at the idea that 
perceptions of past events are often created together by the team that experienced them. 
So what does that mean for situational awareness? Endsley (1995b) briefly touched on 
the concept of team situational awareness, saying: “Overall team SA can be conceived as 
the degree to which every team member possesses the SA required for his or her 
responsibilities” (p. 39). At the same time, he argues that the overlap of SA requirements 
between team members may serve as an “index of team coordination or human-machine 
interface effectiveness” (p. 39). The concept of shared mental models (Cannon-Bowers et 
al., 2001, Prince & Salas, 1993; Stout, Salas, & Carson, 1994) in critical teams is relevant 
here, and the corresponding literature may serve as a good foundation for a study on team 
situational awareness. 
Fourth, what counts as transferrable experience? Here I would like to use a sports 
analogy that prompted this query. Media members and professional athletes alike often 
argue that Team B will beat Team A in a playoff game or series because they have more 
postseason experience, the idea being that they are more used to big pressure games. 
However, everyone playing in the game is a professional athlete; you cannot get to the 
Super Bowl by winning a high school football game. Therefore, everyone has experience 
playing in pressure packed games against the best opponents. If those games do not count 
for Team A as experience because they are not playoff games, then why would last year’s 
playoff games count for Team B? Some situational variables are different and the 
opponent is obviously different, so why do those experiences count as experience? As it 
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pertains to critical teams, I wonder what makes simulations and past experiences count or 
not count as experience. If a firefighter has experiences from the military, do they count? 
Fifth, on the topic of simulations and experience, does realism matter in 
simulations?  Shapiro and colleagues (2004) did not find that high-fidelity simulations 
improved clinical team performance in emergency departments. In addition, Toups and 
colleagues (2011) explore the concept of zero-fidelity, or non-mimetic, simulations as 
learning opportunities. Zero-fidelity simulations are not designed to mimic concrete 
characteristics, like the heat of a fire or shape of a patient’s body. Instead, they might take 
the shape of a simple video game that uses dots to symbolize people and boxes to 
represent locations. Zero-fidelity simulations have two benefits over those that are high-
fidelity: economy and focus. They are economical because they are simpler to produce, 
and they are designed to limit the focus of teams on one particular skill, such as decision 
making or communication. Toups and colleagues (2011) found that a zero-fidelity video 
game designed to make firefighters share information with each other was treated by 
firefighters as if the teamwork and communication aspects were 100 percent real. In a 
future study, I would like to explore more deeply the concept of simulations that are not 
made to be real, but instead focus on one skill, such as sandbox simulations as a tool for 
developing communication, situational awareness, and/or decision making skills. 
Lastly, how would my conceptions of critical-interactive phases and training 
outcomes be different if I had interviewed every member of a single team? My sample 
was stratified across numerous teams, team types, and roles, and individuals.  While there 
is value in stratification, I would like to examine these concepts again in depth with every 
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node within one single team. In this way, I could focus more on intersubjective meaning 
as opposed to extrasubjective or individual meaning. As a student of team interaction, I 
believe this is an important next step in this line of research. 
Conclusion 
 This study contributes to communication research by exploring how critical team 
members are primed, prepared, and equipped to deal with improvisation by the 
organizations that support them. The data that was collected and analyzed in this project 
were used to create a model of phase support, a model, and an adapted theory of critical 
team experience. The model of phase support illuminates how different phases of critical 
team process are used to support others. CARTOG, a grid designed to show how training 
outcomes can be used at different phases of critical team process, works within the 
context of the structured yet flexible roadmap-style approach to improvisation for critical 
teams. And the theory of critical team experience, adapted from Dewey’s (1938) theory 
of experience, helps to elucidate how experience, sensemaking, and communicative 
decision making play a role in the outcomes of critical teams. 
 This study was successful in answering Putnam and Stohl’s (1990) call for 
research on bona fide teams. They lay out three requirements for group research. First, 
group research should involve the emotional intensity and stress associated with real 
groups.  Because I studied real teams and real critical team members, this requirement 
was satisfied. Critical teams always have something at stake (e.g. human lives, team 
victories), and cannot exist without emotions and stress.  Second, groups should have 
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temporal structures that resemble real life spans.  The temporal structure of real critical 
teams was at the heart of this study. Third, group research should cover a variety of team 
types. This study involved observations of two SWAT teams, one bomb squad, two fire 
crews, and two police units, as well as interviews with wildland firefighters, urban 
firefighters, military members, ER physicians, ER nurses, a ski patroller, and members of 
SWAT teams and bomb squads. While Putnam and Stohl may not have called for 
covering a variety of team types in one study, I believe this project benefits from the 
variety of sites and interviewee types. 
 In conclusion, I would like to point out that they are called critical teams for a 
reason. Dawna Ballard and I (2012) chose the term based on a passage from Cannon-
Bowers and colleagues (2001) in which they say that “critical performance” depends on 
the coordinated activity of teams who “operate in situations where ineffective 
performance can have disastrous consequences” (p. 221). I read this in two ways.  First, 
they are critical teams because their work is critical, meaning that they often make 
decisions and take actions that affect if people live or die. There is no more critical 
outcome than that. Second, they are critical teams because the concept of teamwork is 
imperative in their process. They are not simply collections of physically fit, intelligent, 
experienced individuals. Critical teams must coordinate their efforts to do work that must 
be done in our society, and as a team scholar, those are my motives for this project. 
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